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COURTROOM MISCONDUCT BY PROSECUTORS
AND TRIAL JUDGES
ALBERT W. ALSCHULER*

As courtroom disruption became a national issue in the late
1960's, public attention focused primarily on the conduct of
the criminal defense attorney and his client. ProfessorAlschuler examines the courtroom misconduct of prosecutors and
trialjudges both as it relates to disruptive behavior by defen-

dants and defense attorneys and as it poses a threat in its own
right to the orderly administration of justice.
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THE PROSECUTOR

Criminaljustice is concerned with the pathology of the body
politic ....

A criminal trial, it has well been said, should

have the atmosphere of an operatingroom.

J., dissenting
in Sacher v. United States1

FRANxFURTER,

A.

The Frequency and Significance of Prosecutorial
Misconduct: An Introductory Overview

In February 1971, Brent Stein was on trial in a Dallas courtroom
on a charge of interfering with a police officer during a civil disturbance. Stein, the former editor of the underground newspaper Dallas
Notes,2 testified that he had neither been involved in the disturbance

nor interfered with the officer. On cross-examination, he added that he
had been manhandled by the police officers who arrested him.
Assistant District Attorney John Stauffer responded to Stein's
charge of police brutality by saying, "Too bad they didn't kill you."
Stein's attorney immediately moved for a mistrial. The trial judge,
after admonishing the prosecutor that his remark was improper, denied
the defense motion.3

There the matter will probably end. If Stein's conviction were to
come before an appellate court for review, the court would probably
,conclude that the trial judge's prompt admonition had cured any
error. 4 If it had been a defense attorney who had stood before the bench
and expressed his disappointment that the prosecutor had not been
murdered, he would have run a substantial risk of being cited for contempt of court. Despite the theoretical availability of this sanction in
1343 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1952).
2 See Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971). A massive seizure of materials and equip-

ment by the Dallas Police Department, which Mr. Justice Douglas characterized as a
"search and destroy mission," had effectively closed down Stein's newspaper. Id. at 204
(dissenting opinion).
3 "Judge Denies Stein Mistrial for Prosecutor's Remark," Dallas Morning News,
Feb. 26, 1971, § D, at 1, col. 5.
4 See text accompanying notes 101-06 infra.
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the Stein case, District Attorney Stauffer was in little danger of a
contempt citation. 5 Similarly, it was almost inconceivable that Stauffer
would be disciplined by the bar.6 Stein would have no basis for a civil
action against the prosecutor, 7 and no other formal corrective measure
was even remotely available.
It would be fashionable and diplomatic to suggest that this incident was an isolated one, that the vast majority of prosecutors perform
their tasks with dignity and restraint, and that only a few "bad apples"
pose any problem at all. Unfortunately, the statement would probably
not be true. The academic commentators who have examined the
problem of prosecutorial misconduct have almost universally bemoaned its frequency.8 Moreover, even a brief glance at the digests
of appellate decisions, especially in the state courts, indicates that courtroom misconduct by prosecutors provides one of the most frequent
contentions of criminal defendants on appeal. John F. Onion, the
Presiding Judge of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, estimates
that at least 60 percent of the cases that come before his court involve a
claim of prosecutorial misconduct, although he adds that only occasionally is the claim well founded.9
The lack of a more effective remedy for this misconduct is ironic
and unfortunate, for a prosecutor's abuse of a criminal defendant in
the manner illustrated by the Stein case seems more damaging to both
the substance and appearance of justice than any disrespectful wisecrack that a "movement" defense attorney has ever uttered in a courtroom. There are several reasons for this conclusion. First, the likely
subjects of a defense attorney's disrespect, the prosecutor and trial
judge, are not themselves on trial. A criminal defendant, whose liberty
is at stake and who is involved in one of the most traumatic experiences
of his life, presents a far more vulnerable target. At the same time, a
loss of professional detachment usually seems less excusable in the
prosecutor, who confronts crime and courtrooms every day, than it
does in the defendant-or even in many defense attorneys who feel
the weight of their responsibility for the defendant's liberty and who
are not accustomed to playing for such high stakes.
5 See text accompanying notes 164-69 infra.
6 See text accompanying notes 152-63 infra.
7 See text accompanying notes 141-51 infra.
8 See, e.g., R. PouND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMmUCA. 187 (1930); Singer, Forensic Misconduct by FederalProsecutors-And How It Grew, 20 ALA. L. REv. 227 (1968); Hobbs,
Prosecutor's Bias: An Occupational Disease, 2 ALA. L. REv. 40 (1949); Note, Prosecutor
Forensic Misconduct--"Harmless Error"?, 6 UTAi L. REv. 108 (1958).
9 Telephone interview, May 5, 1971.
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The most obvious ill effect of prosecutorial misconduct is, of
course, its tendency to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. The state
is entitled to a fair trial as well, but nevertheless misconduct by prosecutors seems distinguishable from misconduct by defendants or their
attorneys in terms of its ultimate effect. When a defense attorney resorts
to what Professor Paul Freund calls "the infantile-regressive mode of
expression,"' 0 he knows, if he has any sense, that he is likely to alienate
the jury trying his client. The attorney may have decided to appeal to
a larger audience (perhaps Walter Cronkite's) or just to go down with
his colors flying. A prosecutor, of course, may also find that his misconduct will create resentment and hurt his chances with the jury.1
Nevertheless, while a defense attorney sometimes suffers from association with his client, a prosecutor usually benefits from his association
with the cause of law enforcement. The assistant district attorney is
the representative of an elected, presumably popular public official,
and the mere fact that he is a state employee may create a sense of trust
and an expectation of fairness that a defense attorney would find
difficult to match through the most strenuous exertion of his charm.
A California appellate court has observed that the statements of a
defense attorney "have little weight as compared with similar statements of the district attorney.... A statement of the prosecutor... is
weighted with the authority of his office. It... cannot fail to make an
impression upon the minds of jurors."' 2 Thus, another reason for viewing prosecutorial misconduct as more damaging than misconduct by
defense attorneys is simply that the prosecutor, for a variety of reasons,
commonly has more influence with the jury.13
Prosecutorial misconduct may also have serious consequences
apart from its impact on the jury in the case at hand. The Wickersham
Commission observed in 1931 that unlike police abuse, prosecutorial
misconduct occurs "in the publicity of a court room" where it is easily
1o Freund, Contempt of Court, 1 HuMAN RIGHTS 4, 8 (1970). Freund adds that certain
forms of militant expression in the courtroom have "all the persuasive power of that
classic line of Ring Lardner, 'Shut upl he explained."'
11 See Pacman v. United States, 144 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
786 (1944).
The producers of the CBS News broadcast, "Justice in America, Part I: Some Are
More Equal Than Others" (Apr. 20, 1971), reassembled most of the members of a New
York jury which had tried a member of the Black Panther Party for a conspiracy to rob.
The jurors uniformly expressed a sense of insult and disgust at the prosecutor's effort
to suggest a connection between the Black Panther Party and the government of Communist China and to inject this consideration into the case.
12 People v. Kirkes, 243 P.2d 816, 831-33, aff'd, 39 Cal. 2d 719, 249 P.2d 1 (1952). See
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
13 See Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in .the Prosecution
of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUTm. L. Ray. 946, 947 (1954).
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noted by members of the public and the press.' 4 Because this "lawless
enforcement of the law" is perpetrated by the "officials most definitely
responsible for law observance," the natural result is public resentment of the entire legal process. Moreover, this resentment is likely
to become especially intense when the defendant belongs to a racial
minority or other stigmatized or unpopular group. Members of this
group tend to view official misconduct as evidence that they cannot
expect fair treatment from the courts. Finally, rehabilitative efforts are
obviously hindered when the defendant "feels deeply and justly that
society in the person of its chief representatives has behaved tyrannically
and brutally."'1
These considerations all point to the propriety of a double standard: the prosecutor should be afforded less leeway in his courtroom
conduct than the defense attorney.1 Although some courts have explicitly accepted this position,' 7 others have insisted that both attorneys
should be judged by the same criteria.' 8 These abstract verbalizations
are, of course, less significant than actual judicial practice, and in practice, particularly in the area of punishment for contempt, the courts
have utilized a double standard. It has been backwards.
B.

Efforts to Define ProsecutorialMisconduct

The courts have fairly well delineated the basic outlines of a few
forms of prosecutorial misconduct. For the most part, these types of
misconduct involve efforts to influence the jury through various sorts
of inadmissible evidence. Thus a prosecutor may not comment on the
14 NATIONAL COMISSON ON LAw OBsERVANcE

AND ENFoRCamET

REPORT ON LAW-

iN LAw ENFORCEMENT 268 (1981) [hereinafter cited as WIcRERsHAm Comm'N REP.].
IEsNss

15 Id.
16 See Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.BA.J. 1159,

1218 (1958):
The public prosecutor cannot take as a guide for the conduct of his office the
standards of an attorney appearing on behalf of an individual client. The freedom elsewhere wisely granted to partisan advocacy must be severely curtailed
if the prosecutor's duties are to be properly discharged. The public prosecutor
must recall that he occupies a dual role, being obligated, on the one hand, to furnish
that adversary element essential to the informed decision of any controversy, but
being possessed, on the other, of important governmental powers that are pledged
to the accomplishment of one objective only, that of impartial justice. Where the

prosecutor is recreant to the trust impicit in his office, he undermines confidence,
not ony in his profession, but in government and the very ideal of justice itself.
1 Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 864, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706
(1925); Fitter v. United States, 258 F. 567, 572 (2d Cir. 1919); Bynum v. State, 85 Ala. App.
297, 298, 47 So. 2d 245, 247. cert. denied, 245 Ala. 22, 47 So. 2d 247 (1950).
18 United States v. Cook, 432 F.2d 1093, 1106-07 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
996 (1971); State v. Brown, 214 La. 18, 24, 36 So. 2d 624, 626 (1948); State v. Dallao, 187 La.
392, 434, 175 So. 4, 18, cert. denied, 802 U.S. 635 (1937); State v. Graziani, 168 La. 397, 802,
121 So. 872, 874 (1929).
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failure of the defendant to testify;' 9 he may not assert facts which have
not been presented in evidence; 20 he may not suggest that evidence
exists which he has been unable to introduce; 21 he may not express
his personal belief in the defendant's guilt; 22 he may not, at least in
non-capital cases, discuss the possibility of pardon or parole;23 nor may
he argue that erroneous convictions can always be reversed on appeal. 24
When it comes to what are commonly the most disruptive forms
of prosecutorial misbehavior, however-abuse and insult, inflammatory
argument, and appeals to prejudice-specific judicial standards are
usually lacking. A starting point for the courts is often the statement
19 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
20 See, e.g., Kemph v. State, 464 S.W.2d 112 (rex. Crim. App. 1971) (reference to
defendant's seduction of a fifteen-year-old girl, a fact not in evidence and not relevant
to any issue in the case); Sanders v. State, 175 Ark. 61, 296 S.W. 70 (1927) (a certain
letter would "stick" defendants if it had not been excluded); Wasy v. State, 236 Ind. 215,
138 N.E.2d 1 (1956) (unsubstantiated charge that someone had tried to bribe a prosecution witness); Whitfield v. State, 21 Ala. App. 490, 109 So. 524 (1926) (repeated reference
to offense committed subsequent to offense at issue); Cline v. State, 57 Okla. Crim. 206, 47
P.2d 191 (1935) (improper impeachment of defendant's character). See Note, The Permissible Scope of Summation, 36 COLum. L. R v. 931 (1936).
21E.g., Ginsburg v. United States, 257 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1958) ("I could probably
have fifty people here who would show that the defendant is not of good character');
People v. Talle, 111 Cal. App. 2d 650, 245 P.2d 633 (1952) (prosecutor's invitation to
jurors to visit his office after trial; statement that the prosecutor could give the jurors
a great deal of information that he could not divulge in the courtroom); Snipes v.
United States, 230 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1956) (prosecutor's statement that he could have
brought forty counts rather than the one before the court); Brower v. State, 26 Okla.
Crim. 49, 53, 221 P. 1050, 1052 (1924) ('I have my reasons"); Commonwealth v. French,
170 Mass. 619, 259 N.E.2d 195 (1970), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Limone v. Massa-

chusetts, 39 U.S.L.W. 3126 (U.S. Aug. 11, 1970) (No. 526, 1970 Term; renumbered No. 5-70,
1971 Term) ("Of course you have to use your imagination. There are many things in a
court of law that can't be introduced').
22This limitation is sometimes confusing. It is permissible for the prosecutor to
ague forcefully that the defendant is guilty beyond any doubt, but he must not assert
at it is his policy not to prosecute unless he is personally persuaded of the defendant's
guilt. Even more clearly, the prosecutor must not assert that as an old-timer in the
criminal courts, he knows a guilty man when he sees one. Two vices can be discerned in
this sort of expression of personal opinion-first, the prosecutor's invitation to the jury
to rely on him as a crime expert, and second, the implication that the prosecutor's judgment may be based on evidence not presented at trial. When the prosecutor is dearly
arguing from the evidence, there is no error. See United States v. Grunberger, 431 F.2d
1062, 1068 (2d Cir. 1970); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 349 n.15 (1958); Leary
v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 865 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969);
Walker v. State, 105 Tex. Crim. 252, 288 S.W. 220 (1926); State v. Hively, 103 W. Va.
237, 136 S.E. 862 (1927); Note, Expression of Opinion by Prosecuting Attorney to Jury,

25 MiCo. L. R.v. 203 (1926).
23 In colorful Texas, a prosecutor once argued that if the defendant were sent to
the penitentiary, killed twenty-five guards, and were convicted of all of these crimes, he
would still be pardoned by Mrs. Ferguson, the governor. This improper argument was
not the sole ground for reversal, however, since in the same case the prosecutor had responded to the defendant's plea of insanity by urging the jury to convict whether or not
the defendant was insane. Maynard v. State, 106 Tex. Crim. 558, 293 S.W. 1104 (1927).
See generally, Note, supra note 13, at 957.
24 E.g., Goff v. Commnonwealth, 241 Ky. 428, 44 S.W.2d 306 (1931); Deutsch v. State,

46 Ohio App. 223, 188 N.E. 399 (1932); People v. Esposito, 224 N.Y. 370, 121 N.E. 344
(1918);

Crow v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. 264, 26 S.W. 209 (1894); People v. Stembridge,

99 Cal. App. 2d 15, 221 P.2d 212 (1950).
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of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility,
"The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the
'25
usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.
Or a court may begin with Mr. Justice Sutherland's classic opinion in
Berger v. United States:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which
is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do
so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty
to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction 26
as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
one.
Eloquent as they are, statements at this level of generality do not
solve cases. They are instead invoked ceremoniously when an appellate
court decides, on more detailed grounds, to reverse a conviction for
prosecutorial misconduct.27 Nor do these statements seem inconsistent
with the "boilerplate" on the other side. Even before its decision in
Berger, the Supreme Court, in Dunlop v. United States, had provided
some quotable language that could be employed whenever an appellate
court decided to disregard an instance of prosecutorial misconduct:
There is no doubt that, in the heat of argument, counsel do
occasionally make remarks that are not justified by the testimony, and which are, or may be, prejudicial to the accused....
If every remark made by counsel outside of the testimony
were grounds for a reversal, comparatively few verdicts would
stand, since in the ardor of advocacy, and in the excitement of
trial, even the most experienced
counsel are occasionally
28
carried away by this temptation.
25 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 7-18. See also
the predecessor of this provision, ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETI-ics No. 5: "The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see that

justice is done."

28 295 US. 78, 88 (1935).
27 The courts have also said that a prosecutor should have "character incorruptible,
reputation unsullied, a high standard of professional ethics, and sound judgment of no
mean order." Attorney Gen. v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 489, 132 N.E. 322, 326 (1921).
28 165 US. 486, 498 (1897).
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The tone of other judicial statements seems to depart even further
from the ideal of impartiality suggested by the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Berger opinion. For example, the Ninth Circuit
observed in 1945:
It is our opinion that if the conduct of the prosecution in
argument in this case constitutes error, then, the prosecution
in every case is limited to a listless, vigorless summation of
fact in Chesterfieldian politeness. Gone are the days of the
great advocates whose logic glowed and flowed with the heat
of forensics! Gone, except for counsel for the defense. 29
As general as this rhetoric on both sides seems to be, it does raise
the basic problem of the attitude with which a prosecutor should
approach his courtroom tasks. Should he really be a man for all
seasons, "both an advocate, determined to convict the defendant, and
a representative of the state, safeguarding the rights of all"?O Or
should he follow the line suggested by Whitney North Seymour Jr.
and act as a quasi-judicial officer in deciding whether to prosecute and
then, once the trial begins, as a zealous champion who leaves the
judging to the judges?8 1 My own answer to these questions is admittedly extreme: The prosecutor should not think of oratory as part
of his job at all. He should avoid the "glow and flow of the heat of
forensics" and should, in fact, strive for more "Chesterfieldian politeness." The prosecutor should forego not only appeals to prejudice, but
82
any deliberate appeal to emotion.
29 Ballard v. United States, 152 F.2d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 1945), rev'd on other grounds,
329 U.S. 187 (1946). See United States v. Wexler, 79 F.2d 526, 530 (2d Cir. 1935) (L. Hand,
J.), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 703 (1936). Judge Hand had written the decision that, seven
months earlier, had been reversed in Berger. This statement can be viewed as his response.
See also Gray v. State, 90 Miss. 235, 241, 43 So. 289, 290 (1907).
80 Note, supra note 13.
81 Seymour, Why Prosecutors Act Like Prosecutors, 11 RECoRD OF N.Y.C.BA. 302,
312-13 (1956).
82 The appeal to emotion most often endorsed by the courts is the "plea for law
enforcement." An example is provided by a Texas case:
There are a number of stands that you, as citizens of this county, may take. You
can, on the one hand, say to Officer R.E. Kelnar, Officer A.T. Hermann, and

Officer A.J. Crow, and all the rest of them with the Houston Police Department:
'You may go and do the best you can to stop crime. We don't mind if you get
shot; we don't care, and we are not going to support law enforcement in this
county." Or by your verdict you may say, "Officer Kelnar and those that serve
with you, we are proud of you and we appreciate what you are doing for us. We
want to help in every way that we can. When Thomas Henry Rhodes takes his
pistol and tries to kill you, we are going to support you and find him guilty ....
Rhodes v. State, 450 S.W.2d 329, 331-32 (Tex. Grim. App.), cert. denied, 400 US. 927 (1970).
See also State v. Carter, 451 S.W.2d 340, 344-45 (Mo. 1970) (proper plea for law enforcement for prosecutor to urge conviction as a warning to defendant to stay out of
county); Asy v. State, 456 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex.Grim. App. 1970) ("But also sympathize
with the wives and children of this county and state"); Villarreal v. State, 440 S.W.2d 74,
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This prosecutorial attitude should promote more rational verdicts
in criminal cases. In my opinion, the adversary system reflects an intelligent division of labor in marshaling relevant evidence. Because objectivity is an illusion, the prejudices of a single fact-gatherer might
lead him to overlook important considerations and important data.
To overcome this defect, the legal system effectively preordains the
prejudices of two advocates. It directs these advocates to find all the
evidence they can to support their assigned positions, to present this
evidence in a coherent and orderly way, and to argue its relevance to
the jury. On this view, the adversary system does not rest upon the
proposition that truth is most likely to emerge from unrestrained,
emotional oratory on both sides of an issue.
How the adversaries' arguments to the jury should proceed necessarily turns on how we want the jury to make its decision, a fact that
some observers seem to forget. If a judgment of criminal conviction
should not rest upon emotionalism, we should encourage the prosecutor not to argue in emotional terms. If the basis for a criminal conviction should be a detailed sifting of the evidence, we should encourage the prosecutor to present arguments that will promote a
careful sifting of the evidence.
Again, the rules need not be the same for both advocates. Long
ago, a distinguished Englishman said that it was better for ten guilty
men to go free than for one innocent man to be convicted, and another
added that the quality of mercy is not strained. Prosecutors themselves
regularly exercise an equitable discretion to dismiss cases in which
the evidence dearly demonstrates the defendant's guilt. Thus if a
defense attorney, through emotional appeal, is able to persuade a jury
that his client's conviction would be unfair, there should be no great
cause for alarm. Although even an occasional conviction not based on
the evidence is a terrifying prospect, an occasional "nonevidentiary"
acquittal is a tolerable and probably desirable occurrence. 3
My acceptance of this double standard does not rest on a simple
pro-defendant bias. Men once satisfied their desire for certainty in
judgments of criminal guilt by seeking the verdict of God; today we
pursue the same goal by requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt
and the unanimous verdict of twelve jurors. This quest for certainty
75 (rex. Crim. App. 1969) ("And now as you have an opportunity for the first time in

your lives to do something about helping this county be a better county'). But

cf. State

v. Raspberry 452 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. 1970).
83 SeeD. NEWMAN,
TRLAL 134 (1966).

CONVIMrION: THE DETERMINATION OF GuILT OR INNOCENCE WrrHouT
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serves the public's interest as much as it does the defendant's. Although
we usually maintain that we provide procedural and evidentiary
safeguards solely for the protection of persons accused of crime, in
reality we provide them as much for ourselves. Much of the forceful
condemnation that attaches to convictions of crime would be lost if
the public doubted the accuracy of the factual determinations that
lay behind them. When our system of criminal procedure fails to
ensure a high degree of certainty of guilt, criminal punishment loses
some of its effectiveness as an instrument of social control. For this
reason, arguments by prosecutors that tend to make juries less deliberate, less reflective, and less dispassionate cheapen the criminal law.
At the everyday, tactical level, prosecutors should recognize that
calm, analytical argument is probably the most effective form of advocacy and, in any event, that it minimizes the danger of reversal on
appeal. Beyond that, prosecutors should recognize that rationality in
the criminal process only makes it stronger. One need not harbor an
ideological bias in favor of criminal defendants to regard prosecutorial
restraint as a virtue.
These observations do not go very far in solving cases, and
neither do many of the statements of the courts. It may therefore be
,productive to review the factual circumstances of some of the decided
cases in an effort to capture the courts' sense of what constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. This task is complicated by the various procedural
obstacles confronting an advocate who seeks reversal of a conviction
on the basis of a prosecutor's courtroom behavior. The question in a
given case may be not whether the prosecutor's conduct was erroneous,
but whether the error was so dear that an appellate court could con-sider it despite the absence of an objection at trial, whether the effect
of the error was minimized or eliminated by the subsequent action of
the court or prosecutor, or whether the error was serious enough to
affect the integrity of the verdict. We therefore confront such categories
as "error," "plain error," "cured error," "harmless error," and "error
if any."
The sense that most dearly emerges from the decisions is that
of unpredictability. Cases proceed on an ad hoc basis, and results do not
follow a consistent pattern. Even if the alleged misconduct in one case
seems similar to the alleged misconduct in another, the procedural
context is invariably different. The force of precedent is therefore
slight. The courts seem to enjoy an almost total freedom to reach any
result on any given set of facts.
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Overt appeals to racial, national, and religious prejudice, for
example, were once a fairly common form of misconduct. The courts
were quick to reverse convictions when prosecutors argued that Negroes
should not be judged by the same law as white men,3 4 that Southern
gentlemen would not condemn the victim of the crime for trying to
keep a Negro in his place,3 5 and that the jury would have lynched the
defendant's copper neck if they had seen the family of the victim.30
It was also reversible error, in an attempted-murder prosecution before
an all-white jury, to cross-examine the defendant by saying, "Then
you struck him because he was a white man."37 Yet an admonition and
an instruction to disregard were held sufficient to cure the error when
the prosecutor made the following appeal in a prosecution for the unlawful sale of liquor:
There is lots of drinking going on up around Liberty Hill. If
you want to stop it, give this nigger the limit.... I want you
gentlemen to send the word by these people from Liberty
Hill out there in the court room that this nigger is stuck and
there must be no more liquor drinking at their Saturday night
socials or any other time up there.38
Moreover, when a prosecutor argued that a verdict of guilty would
"throw a chill down the spine of every Negro in Gregg County and
thereby stop some of these Negro killings," an appellate court in 1941
described the statement as a "mild effort at oratory" and said, "[W]e
find nothing to condemn."3 9
In a similar vein, it was reversible error for prosecutors to argue
that the testimony of one Christian was worth more than that of all
Jews,40 that because the defendant had changed his name from Rosenfelt to Ross, he was a traitor to his race, 41 that the defendant had never
filed an income tax return "because it was not the nature of his creed
34 State v. Brice, 163 La. 392, Ill So. 798 (1927).

35 Blocker v. State, 112 Tex. Crim. 275, 16 S.W.2d 253 (1929).
36Johnson v. Commonwealth, 217 Ky. 565, 290 S.W. 325 (1927).
37 State v. Moore, 212 La. 943, 33 So. 2d 691 (1947).
38 Yett v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. 23, 24, 7 S.W.2d 94, 94 (1928).
39 King v. State, 141 Tex. Crim. 257, 148 S.W.2d 199 (1941). Compare State v. Alexander, 255 La. 941, 955, 233 So. 2d 891, 896 (1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S. 936 (1971):
It appears from the record that [the prosecutor] pronounced the word Negroes
with less emphasis on the letter "o" than commonly used so that the word as
she pronounced it sounded somewhat like "nigras". The judge thought the objection to the pronounciation . . . frivolous. But counsel in argument here

stresses that the
defendant before
40 Skuy v. United
41 Ross v. United

pronunciation of the district attorney somehow prejudices
an all-white jury. We agree with the trial judge.
States, 261 F. 316 (8th Cir. 1919).
States, 180 F.2d 160 (6th Cir. 1950), cert, denied, 344 U.S. 832 (1952).
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to do anything of the kind,"42 and that "[t]here has, of course, grown
up a suspicion in this country with reference to fires whenever a Jew
has anything to do with it."43 The statement of the appellate court in
this last case may itself have been revealing of the temper of the times:
"It should make absolutely no difference in a court of justice whether
the defendant is a Jew ... a Chinaman, a Negro, or an American"
(emphasis mine). In 1930, however, the Eighth Circuit saw nothing
improper when a prosecutor responded to a defendant's story by saying,
"I never knew of a Jew before that would surrender a piece of a warehouse.., for nothing."4 4 The court commented that this statement was
merely a reference to the "recognized business acumen of the Jewish
45
race."
It is improper for a prosecutor to argue that a defense should be
rejected even when it is supported by the evidence.4 For this reason, a
Kentucky court ordered a new trial in a case in which the prosecutor
said, "The law of self-defense and reasonable doubt is the biggest joke
of the day."47 Yet when a prosecutor referred to self-defense as "a
typical gunman's defense," a Pennsylvania court refused to reverse and
48
held that the prosecutor was "within his rights."
Similarly, convictions have been reversed when the prosecutor
argued that the defendant deserved lynching, 49 but not when the
prosecutor merely said, "If the circumstances are as narrated ... the
electric chair is too good."6 0
Criminal prosecutions during wartime have sometimes led prosecutors to draw invidious comparisons between defendants and America's fighting men and to urge conviction as an act of patriotism. Guilty
verdicts have often been reversed because of this conduct, 51 yet the
42
48

People v. Schuster, 339 111. 73, 76, 170 N.E. 726, 727 (1930).
People v. Simon, 80 Cal. App. 675, 677, 252 P. 758, 759 (1927).
44 Rosenthal v. United States, 45 F.2d 1000, 1003 (8th Cir. 1930).
45 Compare Fontanello v. United States, 19 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1927) (conviction reversed when prosecutor argued Italian domination of illegal liquor trade), with United
States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 742 (1946)
(nonprejudidal error for prosecutor to refer to defendant's Italian descent and the fact
that Americans were battling Italians at that very moment). See also People v. Piazza, 84
Cal. App. 58, 257 P. 592 (1927) (harmless error for prosecutor to refer to the untruthfulness of Italians and the importance of maintaining American customs).

46 E.g., Rogers v. State, 111 Tex. Crim. 419, 13 S.W.2d 116 (1929).

47 Fleming v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 160, 5 S.W.2d 899 (1928).
48 Commonwealth v. Del Vacdo, 299 Pa. 547, 554-55, 149 A. 696, 699 (1930).
49 Johnson v. Commonwealth, 217 Ky. 565, 290 S.W. 325 (1927); O'Neill v.

State, 189
Wis. 259, 207 N.W. 280 (1926).
5D0Commonwealth v. Meyers, 290 Pa. 573, 580, 139 A. 374, 377 (1927).
51 See Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 286, 247 n.3 (1948) (dictum); Greenberg v.
United States, 280 F.2d 472 (1st Cir. 1960) (reference to low taxes paid by defendant during
World War II and the sacrifices of others); August v. United States, 257 F. 588 (8th Cir.

1918).
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Indiana Supreme Court found only harmless error in this argument in
a misdemeanor prosecution:
This hoodlum... by the acts which have been proved here in
evidence is no better than a saboteur, and should be made to
face the firing squad.... These fellows are worse than German
spies sent over here from Naziland.... If you jurors think
any thing of your soldier and sailors sons and daughters, give
this fellow the limit of the law, and if you don't think of your
own sons and
daughters, for God's sake think of my son who is
52
over there.
In this case, the prosecutor had conducted his cross-examination by
asking male witnesses about their draft status and female witnesses
about the draft status of their husbands. He had also asked defense
witnesses if they knew there was a war on.
Prosecutorial abuse of the defense attorney is a frequent ground
of reversal. Extreme examples are: the California case in which a
prosecutor said that the defense attorney had for thirty-three years
represented "[h]ighway robbers, murderers, men of the underworld
and he is now defending Alpine. Do you not see back of this case,
ladies and gentlemen, the operation of the underworld?";53 the Texas
seduction prosecution in which the prosecutor responded to a claim
that the prosecutrix was unchaste by saying, "If... a paid lawyer can
come here and besmirch the character of a young lady it is time we
should resent it with our guns";5 4 and the 1970 Illinois case in which a
prosecutor said that the defense attorney could qualify as an S.S.
trooper. 5 In another 1970 Illinois decision, by contrast, an appellate
court found it harmless error for the prosecutor to assert that he knew
from years of personal experience that the defense counsel was trying
to free the defendant by trickery. 56
52 Blue v. State, 224 Ind. 394, 414-16, 67 N.E.2d. 377, 385 (1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
840 (1947). See also United States v. Lawson, 337 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S . 919 (1965) ("Frhose men at Gettysburg . . . fought and they died").
53 People v. Alpine, 81 Cal. App. 456, 468, 254 P. 281, 286 (1927).

54 Harrell v. State, 114 Tex. Grim. 412, 413, 24 S.W.2d 47, 48 (1930).
55 People v. Weller, 123 Ill. App. 2d 421, 258 NY,.2d 806, 809 (1970). See also People
v. Garippo, 321 Ill. 157, 151 N.E. 584 (1926).
56 People v. Gilyard, 124 Ill. App. 2d 95, 108, 260 NYE.2d 364, 370 (1970). Courts
have also found the error harmless when a prosecutor referred to unscrupulous, shyster
lawyers who got criminals free, People v. Cummings, 338 IM. 636, 170 N.E. 750 (1930);
to the deplorable conduct of an attorney who would represent a murderer, Adams v.
State, 176 Ark. 916, 5 S.W.2d 946 (1928); to the dollars jingling in the defense attorney's
pocket, Gatlin v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 247, 20 S.W.2d 431 (1929); and to the asserted
fact that the defense attorney was a "poor, humble, simple little fellow" who talked
"out of two sides of his mouth, or as the Indian might say a forked tongue," State v.
Gonzales, 105 Ariz. 434, 436, 466 P.2d 888, 390 (1970).
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Apart from efforts to bring inadmissible evidence before the jury,
the most frequent form of prosecutorial misconduct is abuse of the
defendant. It has been held reversible error to call the defendant
"doubly vicious because he demanded his fall constitutional rights,"57
a "cheap, scaly, slimy crook," 58 a "leech of society," 59 a user of "Al
Capone tactics of intimidation," 60 and a "junkie, rat, and 'sculptor'
with a knife." 61 Courts have, however, found no error in cases in
which the defendant was called "animalistic," 62 "lowdown, degenerate
and filthy," 68 "a mad dog," 64 "a rattlesnake," 65 "a trafficker in human
6 7 "a hired
misery," 66 "a blackhearted traitor,"1
gunfighter,"68 "a creature
of the jungle,"6 9 "a type of worm," 70 or "a brute, a beast, an animal, a
mad dog who does not deserve to live.17 1
The uncertainty that these cases exhibit is largely the product
of necessity. The varieties of prosecutorial mischief are so great that
it would be impossible to anticipate them all and to define them in
advance. Moreover, much does turn on the context of the alleged misconduct and the procedural posture of the case. Still, the courts generally seem to have set their "thresholds of error" too low. They have
often shown more sympathy for the foibles of the prosecutor than for
the defendant's right to a fair trial.
One further observation on the problem of defining prosecutorial
misconduct seems in order. In many cases, the courts have justified
57 United States v. Hughes, 389 F.2d 535, 586 (2d Cir. 1968).
58 Volkmor v. United States, 13 F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir. 1926). The prosecutor also
said, "A skunk is always a skunk; you can decorate him any way you want to. .. . I
also presume you cannot make a rose out of an onion, no matter what you do....
Take
a weak-faced weasel, such as the defendant-." At this point, the defense counsel interjected an objection, but the prosecutor continued with the remark quoted in the text.
59 State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 894, 408, 253 P.2d 203, 211 (1953).
60 Homer v. Florida, 312 F. Supp. 1292, 1295 (M.D. Fla. 1967), affd, 398 F.2d 880
(5th Cir. 1968). This statement was not the only ground for reversal. The prosecutor
failed to correct a material, false statement made by a prosecution witness; he characterized the defense attorney as "an expert in the rackets"; he asserted facts not in
evidence; and he said, "It isn't viciousness that you see from the prosecutor here. What
it is, is venom, for this reason: I represent the law."
61 People v. Hickman, 84 App. Div. 2d 831, 312 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1970).
62 People v. Elder, 25 Ill. 2d 612, 614, 186 N.E.2d 27, 29 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
814 (1963).
63 Williams v. State, 93 Okla. Crim. 260, 275, 226 P.2d 989, 997 (1951).
64 Commonwealth v. Capps, 382 Pa. 72, 79, 114 A.2d 38, 342 (1955).
65 Commonwealth v. Narr, 173 Pa. Super. 148, 153, 96 A.2d 155, 156 (1958).
66 United States v. Markham, 191 F.2d 936, 989 (7th Cir. 1951).
67 Stephan v. United States, 13 F.2d 87, 98 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 818 U.S. 781
(1948).
68 Johnston v. United States, 154 F. 445, 449 (9th Cir. 1907).
69 State v. Goodwin, 189 La. 443, 446, 179 So. 591, 599 (1938).
70 United States v. Walker, 190 F.2d 481, 484 (2d Cir. 1951).
71 Miller v. State, 226 Ga. 730, 731, 177 S.E.2d 253, 254 (1970).
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the epithets applied to criminal defendants by calling them reasonable
deductions from the evidence. 72 An extreme example is the rape case
in which the prosecutor said, "A snake crawls on his own belly, but
these human vultures crawl on the bellies of our helpless and defenseless women." An appellate court described the statement as "a reason73
able deduction from facts commonly known. .
Courts too often assume in this fashion that "going beyond the
evidence" is not simply one form of misconduct but the only one.
Some courts even go so far as to say, "In the closing argument, excessive
and emotional language is the bread and butter weapon of counsel's
forensic arsenal, limited by the principle that attorneys are not permitted to introduce or comment upon evidence which has not previously
been offered and placed before the jury."74
The fact that a defendant might be black, however, would surely
not justify an argument based on that circumstance, and other appeals
to irrational decisionmaking should also be condemned. I cannot define prosecutorial misconduct with precision, but I can suggest a simple
and obvious test that seems applicable in most circumstances and that
might lead to findings of error in many situations in which the courts
today excuse prosecutorial conduct. The basic issue should be whether
the prosecutor's conduct was designed to induce a decision not based
on a rational assessment of the evidence. If so, the conduct should be
75
held improper.
Direct precedent for this sensible position is sparse but not entirely
72 Eq., Johnston v. United States, 154 F. 445, 449 (9th Cir. 1907); State v. Goodwin, 189
la. 443, 470, 179 So. 591, 600 (1938).
73 Hill v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. 415, 423, 157 S.W.2d 369, 373 (1941), rev'd on other
grounds, 316 US. 400 (1942).
74 State v. Gonzales, 105 Ariz. 434, 437, 466 P.2d 388, 391 (1970). See also People v.
Phillips, 126 IlM.App. 2d 179, 184, 261 NXE.2d 469, 471-72 (1970) ("It is not improper for
the prosecuting attorney to reflect unfavorably on the character of the accused and to
denounce his alleged wickedness'); Battle v. State, 478 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Okla. Crim. App.
1970) ("The right of argument contemplates a liberal freedom of speech .... It is only
when argument by counsel for the State is grossly improper and unwarranted upon some
point . . . that a reversal can be based on improper argument"). But see Singer, supra
note 8, at 254.
75 This test focuses on only one of the vices of prosecutorial misconduct, but it will
usually be adequate to identify conduct by prosecutors that presents the other vices as
well. Still, the test is obviously not designed for all situations-for example, those in
which the misconduct occurs outside the presence of the jury.

Compare Note, supra note 13, at 949: "Prosecutor's forensic misconduct may be
generally defined as any activity by the prosecutor which tends to divert the jury from
making its determination of guilt or innocence by weighing the legally admitted evidence
in a manner prescribed by law." Perhaps the most comprehensive effort to define courtroom misconduct by prosecutors has been provided by the ABA PuojEar ON STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION

(tent. draft 1970). The relevant standards are §§ 5.2, 5.4(b), 5.5-5.9.
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lacking. For one thing, there is the English experience. As one observer
describes it,"8
For a very long time now both law and tradition require that
a criminal prosecution in England should be conducted in the
most objective and humane manner possible ....It is held as
self-evident that while the prosecution should place before
the jury all the relevant facts of the case in strict accordance
with the rules of evidence, this should be done in the most
dispassionate and unemotional way possible ....

In 1936, the Sixth Circuit declared, "Above and beyond all technical
procedural rules ...

is the public interest in the maintenance of the

nation's courts as fair and impartial forums where neither bias nor
prejudice rules, and appeals to passion find no place. . .. ,,77 And as
early as 1889, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that "heated zeal"
might be "excusable on the part of counsel engaged in the defense of
a man on trial for his life," but not on the part of the prosecutor. In
the court's view, the state's representative should be "an impartial
officer" rather than "a heated partisan." 78 We would do well to recapture that attitude.
C.

Remedies for ProsecutorialMisconduct

1. The Uses and Limitations of Appellate Reversal-Despite its
forceful description of the prosecutor's duties in 1889, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court refused to consider the defendant's claim that his
conviction should be reversed because of the prosecutor's improper
summation. The court was "[u]naware of any way by which the speeches
of counsel [could] legally be placed on the record," and Chief Justice
Paxson commented, "I would regard any system of practice by which
error could be assigned to the summing up of counsel as a very great
calamity." 79 Although other courts had been reviewing allegedly improper arguments on their merits since at least the 1850's, the Pennsylvania court continued as late as 1905 to oppose any system in which
"the appellate court would be asked to review the trial, not on the
evidence, but on the talk."8 0
Today, by contrast, courts uniformly recognize the importance
78 Robbins, The Hauptmann Trial in the Light of English Criminal Procedure, 21
A.BA.J. 301, 305 (1935). See also Note, supra note 8, at 118-19.
77 Pierce v. United States, 86 F.2d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 1936).
78 Commonwealth v. Nicely, 130 Pa. 261, 270, 18 A. 737, 738 (1889).
79 Id.
80 Commonwealth v. Ezell, 212 Pa. 293, 296, 61 A. 930, 931 (1905).
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of the prosecutor's dosing argument to the fairness of the trial process,
and allegations of prosecutorial misconduct have become a staple of
the appellate reports. Indeed, the review of criminal convictions has
given the courts their only significant opportunity to present formal,
written views concerning the proprieties of prosecutorial behavior. It
is interesting to reflect that because other mechanisms for remedying
prosecutorial misconduct have been largely unavailable, prosecutors
would have been left effectively without judicial guidance if the early
position of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had prevailed.
The basic function of appellate review is of course to insure a
fair trial for the defendant and not to discipline the prosecutor. Accordingly, when serious misconduct occurs outside the presence of the
jury,8 ' when it can be cured by instructions at the trial court level, or
when it is considered harmless because evidence of guilt is overwhelming, another remedy must be found. Judge Learned Hand said
in a 1939 decision:
That was plainly an improper remark, and if a reversal would
do no more than show our disapproval, we might reverse. Unhappily, it would accomplish little towards punishing the
offender, and would upset the conviction of a plainly guilty
man .... [1Mt seems to us that a reversal would be an im2
moderate penalty.8
Academic commentators have generally despaired of appellate reversal as an effective means of controlling prosecutorial misconduct.
They have referred to reversal as a "quasi-sanction" 83 and have said, "Appellate justices time and time again have condemned... poor conduct
and warned prosecutors to keep within the bounds of propriety. Later
opinions reflect the result-frustrating failure."8 4 These academic observers have found it imperative that "two distinct problems-justice
and discipline-be kept separate."85
In deciding whether to reverse, however, courts have frequently
attached significance to whether the prosecutor's misconduct was intentional.86 Many of the commentators have been critical of this sort
81 See Veney v. Warden, 259 Md. 437, 271 A.2d 133, 142 (1970).
82 United States v. Lotsch, 102 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 622 (1939).
88 Note, Misconduct of Judges and Attorneys During Trial: Informal Sanctions, 49
IowA L. Ra,. 531, 543 (1964).
84 Note, Prosecutor Indiscretion: A Result of Political Influence, 34 IND. L. J. 477,
487 (1959).
85 Singer, supra note 8, at 237.
86 Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 188 (1963); Gladden v. Frazier, 388 F.2d 777,
780 (9th Cir. 1968), aff'd sub nom. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); Nicholson v.
United States, 221 F.2d 281, 284 (8th Cir. 1955); Baish v. United States, 90 F.2d 988, 991
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of judicial analysis, arguing that the effect of misconduct on the trial
process remains the same whatever the prosecutor's intention. Because
fairness for the defendant, not discipline of the prosecutor, is the func87
tion of appellate review, intention should be irrelevant.
I am inclined to agree with the courts rather than the commentators on this issue for two reasons. First, the effects on the defendant
and on the trial process do not really remain the same regardless of
the prosecutor's intention. Somewhat paradoxically, the term "intentional" may be used primarily to describe the objective character of
what happened. The statement, "His conduct was so bad that I think
that it constituted intentional wrong-doing," says something about how
bad the conduct was. Beyond that, even when the objective manifestations of the prosecutor's conduct do remain more or less the same, a
calculated and cold-blooded air may sometimes communicate itself
and have an effect of its own. As Justice Holmes once said, even a dog
understands the difference between being kicked and being stumbled
over.
Second, appellate reversal may indeed serve to discipline prosecutors, and courts need not be blind to that fact. For that reason alone,
the prosecutor's intention may properly tip the balance in the proverbial "close case." The United States Supreme Court has argued that
the rule excluding illegally obtained material from evidence deters
misconduct by policemen,8 8 and depriving the prosecutor of the benefit
of his own improper behavior might similarly have a deterrent effect.
This analogy confronts a significant difficulty, however, because recent
evidence suggests that the exclusionary rule has not materially altered
police conduct.8 9 The experience of the station house, far from showing
the effectiveness of appellate review, may lead to skepticism concerning
the ability of the courts to affect the behavior of prosecutors through
appellate reversal.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to think that reversals, lost convictions, and retrials might influence prosecutors more than they apparently
(10th Cir. 1937); People v. Horowitz, 70 Cal. App. 2d 675, 699, 161 P.2d 833, 846 (1945);
People v. Wells, 100 Cal. 459, 461, 34 P. 1078, 1079 (1893).
87E.g., Singer, supra note 8, at 271-72; Note, supra note 13, at 975. Some courts have
also adopted this position. E.g., United States v. Nettl, 121 F.2d 927, 930 (3d Cir. 1941)
("We cannot understand how the accused is interested in the personal character of his
accuser... . [lit hurts the defendant just as much to have prejudicial blasts come from
the trumpet of Gabriel"); Grifflin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1950); United
States v. Sprengel, 103 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1989).
88 Linkletter v. Walker, 581 U.S. 618, 633 (1965).
89 See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CH. L. Rv.
665 (1970); J. SKoL2icK, JusncE Wrmout TRIAL 22343 (1966).
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influence police officers. First, the burden of a retrial falls on the
prosecutor himself. He is in effect told to "go back and do it right."
Second, although it has often been contended that policemen "count"
arrests and not convictions, the same thing cannot be said of prosecutors. Third, a policeman's superiors are not members of the legal
profession and do not regularly read appellate opinions. When the
behavior of an assistant district attorney leads to a reversal, his superiors know about it. Fourth, as a member of the legal profession himself,
a prosecutor may find a judicial rebuke especially stinging.
This analysis points to the potentiality of appellate review as a
device for controlling prosecutorial misconduct, but unfortunately it
does not demonstrate the effectiveness of this remedy today. Instead,
a variety of procedural snares have deprived this mechanism of much
of its potential force. When prosecutorial misconduct occurs at trial,
the defense attorney has, of course, only two choices. He may object
or he may remain silent. If he objects, he then gives the trial judge
two choices-to overrule the objection or to sustain it. If the trial
judge sustains the objection, the usual remedy will be an instruction
to the jury to disregard the prosecutor's improper comments. As simple
and basic as it seems, this procedure leaves the defense attorney effectively boxed in when it comes to an appeal, whatever the prosecutor's
conduct. The purpose of many rules of appellate practice is, of course,
to confine appellate review to exceptional situations. If the defense attorney has failed to object, the appellate court will ordinarily conclude
that the error was "waived." If an objection was made but overruled,
the misconduct will rarely be so serious that the appellate court will
find more than "harmless error." Finally, if an objection was made and
sustained, the appellate court will ordinarily conclude that the trial
judge's instructions effectively "cured" the error.
These generalizations are subject to exceptions, and many convictions have been reversed on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. Still,
reversals occur in only a small percentage of the cases in which the
appellate courts condemn the prosecutors' behavior as improper. It may
therefore be desirable to reexamine the basic rules of appellate practice
as they apply to cases of prosecutorial misconduct. Although appellate
review should indeed have a limited function, perhaps it can be restructured to become a somewhat more effective mechanism of control
in this area. At the moment, in default of other remedies, appellate
review is the only significant corrective device available for prosecutorial misconduct. We should therefore do our best to make it work.
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2. The Requirement of Objection and the Remedies Available
in the Trial Court.-In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,90 an
antitrust prosecution, the prosecutor referred to the defendants as
"malefactors of great wealth" and "eager grasping men... without any
consideration for the underdog or the poor man." The prosecutor also
told the jury that high governmental officials wanted a conviction in
the case, that the defense attorneys had been "working night and day
with suggestions as to how the red herring [could] be drawn across the
clear-cut issue in this case," that government counsel viewed the case as
a crusade because they "believe[d] to the bottom of their hearts in the
justice of the cause," and that the expert witnesses who had been
presented by the defense were worse than damn liars.
The United States Supreme Court agreed that some of the prosecutor's remarks were improper, but it refused to reverse the defendants'
convictions. Among other things, the defense attorneys had failed to
object to some of the prosecutor's most inflammatory statements, and
the Court said, "Counsel for the defense cannot as a rule remain silent,
interpose no objections, and after a verdict has been returned seize for
the first time on the point that the comments... were improper and
prejudicial." 9'
The requirement of objection as set forth in the Socony-Vacuum
decision services two closely related policies. First, there is the notion
of judicial economy; the trial court should have the first chance to
correct any trial errors because its remedies are ordinarily less burdensome and expensive than appellate reversal. Second, there is the moral
notion that the defendant should not be allowed to "ride the verdict";
he should not be able to have a conviction set aside on the basis of
secret, "hip-pocket" error while he can retain the benefit of a verdict
of acquittal.
The requirement of objection is, however, subject to criticism
on the ground that it visits the carelessness of the lawyer upon his
client, 12 and upon other grounds that seem to have special force when
the asserted error consists of prosecutorial misconduct. For one thing,
a jury is likely to resent repeated objections, and objection during an
attorney's closing argument often seems especially impolite. It is, of
course, the prosecutor's closing argument that provides the most frequent occasion for prosecutorial misconduct.
90 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
91 Id. at 238-89 (Douglas, J.).

92 Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 US. 391 (1963).
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Some prosecutors may even capitalize upon a jury's resentment
of interruptions in the manner that the prosecutor did in the SoconyVacuum case. When the trial judge sustained a defense objection to
the prosecutor's assertion of a fact not in evidence (although the judge
remarked that he had been thinking about something else and had not
heard the statement in question), the prosecutor said, "Now if you will
let me alone a few minutes, I will be through. If you don't, like 'Old
Man River,' I will just keep rolling along. I don't want to do that." 93
Apart from the danger of resentment by the jury, many attorneys
seem to regard the lack of objection during an opponent's dosing
argument as a matter of professional courtesy. 4 Their attitude seems
to be that excesses on one side can always be cancelled by excesses on
the other, and that there is a certain beauty in the mutual remission
of sin.
A more important objection to the "objection rule" is that the
defense attorney's complaint, even if sustained by the court, may have
exactly the opposite effect from the one intended. It may call attention
to the prosecutor's improper remarks and reemphasize them in the
jurors' minds. 5 Again, this criticism, although applicable in other
situations, has special weight when prosecutorial misconduct is at
issue. In this area, courts are not concerned with technical errors in the
admission of evidence or with difficult legal matters which jurors might
recognize that they do not understand. They are concerned instead
with cases in which a flamboyant prosecutor has dipped into his mental
menagerie for a disparaging label for the defendant. The effect of
the prosecutor's vivid imagery is not likely to be altered by the process
of objection and formal ruling by the trial court.
Many courts have refused to require objection in serious cases of
prosecutorial misconduct. 6 Indeed, in the federal courts, this result is
required by Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
93310 Us. at 267 (Roberts, J., dissenting). As always, the problem is multiplied when
a lawyer's misconduct is reinforced by misconduct on the part of the trial judge. In
Giglio v. Valdez, 114 So.2d 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), a civil case, the trial judge said,
"That's a sharp trick, that's exactly what it is. You see a lawyer getting along pretty
good on his argument and you interrupt him and disrupt his line of thought. . . . As a
general rule I don't let lawyers interrupt other lawyers, and I ain't a going to start it.
I'm too old to start doing that sort of thing." The appellate court held that these
judicial remarks constituted reversible error.
94 Cf. R. KEEroN, TRIAL TAcrics AND METMoDS 197-98 (1954).
95 See, e.g., Note, Statements by Prosecuting Attorneys to Juries Which Demand
Improper Considerationsfor Verdict or Punishment, 39 VA. L. Rav. 85, 97 (1953).
96 E.g., Lawn v. United States, 355 US. 339, 359-60 n.15 (1958); Viereck v. United
States, 318 U.S. 236, 248 (1943); State v. Hawley, 229 N.C. 167, 48 S.E.2d 35 (1948); Jenkins
v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. 457, 93 S.W. 726 (1906); State v. O'Donnell, 191 Wash. 511, 71 P.2d
571 (1937).
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which provides, "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may
be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the
court." Even in the federal courts, however, judges usually do not
advert to this rule but instead seem to consider the problem afresh
with each case. Judge Simon Sobeloff wrote in 1965:
[T]here may be instances where the failure to object to a
grave violation manifestly stems from the attorney's fear that
an objection will only focus attention on an aspect of the case
unfairly prejudicial to his client....

[I]t is the judge's duty,

on his own initiative, to interrupt, admonish the offender and
instruct the jury to disregard the improper argument.9 7
Although Judge Sobeloff's refusal to attach conclusive weight to the
lack of objection is sound, the solution that he proposes is not ideal.
If a defense attorney has deliberately chosen to let an improper remark
pass in the hope that the jury will forget it, he is not likely to regard
it as a favor when the judge himself, in an effort to correct the remark,
reemphasizes it. When the circumstances permit, the trial judge
should instead call both lawyers to the bench, chastise the prosecutor
appropriately, and ask the defense attorney whether he wishes an
instruction on the impropriety of the prosecutor's behavior.
In assessing the requirement of objection, it is important to consider the range of remedies available in the trial court. Courts have
sometimes said that no objection is required when action by the trial
court could not correct the error.98 As a California appellate court
explained the rule,
Where an examination of the entire record fairly shows that
the acts complained of are of such a character as to have produced an effect which, as a reasonable probability, could not
have been obviated by any instructions to the jury, then the
absence of [objection] will not preclude the defendant from
raising the point in this court. 99
This analysis seems to overlook the fact that a trial court can always
order virtually the same remedy that an appellate court would provide.
The court can declare a mistrial. A mistrial has at least one advantage
over reversal by an appellate court. The defendant cannot "speculate
on the verdict." When misconduct occurs early in a trial, moreover, a
97 United States v. Sawyer, 347 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1965).
98 Pierce v. United States, 86 F.2d 949, 954 (6th Cir. 1936); Volkmor v. United States,
13 F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir. 1926); Simmons v. State, 139 Fla. 645, 648, 190 So. 756, 757
(1939), overruled as to substantive holding, State v. Hines, 195 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1967).
99 People v. Podwys, 6 Cal. App. 2d 71, 74, 44 P.2d 377, 379 (1935).
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mistrial also serves the goal of judicial economy. When, for example,
the prosecutor makes a seriously prejudicial remark during his opening statement, it may not be especially burdensome to empanel a new
jury and start over. Moreover, even when the jury-selection process
does become a major, time-consuming activity, a mistrial is obviously
more efficient than appellate reversal or the grant of a new trial after
the verdict.
When, however, misconduct occurs late in a trial-during the
prosecutor's closing argument for example-judicial economy may
argue against a mistrial. The jury may of course acquit even after
serious misconduct has occurred. It may therefore be more efficient
to allow the trial to reach its conclusion than to go back to the
beginning and to repeat the entire trial process. A few hours of jury
deliberation may make the problem academic, while a mistrial would
probably lead to a new trial lasting as long as the first. If the jury does
not acquit, the prosecutor's serious misconduct would still entitle
the defendant to a new trial. In that sense, the defendant would be
able to "have it both ways." In these circumstances, however, the goals
of judicial economy and of avoiding "speculation on the verdict" pull
in opposite directions, and allowing the defendant to "speculate"
seems the lesser evil.
When serious misconduct occurs late in a trial, there are just three
realistic alternatives. The trial can continue, and its result can be
binding on both parties. This alternative is unfair to the defendant in
that it may subject him to a verdict influenced by the prosecutor's
misconduct. Or the court may declare a mistrial. This solution is also
unfair to the defendant; it will subject him to the trauma and expense
of a second judicial proceeding. Finally, the court may permit the trial
to continue but consider the result binding only if the jury acquits.
The situation is one in which the defendant, the victim of the prosecutor's wrong, cannot be placed in the position that he would have
occupied had the wrong not occurred. It seems better to place him in an
unusually favorable position-one in which he can "have it both ways"
-than one in which he will inevitably pay a heavy price for the wrong
of his opponent. Indeed, if this alternative were adopted, the defendant
might still pay a significant price for the prosecutor's misconduct. It
might still take two trials to place the defendant in the position that he
should have occupied after one. 10 0
100 I do not propose that "incurable" misconduct should lead to an automatic
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This analysis brings us back to the judicial argument that objection should not be required when curative instructions would be
inadequate to remedy the prosecutor's wrong. When "incurable"
misconduct occurs early in a trial, it seems to me that there remains a
substantial interest in requiring immediate objection so that the trial
court will consider the desirability of declaring a mistrial. This interest
diminishes, however, as the trial proceeds. Even at the end of the trial,
a prompt objection would enable the court to decide at the critical
moment whether the situation was so extreme that the defendant should
be allowed to "ride the verdict." Nevertheless, when the situation in
fact calls for this remedy, the lack of an objection should not be fatal.
The case will occupy the same posture after the verdict that it would
have occupied if the objection had been made and sustained. From
the standpoint of judicial economy, it would still be desirable to avoid
the burden and cost of an appellate proceeding, but that goal could
be accomplished by requiring a motion for a new trial after the verdict
without any requirement of objection.
Mistrials are wasteful, and busy trial judges are probably more
influenced by that consideration than they should be. Partly for this
reason, the usual remedy for prosecutorial misconduct is an instruction
to the jury to disregard the improper behavior. Courts "presume" that
juries obey these curative instructions, but of course they know
better. Juries are quite incapable of forgetting on command. The
difficulty of correcting trial error through catechism is accentuated
when prosecutorial misconduct is at issue. Professor Richard Singer
asks, "[H]ow can a fair instruction be drawn that admonishes the jury
101
to forget that the prosecutor called the defendant a human vulture?"'
It would be unfair to assert that curative instructions have no ameliorative effect whatever. An instruction, even when it does not "cure"
the error, may detract from it. A jury cannot forget, but a jury may be
less influenced by the prosecutor's improper conduct when it knows
that the trial judge strongly disapproves. When error is followed by
instruction, the usual result may be a sort of psychological vector
between the two events-not a return to the status quo ante, but still
something less than the appeal to improper decisionmaking that the
prosecutor apparently had in mind.
Thinking in terms of "psychological vectors" suggests a possible
acquittal, but even that position does not seem wholly untenable if one believes that
the defendant should not suffer any detriment because of the prosecutor's wrong.
101 Singer, supra note 8, at 261.
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alternative to the usual "instruction to disregard." I advance this
alternative, not entirely seriously, but primarily as a starting point for
analysis. Rather than attempt to "blot out" the prosecutor's misconduct
by incantation, the trial judge might really try to cure it, by "aiming"
his remarks to the jury at a point which would lead to a "final vector"
of zero. Suppose, for example, that at the end of a long trial, the prosecutor improperly referred to the defendant's numerous prior convictions. Instructing the jury to disregard this revelation would probably
be an exercise in futility, but the judge might go further: "Ladies and
gentlemen of the jury, you must disregard the prosecutor's last statement. I happen to know that this defendant had never even been
arrested until his trouble in this case. The prosecutor is attempting
to influence you by material not in evidence, and in this instance, he
has his facts wrong. The prosecutor should know better, and his misconduct should indicate to you why the law insists that you base your
verdict solely on the evidence admitted during this trial." This strong
statement, virtually calling the prosecutor a liar, might really succeed
in "blotting out" his serious error.
It would of course be unseemly for the trial judge to engage in
this sort of bickering with the prosecutor, and especially so when the
prosecutor's improper remarks were factually accurate and the judge's
"curative statement" untrue. There is, however, no entirely satisfactory
alternative. The judge could intone a colorless instruction to the jury
to disregard the statement-in which event the defendant would run a
significant risk of being convicted in part because of his prior record.
Or the judge could declare a mistrial, which would impose a significant
burden and expense upon both the defendant and the state. When a
brief judicial statement would in fact provide a clear, speedy, and
effective remedy, "unseemliness" may be a small price to pay. The
notion that the courts might begin to sacrifice their dignity to a functioning concept of "situation ethics" is at least a fascinating one.
Under this regime, trial judges would emerge as more than "ruling
machines." They might even have fun. When a prosecutor referred to
the defendant's unimpressive and somewhat shady lawyer as a "two-bit
shyster," the judge might indignantly declare that he had always regarded this fair-minded leader of the bar as a personal hero. When the
prosecutor spoke of the defendant as a human vulture, the judge might
remark that at least the defendant seemed to him a better man than
the prosecutor. A very few rebukes of this sort might lead to a significant decline in the incidence of prosecutorial misconduct. Moreover,
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because the trial judge probably has a greater influence with the jury
than the prosecutor, his serious efforts to counter the prosecutor's misconduct could work. Repeated factual misstatements would, I recognize,
lead to a loss of judicial credibility, but strong counter-epithets and
expressions of opinion do not seem to pose that danger.
I admit that I am being more devilish than earnest in making this
suggestion. It is so inconsistent with current concepts of the judicial
10 2
function that most observers probably would not consider it seriously.
Nevertheless, putting these extreme cases does serve a purpose. The
cases indicate how much more trial judges could do to correct instances
of prosecutorial misconduct than simply to utter the words, "Objection
sustained-jury may disregard."
Even if one is appalled by the notion of judicial "counter-error"
as a corrective, he may recognize the need for a heightened sense of
judicial activism in remedying prosecutorial misconduct. When the
prosecutor's behavior has in fact created a misimpression, the judge
should not hesitate to correct it. He should not automatically leave that
task to the defense attorney. Similarly, the judge should usually explain
to the jury why the prosecutor's conduct was improper, and he should
forcefully remind the jurors of their duty to render a careful and
thoughtful verdict based solely on the evidence. Finally, the judge
should not be reluctant to accompany his instructions to the jury with
a strong admonition of the prosecutor. A dispassionate ruling sustaining an objection may be far less effective than the statement, "Mr.
Prosecutor, that remark was thoroughly unprofessional. Any further
effort to appeal to passion and prejudice, or to inject other improper
considerations into this case, will be met with strong sanctions. Ladies
and gentlemen of the jury, I apologize for the prosecutor's behavior,
and I instruct you to disregard his last statement. As rational, intelligent men and women, I am sure that you would not have been influenced by it in any event."
Courts have universally recognized the propriety of a judicial
admonition when a prosecutor has engaged in courtroom misconduct, 03
102 Compare ABA PRojEct ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDs RELATING
TO THE JUDGE's ROLE IN DEALING wIrH TRIAL DISRUPTONS, standard B.1 (tent. draft 1971)

[hereinafter cited as ABA,

JUDGE's ROLE]:
When it becomes necessary during the trial for [the trial judge] to comment upon
the conduct of . . . counsel . . . he should do so in a firm, dignified and restrained manner, avoiding repartee, limiting his comments and rulings to what
is reasonably required for the orderly progress of the trial, and refraining from
unnecessary disparagement of persons or issues.
10S United States v. Bugros, 304 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Pepe, 247
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but in cases involving defense counsel, some courts have suggested that
it is improper for a trial judge to admonish any attorney in the presence
of the jury.104 These courts rely on the danger that an unsophisticated
jury may read the admonition as an expression of the judge's opinion
concerning the merits of the litigation. This danger, however, if
present at all, seems greater when the defense attorney is the object
of the trial judge's comments than when it is the prosecutor who is
censured. The defense attorney may be closely identified with his client
in the jurors' minds, and the jury may infer that the judge's low
opinion of the defense attorney's conduct extends to the defense attorney personally and to the defendant as well. If the trial judge
expresses his distaste for the prosecutor's conduct, however, the jury
is not likely to read the statement as a manifestation of judicial dislike
for the state government. The jury is much more likely to regard the
admonition for what it is-the rebuke of a single individual for a
single instance of misconduct. The courts' rulings concerning the
impropriety of any judicial admonition in the presence of a jury
should therefore be read in the context of the cases in which they were
made.
Appellate courts have often said that primary responsibility for
correcting misconduct by prosecutors lies with the trial courts.0 5 This
responsibility cannot be discharged by perfunctory yes-or-no rulings on
objections. Insofar as they can, trial courts should insure that every
judgment of criminal guilt reflects a careful and responsible decision
by the jury. When judicial activism leads a court to impose its own
views upon the jury, of course it should be condemned; but judicial
restraint that effectively allows biased, emotional, and self-righteous
prosecutors to impose their views on the jury seems to me an even
greater fault.
Appellate courts properly look to trial judges as the primary
line of defense against prosecutorial misconduct, but these courts
should not minimize the extent of their own responsibility for the
quality of deliberation at the trial level. The written opinions of
appellate courts have an impact that extends far beyond the case at
hand. In deciding what significance to attach to the lack of objection,
the courts should consider the effectiveness of the remedy that the trial
F.2d 838, 844-45 (2d Cir. 1957); Baker v. United States, 115 F.2d 533, 542-43 (8th Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 12 U.S. 692 (1941).
104

Whittenburg v. State, 46 Okla. Crim. 380, 386, 287 P. 1049, 1051 (1930); Bell v. State,

150 Tex. Crim. 90, 92-93, 92 S.W. 2d 259, 260 (1936).
105 Note, supra note 83, at 536.
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court would probably have provided, the tactical obstacles that may
have stood in the way of an objection (either the fear of provoking
jury resentment or the danger of reemphasizing the prosecutor's improper remarks), the extent to which it is necessary that the defendant
suffer for his attorney's carelessness, and the public interest in securing
dignified and accurate adjudication even when the parties may not
seem to care. When these factors enter the balance, there can be no
justification for an unyielding requirement of contemporaneous objection. 0 6
3. Provocation by the Defense Attorney.-When an appellate
court concludes that prosecutorial misconduct was induced by misconduct on the part of the defense attorney, it may refuse to reverse
on that ground alone. 10 7 Indeed, when the trial record has been incomplete, some courts have gone so far as to "presume" that the prosecutor's improper remarks must have been provoked by unrevealed
defense misconduct. 0 8 The provocation rule has, however, had its
critics. As early as 1914, a Georgia appellate court declared:
The fact that the prisoner's counsel had violated the rule
would not authorize the State's counsel to do likewise ...
We could as well hold that if the prisoner's counsel introduces
illegal evidence, the State's counsel can reply by introducing
other illegal evidence. 10 9
106 It might be helpful to permit the defense attorney to raise his objection at the
dose of the prosecutor's argument or at any time prior to the judge's charge to the jury.
He could thereby avoid the apparent rudeness of interrupting his opponent, yet he would
still give the trial judge specific notice of his complaint and foreclose speculation on the
verdict.
If a speedier objection would have permitted the court to remedy the prosecutor's
misconduct by a less drastic method than the one finally suggested, the delay might
reasonably count against the defense attorney. Nevertheless, if an instruction would still
be useful, a refusal to give it should be error.
Some courts have permitted defense attorneys to raise objections at the dose of
argument. E.g., Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385, 401 (8th Cir. 1959) (dictum), rev'd
on other grounds, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). Others have held the lack of promptness fatal.
Carpenter v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. 897, 406, 87 S.W.2d 731, 735 (1935); State v. Coolidge,
106 Vt. 183, 190, 171 A. 244, 247 (1934); Buck v. Territory, 1 Okla. Crim. 517, 519, 98 P.
1017, 1018 (1909).
107 Brennan v. United States, 240 F.2d 253, 263-64 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
931 (1957); Baker v. United States, 115 F.2d 533, 544 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312
U.S. 692 (1941); People v. Piazza, 84 Cal. App. 58, 82, 257 P. 592, 602 (1927); State v.
Pinkston, 336 Mo. 614, 617, 79 S.W.2d 1046, 1048 (1935) (dictum); State v. Johnson, 195
Wash. 545, 547-48, 81 P.2d 529, 530 (1938).
108 Pietch v. United States, 110 F.2d 817, 823 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 648
(1940); State v. Berlovich, 220 Iowa 1288, 1291, 263 N.W. 853, 855 (1935). Courts have also
relied on provocation as a justification for the prosecutor's behavior when the state
made no suggestion, even on appeal, that the defense attorney acted improperly. United
States v. Sober, 281 F.2d 244, 246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 879 (1960).
109 Nixon v. State, 14 Ga. App. 261, 265, 80 S.E. 513, 515 (1914). See also Dugan Drug
Stores, Inc. v. United States, 326 F.2d 835, 837 (5th Cir. 1964):
We are not impressed with the argument that the conduct of the prosecutor was
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The argument that two wrongs cannot make a right has obvious
force, but I believe that misconduct by a defense attorney can sometimes justify prosecutorial behavior that would otherwise be improper.
The test should not be whether the prosecutor was "provoked," but
whether the prosecutor's action was reasonably designed to remedy the
wrong perpetrated by the defense.
Ordinarily, for example, it would be improper for a prosecutor to
express his personal belief in the defendant's guilt or to suggest that
the defense attorney had been biased by his fee. Suppose, however, that
a defense attorney had improperly told the jury that he knew in his
heart that the defendant was innocent, and that he would blame his
own inadequacies and never again enjoy a good night's sleep if the
defendant were convicted. It would be unfair to confine the remedy
for this misconduct to an instruction to the jury, and to inform the
prosecutor that he could not mention the incident at all in his own
remarks. The prosecutor should be able to go beyond the court's
formal instruction in explaining why the defense attorney's misconduct
should be disregarded. Indeed, in the course of his argument, I think
that the prosecutor should be permitted to mention his own belief in
the defendant's guilt and to suggest that the defense attorney had,
after all, been paid to think as favorably of the defendant as he could.
It should be incumbent on the prosecutor, if he chose this course, to
make it clear to the jurors that he was not urging conviction on the
basis of his personal opinions, but merely illustrating why fall responsibility for the ultimate decision belonged to the jurors alone.
The courts should thus recognize a "right of reply" as a permissible
and appropriate remedy for courtroom misconduct. At the same time,
they should be alert to the danger of excessive retaliation. 110 The fact
that an attorney had urged one sort of error should not justify his
opponent in urging the opposite sort. The line is obviously a fine one,
but I believe that it can be drawn.
This analysis would justify only a small minority of the results
that the courts have reached under the "provocation rule." The provocation rule has usually not been justified on the ground that a
limited and specific response may constitute a reasonable corrective
for defense misconduct. Instead, the courts have commonly proceeded
on a theory of estoppel (the defense with its unclean hands and big,
caused by the conduct of defense counsel. A prosecutor should be immune to improper tactics. If he feels that his opponent has overstepped, the remedy is an
appeal to the trial court-not in the adoption of unfair procedures.
110 See Howard v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 88, 92, 178 S.W2d 691, 693 (1944).
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dirty mouth lacks standing to complain) or invited error (the defense
should not be able to secure a new trial by tempting the prosecutor
to match its improper conduct)."' Indeed, the courts have not usually
regarded provocation by the defense attorney as just one factor in the
case; they have regarded it as a license. One serious slip by the defense
attorney, and the prosecutor confronts an open field. The effect of this
judicial approach is to abandon any controlled search for truth in
favor of a free-for-all."

2

The "provocation rule" may thereby actively

encourage misconduct. For example, although I doubt that it often
happens in quite so deliberate a fashion, one law review note reviews
the provocation cases and then offers this practice tip:
The prosecutor may deduce from this that he would do well
to watch carefully for certain mistakes that the defense counsel
may make, and, instead of objecting if that course is open to
him, attempt to take advantage of that mistake ...Il
Prior misconduct by the defense attorney may be one circumstance
that a court should consider in assessing a prosecutor's behavior. A
prosecutor's conduct must always be evaluated in the context of the
case, and there is no reason why the defense attorney's behavior should
be automatically disregarded. By allowing this consideration virtually
to harden into a rule, however, the courts have apparently lost sight of
the main objective. The issue is not whether the prosecutor's conduct
represented an understandable human response in light of the behavior of the defense. It is whether the defendant was tried in an
atmosphere that gives us confidence in the accuracy and fairness of his
conviction. A narrow and specific response to a defense attorney's misconduct may ultimately lead to a more dispassionate verdict, and
courts should therefore recognize the propriety of this sort of prosecutorial comment. Misconduct by the defense attorney should not,
however, become a license for unrestrained argument by the prosecutor. The central question should remain whether the prosecutor's
behavior was likely to induce a decision not based on a rational assessment of the evidence.
4. The Harmless ErrorDoctrine.-JudgeJoe R. Greenhill of the
Texas Supreme Court sometimes gives an after-dinner speech in which
"'See State v. Cascio, 219 La. 819, 829-30, 54 So. 2d 95, 99 (1951); Buck v. Territory,
1 Okla. Crim. 517, 519, 98 P. 1017, 1018 (1909); Wilson v. State, 143 Tex. Crim. 442,
446, 158 S.W.2d 799, 801 (1942).
112 See Singer, supra note 8, at 247.
113 Comment, Limitations Upon the Prosecutor'sSummation to the Jury, 42 J. Cam.
L.C. & P.S. 73, 81 (1951).
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he describes how to translate appellate opinions into English. When an
appellate court says, "The error, if any, was harmless," Judge Greenhill reports that the statement should be read, "The judge sure goofed
up the trial, but we think that the defendant is guilty anyway, so what
the hell." It is the harmless error doctrine that, more than any other
procedural rule, accounts for the relative ineffectiveness of appellate
review in controlling prosecutorial misconduct today.
Under this doctrine, courts have affirmed convictions at the same
time that they said, "This outrageous conduct on the part of the
Government attorney was unethical, highly reprehensible, and merits
unqualified condemnation." '1 4 Too often, moreover, the courts' application of the harmless error doctrine has been mechanical, resting
on makeweight arguments or on no arguments at all rather than on a
careful evaluation of the circumstances of the trial. Courts have, for
example, cited long deliberations by the jury as showing that the
verdict must have been based on the evidence and not on the prosecutor's improper remarks. 5 Exactly the same circumstance has, however, seemed to demonstrate the opposite point when the courts wished
to reverse; then the length of the deliberations has indicated that the
case was a close one, so that the prosecutor's statements might have
tipped the balance. 1 6
The courts have also found errors harmless partly because the
trial was a long one, 1 17 because the prosecutor said that the jury
should disregard any remark of his that was not supported by the
evidence,11 8 because the jury acquitted the defendant on some of the
charges,11 9 because the jury acquitted some of the co-defendants,120 and
because the jury imposed less than the maximum sentence. 121 The
1t14 Baker v. United States, 115 F.2d 533, 543 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 692
(1941).
115 Goddard v. State, 143 Fla. 28, 38 196 So. 596, 601 (1940); Commonwealth v. Nelson,
172 Pa. Super. 125, 148, 92 A.2d 431, 444 (1952), rev'd on other grounds, 377 Pa. 58, 104
A.2d 133 (1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
116 People v. Podwys, 6 Cal. App. 2d 71, 44 P.2d 377, 379 (1935); People v. Esposito,
224 N.Y. 370, 372, 121 N.E. 344. 345 (1918).
117 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 239-40 (1940); Isaacs v.
United States, 801 F.2d 706, 738 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 US. 818 (1962); United
States v. Kravitz, 281 F.2d 581, 586 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 941 (1961);
United States v. Ramos, 268 F.2d 878, 880 (2d Cir. 1959); Henderson v. United States,
218 F.2d 14, 19 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 49 U.S. 920 (1955); United States v. Hiss, 185
F.2d 822, 832 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951).
118 Haskette v. State, 65 Okla. Crim. 299, 306, 85 P.2d 761, 764 (1938).
119 United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 637-38 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 329 US. 742 (1946); Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 316 Pa. 129, 146, 173 A. 653, 660
(1934).
120 Stunz v. United States, 27 F.2d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 1928).
121 People v. Milewski, 316 Ill.
288, 291, 147 N.E. 246, 247 (1925).
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multiplication of these non sequiturs strongly suggests that the courts
do not care very much about prosecutorial misconduct. Professor
Singer says that the harmless error doctrine, which was "intended to be
a meaningful and rational approach to technical deviations, has grown,
like Topsy, into a trite phrase, repeated by rote, dealing with and concealing truly important substantive errors."'-2 2 In a notable dissenting
opinion, Judge Jerome Frank described the psychological effect of the
courts' routine reliance on the harmless error doctrine in the area of
prosecutorial misconduct:
This court has several times used vigorous language in denouncing government counsel for such conduct as that of the
United States Attorney here. But, each time, it has said that,
nevertheless, it would not reverse. Such an attitude of helpless
piety is, I think, undesirable.... If we continue to do nothing
practical to prevent such conduct, we should cease to disapprove it.... Government counsel, employing such tactics,
are the kind who, eager to win victories, will gladly pay the
small price of a ritualistic verbal spanking. The practice of this
court-recalling the bitter tear shed by the Walrus as he ate
a deplorably cynical attitude toward the
the oysters-breeds
12 3
judiciary.
There are, I think, occasions on which an appellate court may
properly disapprove the prosecutor's conduct while affirming the
defendant's conviction. There is surely no contradiction in advising
prosecutors and trial judges that the defendant's objection should
have been sustained while ruling that the deviation from propriety was
so minor that a new trial is not required. Application of the harmless
error doctrine is not, however, confined to situations in which the
prosecutor's misconduct was minor. Indeed, one of the difficulties of
this doctrine lies in its use to resolve a wide variety of problems with
little recognition of their distinctive qualities. Consider, for example, a
few variations on the facts of a 1927 Missouri case in which the prosecutor's misconduct would certainly be classed as serious. In State v.
Sheeler 24 the prosecutor told the jury that the issue was "whether this
government shall be run by the Italian bootleggers.., or by the men
.. . who are constituted to run our government, by Americans, for
Americans."' 125 In each of the following hypothetical cases, the prose122 Singer, supra note 8, at 269.
123 United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir.) (Frank,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946).
124 800 S.W. 318 (Mo. App. 1927).
125

Id. at 320.

HeinOnline -- 50 Tex. L. Rev. 660 1971-1972

1972]

CO URTROOM MISCONDUCT

cutor's statement will remain the same as it was in the Sheeler case
itself.
First, suppose that despite the prosecutor's heated remarks about
Italian bootleggers, the defendant was plainly not of Italian ancestry.
(That was, in fact, the situation in Sheeler.) Second, suppose that
although the defendant was Italian-American, so were most of the
members of the jury. The prosecutor, carried away with his own prejudices, had simply forgotten his audience and the likely effects of his
remark. Third, suppose that the defendant was Italian-American and
the jurors were not. The defendant was not, however, on trial for a
liquor offense. He was a teetotaler charged with taking indecent
liberties with his granddaughter. Again, the prosecutor's remark would
seem wholly inappropriate, and its most probable effect might be to
persuade the jurors that the prosecutor was insane. Fourth, suppose
that the defendant was an Italian-American on trial for a liquor
violation, and all the jurors were of Puritan ancestry. Still, the evidence
of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming.
In each of these situations, there would be reason to suspect that
the prosecutor's remark had not altered the verdict, and there would
be room to argue that the remark was harmless error. The last situation,
however, seems very different from the first three, and all of them
seem different from situations in which the prosecutor's misconduct
could fairly be classed as minor. In the last situation (in which the
evidence of guilt was apparently overwhelming), application of the
harmless error doctrine would not turn upon the perceived impact
of the prosecutor's remark. The remark might concededly have had a
seriously prejudicial effect; the state would nevertheless claim that the
resulting prejudice was irrelevant because the defendant was plainly
guilty. It is this last situation that truly "places the appellate court in
the jury box"' 1 26 and requires it to make a determination of the
defendant's guilt or innocence on the basis of the entire record. Use
of the harmless error doctrine in these circumstances seems "tantamount to saying that if one is obviously guilty as charged, he has no
fundamental right to be tried fairly."'12 That proposition, in my view,
is outrageous. Indeed, although the Supreme Court has apparently
ruled to the contrary, 128 I consider it a violation of the defendant's right
'26Singer,

supra note 8, at 232.

127 Note, supra note 84, at 486.

128 See Harrington v. California, 895 U.S. 250 (1969); Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18 (1967).
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to trial by jury for a court to disregard serious error because of its own
belief in the defendant's guilt.
There is universal agreement that the right to jury trial would
be violated if a judge were to direct a verdict against the defendant in a
criminal case. A defendant has a constitutional right to a chance for
acquittal whatever the evidence against him. It is, in my view, unfair
for a defendant to be deprived of this right by virtue of trial error
that may have persuaded the jury not even to consider the possibility
of acquittal. When a defendant has been denied a reasonable "shot"
at an irrational jury acquittal, I think that a verdict has been effectively
directed against him. As the Indiana Supreme Court put it, "No court
has the right to assume the guilt of any person accused until that
person has been given a fair and impartial trial . ... ,u19The courts,
in applying the harmless error doctrine, should therefore ask only
whether the error itself was harmless. They should not take it upon
themselves to rule that although the error may have had a prejudicial
impact, it should nevertheless be disregarded because of the defendant's
manifest guilt. It should not be the job of an appellate court to comb
through the record and, in effect, convict the defendant itself.
Application of the harmless error doctrine to the other hypothetical
variations of the Sheeler case would not require an appellate court to
review the entire trial record or to make a judgment of guilt or innocence. The court would be concerned only with the probable psychological effect of the prosecutor's remark upon the jury. It would
ask whether the prosecutor's statement was so irrevelant to the case at
hand or so contrary to the apparent attitude of the jurors themselves
that it could fairly be presumed to have had little or no effect upon
their deliberations.
Still, all of these variations on Sheeler seem different from situations in which the prosecutor's misconduct was truly minor. If, as I
have contended, appellate reversal does serve a disciplinary function,
the interest in discipline obviously becomes more intense as the misconduct becomes more serious. Moreover, even when a court is fairly
and honestly persuaded that an instance of misconduct did not influence the jury, its affirmance might be misread as evidence of the
court's willingness to tolerate the prosecutor's behavior. Especially
when many courts have a manifest history of routine affirmance in
cases of prosecutorial misconduct, the natural assumption may be that
the judges are again winking at lawlessness. The danger of promoting
129 Wasy

v. State, 236 Ind. 215, 220, 138 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1956).
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a cynical disrespect for the judiciary seems greatest when affirmance
follows truly outrageous misconduct.
It is probably a concern of this sort for the appearance of justice
that accounts for the various rules of "automatic reversal" that the
Supreme Court has articulated. When an involuntary confession has
been introduced in evidence, 180 when the defendant has been denied
counsel,' 31 when a community has been saturated with prejudicial pretrial publicity, 8 2 or when the trial judge has had a direct financial
interest in the defendant's conviction, 1 33 the Supreme Court has not
bothered to inquire whether the error was harmful. 3 4 For example, an
involuntary confession might have done no more than duplicate the
statements of other admissible confessions; still, the defendant has been
granted a new trial.1ns
I do not think highly of rules of automatic reversal. When a retrial
would undoubtedly be an idle gesture, it seems foolish to provide one.
Although it is common to declare that justice must not only be done
but must be seen to be done, that statement often carries overtones of
patronizing hypocrisy. It would be quite enough if the courts would
only do justice all the time. A concern for the appearance of justice
may be appropriate, but this concern should carry no further than to
influence the courts to be certain that justice has in fact been done.
The "automatic reversal" cases do seem to suggest the propriety
of a sliding scale of review. The more serious the error, the more
certain a court should be before it labels the error harmless. Although
I would not apply a rule of automatic reversal, I would reverse almost
automatically in cases of serious constitutional error. An appellate
court should be virtually certain that a serious constitutional error has
not influenced the verdict before it proceeds to affirm the defendant's
conviction. Moreover, the court should require the same degree of
certainty in serious cases of prosecutorial misconduct. When the misconduct was no more than a minor slip, however, the mere possibility
that it might have influenced the jury should not result in a timeconsuming new trial. Misconduct may be harmless either because it
180 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 868, 376-77 (1964); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528,
537 (1963); Spano v. New York, 860 U.S. 315, 324 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 US. 560,
568 (1958); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945).
131 White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55
(1961); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942).
182 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 884 US. 333, 351-52 (1966)
188 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927).
134 See generally Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 42-45 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
185 See Haynes v. Washington, 373 US. 503, 518-19 (1963).
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did not influence the jury or because it was trivial. I think that those
issues should be considered separately before a court renders a final
judgment based on an aggregate of both factors.
In a haphazard way that has been determined more by the division
of jurisdiction between the state and federal courts than by conscious
considerations of policy, the courts have adopted a sliding scale of
review. At one end of the spectrum are the "automatic reversal" cases
involving very serious constitutional error. The "automatic reversal"
doctrine has not been applied to instances of prosecutorial misconduct,
however, although some of this misconduct is every bit as outrageous
as the constitutional violations presented in the "automatic reversal"
cases themselves. Next on the scale come other cases involving federal
3 6 the Supreme
constitutional violations. In Chapman v. California,
Court held that whether a federal constitutional error was harmless
was itself a federal question. The standard to be applied was whether
it was clear "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of
did not contribute to the verdict obtained."' 137 Finally, there are cases
of nonconstitutional error, which are governed by a bewildering variety
of state standards. Courts sometimes consider all error harmless when
the trial court's verdict was "not dearly wrong." At other times they
ask whether the result below was "correct." On still other occasions,
they ask whether it was "reasonably probable" that the error did not
influence the verdict. Courts may, moreover, substitute the phrase
"highly probable" or the phrase "more probable than not" for the
phrase "reasonably probable" in this last formulation. 38 Each of these
standards is usually suggested as a universal solvent, applicable to all
state-law errors.
Application of this scheme to cases of prosecutorial misconduct
may produce considerable confusion. Some prosecutorial misconduct
undoubtedly constitutes a violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Other misconduct is presumably only trial
error under state law. The issue usually turns on whether the misconduct deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Whether the misconduct
deprived the defendant of a fair trial may, in turn, depend upon
whether the misconduct was harmless error.
Thus when a court seeks to apply the Chapman standard, it is
sometimes confronted with a problem of renvoi. Which harmless error
136 586 US. 18 (1967).
3.3 Id. at 24.
138 See R. TRAYNOR, THE

RIDDLE OF HARMLESS EROR

15-36 (1970).
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standard to apply may hinge on whether the error was harmless. Courts
might cut through this difficulty by asking whether it was clear beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant had received a fair trial. It
would seem odd, however, to apply a reasonable-doubt standard to
this ultimate issue of law rather than to the factual issue of whether the
prosecutor's behavior influenced the jury. Even if this problem of
circularity could be surmounted, Chapman would apparently call upon
appellate courts to apply one fine distinction (whether the error arose
under state law or had a constitutional dimension) so that the courts
could apply another fine distinction (for example, whether the error
was "probably harmless" or was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt").
I doubt that the courts could slice the salami that thin even if they
wanted to.
So long as the Chapman decision remains the law, it would be
simpler for the courts to apply Chapman's "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to all cases of prosecutorial misconduct. At least
the courts should do so when the misconduct was more than trivial
and when it has been seriously suggested that it deprived the defendant
of a fair trial. Nice calculations as to the source of the right that the
prosecutor violated would serve very little purpose.
A more durable solution might, however, lie in a restructuring
of the harmless error doctrine by both state and federal courts. Contrary
to the apparent assumption of the Chapman decision, constitutional
rights are not fungible.18 9 Neither are rights under state law. The
source of a right is an inadequate measure of its importance to the
defendant. When serious trial error has occurred, a court should find
the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt before it affirms the
defendant's conviction. When the error was minor, however, a conclusion that the error probably did not affect the verdict should be
enough to justify affirmance. In neither event should it matter whether
the error arose under state or federal law.
It is of course difficult to formulate rules for measuring the
"seriousness" of an error, and a "sliding scale" could be bent to
disingenuous analysis of the sort that has characterized the courts' application of the harmless error doctrine in the past. Whatever its
deficiencies, the Chapman decision did represent a significant effort
by the Supreme Court to foreclose unreflective invocation of the harmless error doctrine. Prior to Chapman, courts had far too regularly
concluded that constitutional rights were not worth the bother and
189 386 US. at 44 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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expense required to vindicate them, and in Chapman, the Supreme
Court called a halt. Under the proposed "sliding scale," however, the
courts would be expected to make clear in each case which "harmless
error" standard they were applying. In doing so, they would automatically reveal their views concerning the seriousness of each error.
The federal courts would retain the power to review each state-court
determination to ensure that its effect was not to deprive the defendant
of a federal right. Above all, the courts would be precluded from
applying the harmless error doctrine solely on the ground that the
defendant seemed guilty. With a modicum of good faith on the part of
state and federal appellate judges, this proposal should vindicate
significant rights while discouraging reversals for minor or technical
violations that probably did not affect the verdict. The proposal is thus
designed to further the original goal of the harmless error doctrine.
Before turning from appellate review to other correctives for
prosecutorial misconduct, it may be helpful to examine one final case.
This 1969 decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals illustrates
how much misconduct it may take to persuade a reluctant court to
grant the defendant a new trial. It also offers a review of some of the
procedural devices that the courts frequently employ in misconduct
cases to defeat the substantively valid claims of criminal defendants.
The case is Joyner v. State,140 a prosecution for robbery by assault.
The prosecutor began his argument in Joyner by implying the
existence of incriminating evidence outside the record:
There are many things that you must want to know about this
case that the law deprives you from knowing, properly I
suppose, but I am just frustrated and burned with the idea
that I would like to tell you things that I can't.
The court refused to reverse on the basis of this misconduct, observing
that "the record fails to reflect that any objection was interposed to such
argument at the time it was made. It is axiomatic that an objection is
requisite for appellate review."
The prosecutor next took the gun that the defendant had
allegedly used in the robbery and said, "Let me tell you a little bit
about this pistol: they will kill you .... It will kill any of you, and
me .... (Pointing pistol towards defendant) [I]t will kill any four time
loser, just like that (pulling trigger)." The defendant's prior convictions were not in evidence, and on this occasion the defense attorney
140 436 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).

HeinOnline -- 50 Tex. L. Rev. 666 1971-1972

1972]

COURTROOM MISCONDUCT

did object. The court, however, held that the error was cured because,
following the objection, the prosecutor explained that he had "no reference to any specific individual" and the trial judge instructed the jury
that "what lawyers say is argument."
The prosecutor then suggested without support in the record
that if the victim of the crime had resisted, the defendant would be on
trial for murder. The higher court noted cryptically, "This is not reversible error." The court also held that it was not error for the prosecutor to refer to the defendant as a hijacker, because this statement was
supported by the evidence.
The defense argued that the prosecutor had commented on the
defendant's failure to testify when he said, "Of course, the fact that he
was there, by his own admission-let's see what he said that night:
he didn't say anything that night .... ." The court of appeals rejected
this defense contention without explaining its reasons.
The prosecutor also criticized Supreme Court decisions and
actions of the Texas Legislature. He said that as a result of these
actions, "we are on the verge of anarchy in this country." The Court
of Criminal Appeals held that the prosecutor's statements concerning
the Supreme Court were not a ground for reversal because a prompt
objection had not been made, but it regarded the criticism of the state
legislature as "the only serious question in the case." As the court
observed, the prosecutor was now abusing "another branch of the
government." Still, the court held that the prosecutor's statement was
harmless error: "[I]t is not every demonstration of poor taste on the part
of a prosecutor which necessarily calls for reversal of a conviction."
Perhaps the most striking instance of misconduct occurred prior
to the prosecutor's final argument. The prosecutor asked a defense
witness whether he was a member of the Black Muslim organization
and secured a negative answer. The prosecutor then asked the witness
whether the defendant belonged to the Black Muslim organization.
The defense attorney objected, and the objection was sustained. Although the effect of this incident was probably the same as if the
witness had given an affirmative answer, the appellate court held, "No
reversible error appears."
For the Court of Criminal Appeals, this case was apparently a cliffhanger, but one with a happy ending. After the court had filed an
initial opinion affirming the defendant's conviction, the defense attorney submitted a petition for rehearing. The petition noted that an
objection had been presented on one of the occasions when the court
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said that none had been made, and it also emphasized that the trial had
occurred less than two weeks after the major ghetto disturbance in
Detroit during July 1967. This circumstance added further racial overtones to the prosecutor's statements about "Muslims" and "anarchy,"
and it was enough to tip the balance. The conviction was reversed.
Courts have often shown a significant reluctance to entertain
claims of prosecutorial misconduct. One might expect that in all but
the most extreme cases, defense attorneys would grow tired of presenting these claims and decide to forgo the bother and frustration.
Many appellate courts seem to be awaiting that development impatiently. My own impression, however, is that the courts' "understanding attitude" toward prosecutorial misconduct has added to the
bulk of appellate litigation. If the courts would begin to exhibit a
working commitment to the ideals of prosecutorial dignity and impartiality, the present volume of misconduct cases could be reducedsimply because prosecutors do care about retrials and lost convictions.
Prosecutors today apparently assume that it is appropriate to give unrestrained vent to their personal zeal, and the courts have done little
to create a glimmer of prosecutorial reflection and self-doubt. Some
re-education through reversal seems necessary in order to produce a
fair and dignified system of trial procedure.
At best, of course, the disciplinary function of appellate review
will remain incidental. There will always be cases of misconduct in
which it would be wasteful and functionless to grant new trials. Accordingly, a corrective mechanism that focuses directly on the propriety
of the prosecutor's behavior, disregarding the effect of this behavior
on the verdict, seems necessary. A few mechanisms of this sort are currently available, but as the following sections of this article will indicate, they have not been put into operation.
5. Civil Actions for Damages.--Some prosecutorial misconduct is
defamatory; some probably constitutes intentional infliction of emotional suffering; and some violates the defendant's constitutional right
to a fair trial, so that it might give rise to a cause of action under the
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871.141 Regardless of how a prosecutor's
conduct is characterized, however, a litigant confronts a major obstacle
when he relies upon this conduct as a basis for the recovery of damages:
Prosecutors enjoy an "absolute immunity" from civil liability for
actions undertaken in the performance of their official duties. 14
14142 US.C. § 1983 (1970).
142 Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967);
Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965).
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The prosecutor's immunity cannot be defeated by a showing of
"actual malice."' 143 When a prosecutor's behavior has been characterized
by a "complete absence of jurisdiction," however, the courts have
ordinarily held him liable." The scope of this limitation upon the
doctrine of "absolute immunity" is unclear. Prosecutors apparently
have "jurisdiction" to slander, 145 to deny the defendant a speedy trial,146
to engage in malicious prosecution,' 41 and even to present fraudulent
48
evidence.
If a prosecutor has engaged in "police activity" outside the courtroom, he may be subject to a civil action. 149 If he has acted at all like a
prosecutor, however (even a vicious, lawless, and dishonest prosecutor),
he apparently remains immune. Whatever the boundaries of prosecutorial immunity, no court has held a prosecutor liable for statements
made during the course of a trial. The prosecutor's courtroom remarks, like those of any other lawyer, are absolutely privileged in this
context. 50 Thus the prosecutor's courtroom conduct seems to be
doubly protected, both by a general prosecutorial immunity and by a
privilege applicable to other lawyers and litigants as well.
The justifications usually asserted for immunity are first, that the
threat of liability would make prosecutors less independent and courageous in executing their duties, and second, that the burden of
defending lawsuits would itself interfere with the prosecutors' performance of their public tasks. Although these rationales are plausible,
they do not seem entirely persuasive. In my view, no privilege should
be so "absolute" that it cannot be overcome by a showing of "actual
malice" (which, in this context, might be defined as any conscious sense
of serious wrongdoing).
Plainly there are kinds of courage and independence that should
not be encouraged. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that the burden
of defending civil litigation would require any district attorney's office
to add more than one or two lawyers to its staff. Prosecutors have long
defended actions brought to enjoin threatened illegal prosecutions, and
the burden of defending injunctive actions has not brought the business
143 Wise v. City of Chicago, 308 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 US.
944 (1963).
144 Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124, 128-29 (5th Cir. 1955).
145 Sauber v. Gliedman, 283 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 906 (1961).

146 Phillips v. Nash, 311 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963).
147 Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 406 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
148 Hurlburt v. Graham, 323 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1963); Lusk v. Hanrahan, 244 F.
Supp. 539 (E.D. IlM. 1965).
149 Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 537 (9th Cir. 1965).
150See W. PRossER, Tim LAw oF TORTS § 114(1) (4th ed. 1971); Note, supra note 13,
at 979.
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of prosecution to a halt. I doubt that judicial recognition of a duty to
defend damage actions would have a significantly more devastating
effect. If the burden of defense did pose a problem, perhaps each
plaintiff could be required to make a preliminary showing of malice
in an ex parte proceeding-a proceeding that would not bind the
prosecutor but that might establish the desirability of hearing both
sides in a full trial.
Although the current immunity of prosecutors should be restricted, the restriction probably would not convert damage actions
into a major corrective for prosecutorial misconduct. Both malice and
financial damage would usually be difficult to prove. Moreover, accused
and convicted criminals commonly evoke little sympathy from juries,
while prosecutors may evoke a great deal. Civil actions have been
notoriously ineffective as a remedy for police misconduct, 5 1 and many
of the difficulties encountered in cases involving police officers would
undoubtedly be duplicated in actions against prosecutors. The limitation of prosecutorial immunity would at least serve a symbolic function, however; it would show that prosecutors are not entirely above
the law that holds other mortals financially accountable for their intentional misdeeds.
6. Discipline by the Legal Profession.-The procedure for disciplining an attorney who departs from professional standards usually
begins with the grievance committee of his state bar association. The
judgment of this committee is invariably subject to some form of judicial review before discipline is imposed. Usually the grievance committee commences a legal action; the trial court must make an independent finding of misconduct; and the trial court's finding is subject to
review on appeal. The available sanctions are censure, temporary
suspension from the bar, and permanent disbarment.
These disciplinary procedures are rarely invoked as a corrective
for courtroom misconduct, and they are virtually never invoked as a
corrective for courtroom misconduct by prosecutors. 152 A 1954 study
reported only a handful of cases in which bar associations had began
disciplinary proceedings against defense attorneys for their courtroom
behavior,158 and the authors uncovered only a single case in which
151 See Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L.
Rv. 493 (1955).
152 This observation is also applicable to the various state statutes authorizing the
removal of prosecutors from office for gross misconduct. See Note, supra note 13, at 980.
153 Id. Almost all of these cases involved counsel for leaders of the Communist Party
in the early 1950's. See Sacher v. Association of the Bar, 347 U.S. 388 (1954); In re Isserman, 9 N.J. 269, 87 A.2d 903 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 927 (1953).
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a prosecutor had been disciplined for forensic misconduct.5 4 I have
been unable to discover a more recent instance of professional discipline for courtroom misconduct by a prosecutor. Although appellate
opinions in criminal cases have documented repeated instances of
serious prosecutorial misbehavior, bar associations have not acted upon
the readily available information.
A striking illustration of the reluctance of bar associations to discipline prosecutors was provided by the Grievance Committee of the
Illinois State Bar Association in 1968. In Miller v. Pate,155 the United
States Supreme Court granted habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner
under a death sentence on the ground that the prosecutor had "deliberately misrepresented the truth" in securing his conviction. The
prosecutor had introduced into evidence a pair of men's undershorts
covered with large reddish-brown stains. He had referred to these
shorts, allegedly discarded by the defendant one mile from the scene
of the crime, as "a garment heavily stained with blood." The prosecutor had permitted other witnesses, including the defendant, to refer
to the shorts in similar terms. Indeed, a prosecution witness, a chemist
for the State Bureau of Crime Identification, had testified that the
shorts were stained with blood and that the blood matched that of the
victim of the crime. No defense witness testified to the contrary; the
prosecutor had successfully resisted a defense motion to permit scientific inspection of the shorts.
Later evidence revealed that throughout the proceedings the
prosecutor was aware of a startling fact: The shorts were stained with
paint. The prosecutor had even secured a memorandum from the local
police department explaining, in the prosecutor's words, "how this
exhibit contains all the paint on it."
The Supreme Court's reliance upon the prosecutor's deception
induced the Grievance Committee of the Illinois State Bar Association
to begin its own investigation. The Committee quickly concluded that
"the United States Supreme Court had misapprehended the facts of
the case."' 551 The Committee reported that in addition to the reddishbrown paint, the shorts did contain blood. Its opinion said, "The question before the Grievance Committee, then, was not whether the
prosecution misrepresented the fact that there was blood on the shorts,
t4 In re Maestretti, 30 Nev. 187, 191, 93 P. 1004, 1005 (1908).
155 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
156 Statement of the Grievance Committee of the Illinois State Bar Association in the
Matter of the Prosecution of the Case of People of the State of Illinois v. Lloyd Eldon
Miller, Jr. at 1, May 14, 1968 (unpublished).
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because dearly its statement to this effect was not a misrepresentation.
Instead the question was, assuming the defense did not know of the
paint, whether the prosecution was guilty of unethical conduct in
failing to disclose its presence to the defense."'' 57 The Committee
answered this question in the negative on the ground that "the presence or absence of paint on the shorts was not a material question in
the case." It refused to recommend any disciplinary action.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Miller can fairly be criticized for
failing to make it clear that there might have been blood on the shorts
in addition to the paint. Still, the Court probably did not "misapprehend the facts." The Court quoted the testimony of the state chemist
at trial, and this testimony later became the primary basis for the Grievance Committee's conclusion that blood was present. Moreover, both
the state's brief and the defendant's had fairly presented the situation.
It was conceded that there might have been blood on the shorts. 158 The
presence of this blood did not alter the validity of the Supreme Court's
conclusion that the prosecutor had "deliberately misrepresented the
truth." The Grievance Committee's apparent attempt to convert the
issue from one of affirmative misrepresentation to one of nondisclosure
seems disingenuous. Plainly the prosecutor had deliberately created
the impression that the massive stained areas on the shorts were blood,
and he did so although he knew better. As the Supreme Court observed,
the "gruesomely emotional impact upon the jury was incalculable."'' 5 9
It is ironic that the Grievance Committee saw misleading implications in the Supreme Court's failure to state that there was blood on
the shorts in addition to the paint, but none in the prosecutor's failure
to state that there was paint on the shorts in addition to the blood. In
view of the fact that the presence of the paint was apparently wholly
unsuspected, the approach of the Grievance Committee seems backwards. When bar associations fail to see the ethical problems involved
in using dishonest tactics to place a man in the electric chair, it is not
157 Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
158 See especially Brief for Petitioner at 25 n.7, Miller v. Pate, 886 U.S. 1 (1967): "It is
questionable whether there is or was any blood on the shorts" (emphasis added). Although the defendant adopted this agnostic position, the state argued vigorously that
blood was present. Perhaps the Supreme Court sought to avoid the controversy by failing

to advert to the issue. It would, I think, have represented more thorough opinion-writing
for the Court to refer to the dispute and to state explicitly that it was irrelevant to the
Court's decision. Nevertheless, the Grievance Committee's criticism of the Supreme Court
seems unwarranted. The Court did not suggest that the testimony of the state chemist
was perjured, nor did anyone argue that the defendant's conviction should be invalidated
on that ground.
159 886 U.S. at 5.
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surprising that they have been unconcerned about the verbal abuse of
criminal defendants.
Prosecutors have, of course, been disciplined for accepting bribes,
for perjury, for embezzling county funds, and for other serious criminal
conduct. 1 0 Even in these situations, courts have sometimes exhibited
a strange hesitancy to subject prosecutors to the rules that are applicable to other lawyers. On at least one occasion, for example, a court
announced that although the prosecutor's conduct might merit disbarment, that sanction was inappropriate because it would work forfeiture
of office as county attorney and deprive the people of the services of one
whom they had selected. 161 The court therefore confined the remedy
for the prosecutor's misconduct to a reprimand. On other occasions,
courts have suspended prosecutors from the practice of law but ruled
that the suspension was inapplicable to the performance of their
62
prosecutorial duties.
In theory, suspension and disbarment are intended less as penalties than as devices for the protection of the public, and as the Columbia
Law Review has observed, "[I]t seems anomalous that [an attorney]
may be declared a danger to the bar and yet allowed to represent the
state.'1 63 The legal profession has long contended that its lofty ideals
are effectuated through a process of rigorous self-policing, but at least
in the area of prosecutorial misconduct, its pretensions have been
totally unfounded. Although the courts and the bar associations have
frequently described prosecutors as quasi-judicial officers who must
meet higher standards than other lawyers, both groups have usually
seemed to act on the opposite theory.
7. Punishment for Contempt of Court.-The ideal corrective for
courtroom misconduct by prosecutors may be punishment for contempt
of court. This sanction can be easily and quickly administered, and it
permits substantial flexibility in adjusting penalties to reflect the
severity of the prosecutor's misconduct. The authorized penalties range
from suspended sentences and token fines to larger fines, jail terms,
and indefinite suspension from the practice of law. 164
There is no reason why contempt citations could not be used to
control prosecutorial conduct in the same way that they have been
160E.g., Jones v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 67 Nev. 404, 219 P.2d 1055 (1950); In re
Simpson, 79 Okla. 305, 192 P. 1097 (1920).
161 Commonwealth ex rel. Buckingham v. Ward, 267 Ky. 627, 103 S.W.2d 117 (1937).
162 E.g., Melville v. Wettengel, 98 Colo. 529, 57 P.2d 699 (1936); In re Maestretti, 50
Nev. 187, 98 P. 1004 (1908); Snyder's Case, 301 Pa. 276, 152 A. 33 (1930).
163 Note, supra note 18, at 981.
164 Id.
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used to control the conduct of defense attorneys and lawyers in civil
cases. Indeed, when appellate courts have affirmed criminal convictions
despite the occurrence of prosecutorial misconduct, they have sometimes suggested that the trial court should have held the prosecutor in
contempt. 165 Nevertheless, contempt citations do not seem to have
been used at all for this purpose.
In preparing this article, I surveyed the reported decisions for the
past twenty-five years. Although I uncovered a large number of cases
in which defense attorneys had been punished for contemptuous courtroom behavior, I did not find a single case in which a prosecutor had
been so disciplined. Professor Singer's review of the decisions, although
limited to federal cases, went back further than mine. He was similarly
unsuccessful in his efforts to find any contempt citation for forensic
misconduct by a prosecutor.1 66 I did discover one case in which a trial
court had held a prosecutor in contempt for a courtroom statement,
but the trial court's action was reversed on appeal. 6 7 The prosecutor
in this case had disparaged the trial judge in informal remarks to a
court bailiff-at a time when the judge and jury were absent from the
courtroom.
As this lonely attempt to discipline a prosecutor for asserted courtroom misconduct indicates, contempt proceedings, which are summary
in character and which rest upon ill-defined standards, pose serious
dangers of abuse. Nevertheless, some of the dangers present when
defendants and defense attorneys are disciplined seem minimized when
prosecutorial misconduct is at issue. The usual objects of a prosecutor's
abusive remarks are, of course, the defendant and defense attorney
rather than the trial judge. The court therefore seems less likely to lose
its objectivity through personal embroilment in the controversy.16 8
Moreover, as a previous section of this article has indicated, 1 9 the
discipline of a defendant or of a defense attorney may prejudice the
jury trying his case, but the discipline of a prosecutor seems unlikely
to do so.
Despite these distinctions, reforms in contempt procedures should
certainly be extended to cases of prosecutorial misconduct as well as
to cases of contemptuous behavior by the defense. Like a defendant or
165 Castle v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 168, 170, 106 S.W.2d 626, 627 (1937). Cf. Rogers
v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. 226, 243, 127 P. 365, 372 (1912).
166 Singer, supra note 8, at 276.
167 Brutkiewicz v. State, 280 Ala. 218, 191 So. 2d 222 (1966).
168 Cf. Mayberry v. Penns ylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
169 See text accompanying notes 103-04 supra.
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defense attorney, a prosecutor should, for example, be afforded a full
hearing and an ample opportunity to prepare and present a defense.
Moreover, except in cases of truly outrageous behavior, the prosecutor
should be warned that his conduct might result in punishment before
punishment is actually imposed. Contempt citations should ordinarily
be confined to cases of repeated misconduct in which judicial reprimands have failed to do the job.
"You can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make him drink."
With contempt proceedings (as with professional disciplinary procedures), the machinery is available. The problem lies in persuading the
courts to use it. The task is not easy, and as frustration mounts, one's
thoughts may turn to the creation of a new and independent authority-perhaps an ombudsman or an administrative agency-that
could assume primary responsibility for the discipline of prosecutors.
To be sure, this reform probably would not offer procedures superior
to those currently available, but one can always hope that a different
set of personnel would somehow exhibit a greater understanding of the
problem.
It would certainly be inappropriate, however, to entrust the discipline of prosecutors to non-lawyers, if only because a rather specialized
sense of courtroom propriety seems necessary for effective performance
of the task. It would plainly be worse to make defense attorneys
responsible for the discipline of their opponents. If the judiciary seems
too sympathetic to prosecutors to do an effective job, it is improbable
that the prosecutors themselves would do better. Representatives of
the entire legal profession have, of course, had innumerable chances.
There is apparently no one left. Moreover, there is something seriously
unsettling about employing ombudsmen and similar devices to promote the impartial resolution of disputes that the courts themselves
were created to provide. If the courts were doing their jobs, they would
be our ombudsmen.
The key to the problem lies with the appellate courts. In this area
as in others, they are the most likely agents of reform. If appellate
judges would consistently demand careful and dignified trial procedures as a prerequisite to criminal conviction, their concern would be
effectively communicated to the trial courts. Trial judges might well
begin to use the various correctives at their command, including
punishment for contempt of court, in an effort to ensure the integrity
of their judgments. It is perhaps unfortunate that the legal profession
has come to look to the appellate courts as the principal or almost
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exclusive source of innovation in criminal procedure. Nevertheless,
these tribunals do seem to accumulate primary responsibility for setting
the "tone" of justice. In practice, when the tribunals at the pinnacle
of the judicial system do not care, no one else is likely to care either.
8. Long-Range Structural Reform.-In 1931, the Wickersham
Commission said, "The system of prosecutors elected for short terms,
with assistants chosen on the basis of political patronage, with no assured tenure yet charged with wide undefined powers, is ideally
adapted to misgovernment."'170 Prosecutors' offices are usually characterized by low salaries, rapid job turnover, lack of in-service training
programs, overwhelming caseloads, and a deep involvement in local
politics. All of these considerations seem to push prosecutors toward an
impatient, crusading, "gangbuster" self-image (that of the prosecutor
of the mass media) rather than toward a careful, impartial, quasi-judicial self-image (that espoused by the Code of Professional Responsibility). Institutions shape attitudes, and attitudes shape conduct. I
believe that the structural reform of prosecutors' offices might ultimately lead to a reduction of prosecutorial misconduct in the courtroom.
In England, it is common for a barrister to represent the Crown
at one trial and the defendant at the next. This system seems well
designed to promote professional detachment and perspective. Efforts
to implement the English system in the United States would undoubtedly encounter overwhelming political obstacles. Still, lesser
steps might be feasible. If, for example, through salary increases and
other measures, a body of career prosecutors and public defenders
could be developed, some rotation of assignments between the two
offices might be possible. A decline in mutual self-righteousness might
be the result.
Another productive step would be the elimination of local prosecutors' offices and the reorganization of prosecutorial functions at a state
rather than a county level. As the Wickersham Commission observed,
"Under the conditions of transportation to-day and with the.., coming
of highly organized crime, the State is as natural a unit as the county
or town was a century ago."'17 ' This reform might, among other things,
reduce the temptation of prosecutors to engage in flamboyant conduct
calculated to appeal to the local press.
The realities of political power probably preclude the total
170 WicM ISHAM Com'N REP., supra note 14, at 15.
Id. at 13.

171
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abolition of local prosecutors' offices. Again, however, lesser measures
may be practicable. In 1952, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association
Commission on Organized Crime proposed a Model Department of
Justice Act. This Act would authorize the State Attorney General to
"maintain a general supervision over the prosecuting attorneys of the
State with a view to obtaining effective and uniform enforcement of
the criminal laws throughout the State." 172 The Attorney General
would be empowered to survey the administration of criminal justice,
to organize conferences of prosecutors, and even to supersede local
prosecutors when that course became necessary.
Still another politically difficult but potentially productive reform
would be to replace the current system of electing district attorneys
with an appointive system. Even without this reform, the length of
the district attorney's term might be increased, and it might also be
possible to permit incumbent prosecutors to run unopposed for reelection in the same way that judges do in many of the states that have
adopted proposals for judicial reform.
Although local political interests seem to stand in the way of many
desirable innovations, political forces are not in these days of intense
concern about crime a major obstacle to necessary increases in salaries,
manpower, and training programs. Finally, many jurisdictions have
already removed the appointment of assistant district attorneys from
the patronage system. Certainly none of these reforms could be justified exclusively or primarily on the ground that they would reduce
courtroom misconduct by prosecutors. They might well have an effect
in this area, however, and they should therefore be considered in a full
evaluation of the problem.
II.

THE TRL4. JuDGE

The quality of our judges is the quality of our justice.
Leflar, The Quality of Judges, 35 IND. L.J. 289, 305 (1960).

A.

Introduction: The Trial Judge as Traffic Cop

An effective traffic policeman must sometimes be an aggressive,
"take-charge kind of guy." When a motorist attempts an illegal lefthand turn in heavy traffic and then disobeys ali order to drive straight
ahead, the situation does not call for a sensitive understanding of the
172 MODEL DEPARTMENT OF JusTiu

Aar

§ 7(2) (1952).
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motorist's social circumstances. Instead, it usually requires an immediate, forceful, and intimidating response-perhaps by an officer
whose lip is even stronger than the motorist's. A certain amount of
authoritarianism seems to come with the policeman's uniform and
badge.
The nature of a trial judge's job is, of course, essentially different.
In theory at least, a trial judge should rarely be called upon to act in
a crisis situation. He should act after the fact to resolve carefully
focused disputes that have not yielded to private settlement. Because
both parties to each case are usually convinced of the soundness of their
positions, the trial judge's task is frequently difficult. It requires ample
time, an atmosphere of careful deliberation, and the maintenance of
what Mr. Justice Sutherland called "the calm spirit of regulated
justice." 78
Nevertheless, over the course of the last half-century, this nation
seems to have done its best to divert its trial judges from their naturally
reflective role and to convert them into traffic policemen. At least we
have placed most of our judges at very busy intersections. 7 4 In 1964,
the three judges of Atlanta's Municipal Court resolved over 70,000
cases. 175 The following year, a single judge sitting in Detroit's Early
Sessions Division disposed of more than 20,000 cases.' 7 6 In 1968, New
York City's criminal courts took on 480,000 new cases, and they ended
the year with 520,000 cases still unresolved' 77 In many urban jurisdictions, criminal caseloads have doubled within a single decade. 179
The causes of today's administrative crisis in the criminal courts
are many: population growth; rising crime rates; the proliferation of
criminal statutes by legislatures that rarely consider enforcement costs;
and most recently, the Supreme Court's "due process revolution," which
has required trial courts to devote a greater portion of their resources
to the resolution of pre-trial motions and post-conviction proceedings
173 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 59 (1932).

174 For a general description of the rush-hour atmosphere of one misdemeanor court,
see Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REv. 385 (1951).
175 PRESMENT'S COMMISSION ON

LAW ENFORCEMENT

AND

ADMINISMATION

OF JUSTICE,

TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 31 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 TASK FORCE REP.].
176 Id. at 133.
177 TIME, Nov. 9, 1970, at 60.

178 In Cleveland, for example, the number of felony indictments increased from 4,514
in 1952 to 9,470 in 1963. Unpublished statistics supplied by John L. Lavelle, Court
Administrator for the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County. In Houston, the
number of indictments rose from. 2,582 in 1956 to 5,811 in 1967. Unpublished statistics
supplied by R. J. Roman, Clerk's Office, Harris County District Courts. In Los Angeles, the
length of an average felony jury trial increased from 3.5 days in 1964 to 7.2 days in 1968.
SAN FRANCISCO COMmIrrEE ON CRIME, A REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL COURTS OF SAN FRANCISCO,
PART I: THE SUPERIOR COURT BACKLOG-CONSEQUENCES AND REMEDIES 1 (1970).

HeinOnline -- 50 Tex. L. Rev. 678 1971-1972

1972]

CO URTROOM MISCONDUCT

and which has also increased the length of the average criminal trial. 79
Justice Bernard Botein recently described the situation in Manhattan
by saying, "We are holding the process together with Scotch tape and
wire because of lack of manpower."'-80

Many trial judges seem to have become as preoccupied with
"moving" cases as traffic policemen are with moving vehicles. Moreover, the techniques that they have come to employ are not entirely
dissimilar. Justice Mitchell D. Schweitzer of the New York Supreme
Court apparently expressed the philosophy of many trial judges when
he said:
In this job, one can do as much work as he wants to do. He
can sit back and listen patiently to every matter that is
brought before him. If he does that, he has done the job that
a judge is paid to do. But if every judge took that attitude, the
courts would be backed-up for twenty years. Some of us therefore take a more active part.' 8 '
The general change in judicial attitudes can be seen, not only in
the trial courts themselves, but in appellate opinions concerning courtroom conduct by trial judges. During the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, appellate courts generally attempted to promote a
truly antiseptic atmosphere in America's trial courts. In 1899, for
example, a New York court reversed a criminal conviction because the
trial judge had instructed an evasive defendant to "answer the question and stop quibbling."'1 2 Similarly, in North Carolina in 1917, a
judge told a criminal defendant to answer a question without "dodging." The defense attorney objected, and the trial judge both apologized and instructed the jury to disregard his remark. The North Carolina
Supreme Court nevertheless found the use of the word "dodging" so
offensive that it reversed the defendant's conviction.1 8 3 In 1967, by contrast, a Michigan court found no error when a trial judge, without
significant provocation, told a defendant under cross-examination to
"shut up."1 8
In 1891, the California Supreme Court ordered a new, trial because a trial judge had remarked, apparently accurately, that the defen179 In the District of Columbia, the length of the average felony trial increased from
1.9 days in 1950 to 2.8 days in 1965. REPORT OF TUE PRSDENT'S CorItssIoN ON CP, ra
IN TnE DswPcr OF COLUMBIA 263 (1966).
180 "City Courts Facing a Growing Crisis," N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1968, at 41.
181 Personal interview, Jan. 11, 1968.
182 People v. Hill, 37 App. Div. 327, 328, 56 N.Y.S. 282, 283 (1899).
188 State v. Rogers, 173 N.C. 755, 756, 91 S.E. 854, 855 (1917).
184 People v. Esse, 8 Mich. App. 362, 154 N.W.2d 545 (1967).
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dant "had contradicted herself several times in the record."'8 s8 In 1953,
the Fifth Circuit held that there was no "real claim" of reversible
error when a trial judge accused the defendant of making a misstatement and then refused to specify what it was.18 6
In 1919, the Colorado Supreme Court overturned a conviction
because a judge had responded to a defendant's story by asking, "Do
you mean to tell these ,jurors your wife and your stepdaughter are
s Forty years later, the Ninth Cirtrying to frame up a case on you? 1 87
cuit found no reversible error when a trial judge asked a defense attorney, "Do you mean to say that this defendant here is an innocent
individual that has been duped by this young girl?"'' 8
In 1935, a California court reversed a conviction because a trial
judge had told an apparently malingering defendant that his "theatricalism" must stop.8 9 In 1954, the Missouri Supreme Court found no
error in telling an emotional defendant to "leave out all the histrionics.
You are not in any show here."'190
Although the relative formalism of the early cases would probably
have disappeared in any event, today's overwhelming caseloads have
undoubtedly played a significant part in altering the trial judge's role.
Unlike a traffic policeman whose tasks are eased by the fact that motorists invariably share his interest in promoting the smooth flow of traffic,
a trial judge must confront some lawyers and litigants who would not
be at all distressed to see the flow of cases come to a halt. Perhaps even
more than traffic policemen, judges must be alert for illegal turns.
When criminal proceedings are delayed, tempers cool, memories
fade, witnesses are worn down by repeated court appearances, and
other witnesses disappear. Accordingly, criminal defendants-at least
those who are able to secure their release on bond-usually attempt
to postpone their trials for as long as they can. Delay is also useful to
defense attorneys who have encountered difficulty in collecting their
fees, and the techniques, both honest and dishonest, for postponing
the day of trial are many. 91
In an effort to improve their position in guilty-plea negotiations,
185 People v. Willard, 92 Cal. 482, 489-90, 28 P. 585, 588 (1891).

186 Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806, 811 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed,
346 U.S. 892 (1953).
187 Laycock v. People, 66 Colo. 441, 182 P. 880 (1919).
188 Bush v. United States, 267 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1959).
189 People v. McNeer, 8 Cal. App. 2d 676, 47 P.2d 813 (1935).
190 State v.Brotherton, 266 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Mo. 1954).
191 See generally Banfield & Anderson, Continuances in the Cook County Criminal
Courts, 35 U. CH. L. REv. 259 (1968).
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defense attorneys commonly employ tactics whose primary function
is simply to threaten the trial court's time. An attorney may, for
example, file a series of frivolous pre-trial motions hoping that a
prosecutor will offer sentencing concessions to avoid the burden of a
hearing.192 Other defense maneuvers are used, not for their stated
purposes, but to bring cases before judges who are considered favorable
to the defense. Finally, although this threat probably materializes more
often on television than in reality, some defendants may obstruct the
trial process as a form of political protest.
Many judges therefore believe that lawyers and litigants-particularly those on the defense side of criminal cases-will take advantage
of our inundated court systems if the judges do not exercise a firm
control. These judges may conclude, with some justification, that only
an authoritarian attitude can bring a measure of order out of the
chaos of America's criminal courts.
Our society has, of course, learned that authoritarian police attitudes cannot easily be confined to the situations in which they are
appropriate. Similarly, when a trial judge adopts a forceful, "takecharge" attitude toward defense maneuvers in criminal cases, he may
be unlikely to abandon that attitude when it becomes manifestly
inappropriate. In that way, the administrative crisis confronting our
courts has undoubtedly intensified the likelihood of courtroom misconduct by trial judges.
The pressures of the caseload not only encourage litigants to
abuse the system and judges to react to this threat; in addition, the
rapid flow of cases tends to dehumanize the criminal process. Cases
come to represent numbers rather than people, and authoritarian
judicial behavior becomes more likely. Judge Tim C. Murphy explains, "You sit there day after day and you hear the same problems
and the same excuses. You find yourself becoming impatient or losing
interest."'913 In his 1956 Holmes Lecture at the Harvard Law School,
Justice Walter V. Schaefer wrote, "Someone once wisely said that the
basic trouble with judges is not that they are incompetent or venal
beyond other men; it is just that they get used to it."'' 9Of course judicial misconduct cannot be attributed entirely to
the chaotic atmosphere that prevails today in urban courts. In relatively
192 See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 V. Cm. L. REv. 50,
56-57 (1968).
193 some Call It Justice-A Special Report on Washington Area Judges, THE
Sept., 1970, at 45, 77.
WASmNGToNiA,
194 Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure,70 HAsv. L. Rzv. 1, 7 (1956).
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unpressured rural courts, there are many judges who, in Professor
95
Herman Schwartz's phrase, "daily prove the truth of Acton's dictum."'
Professor Schwartz's portrait of a common species of American trial
judge may be a bit overdrawn, but no trial lawyer will fail to recognize
the figure that it portrays: "Glaring down from their elevated perches,
insulting, abrupt, rude, sarcastic, patronizing, intimidating, vindictive,
insisting on not merely respect but also abject servility-such judges
are frequently encountered in American trial courts, particularly the
lowest criminal and juvenile courts which account for most of our
criminal business."' 196
A local magazine for the District of Columbia, The Washingtonian,
recently investigated the performance of trial judges in and around
that city. Its report provided frequent and striking illustrations of
judicial misconduct. 197 In suburban Virginia, for example, a reporter
visited the courtroom of Judge L. Jackson Embrey and heard the
following exchange:
cOu1T: How old was this boy you were with?
DEFENDANT: I don't know, maybe 18 or 19.
THE COURT: You say this boy is a friend of yours?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. He's a friend.
T
COumT: And you don't know how old he is?
DEFENDANT: Not exactly. No, sir.
THm couiT: Have you ever had your head examined?
DEFENDANT: No, sir.
T
COURT: I think that it would be a good idea, don't you?' 98
T

In suburban Maryland, the reporter investigated the courtroom
behavior of Judge William B. Bowie, whose approach to life and to
judging was illustrated by a remark that he made in court about certain
black defendants: "If they want to live like animals, let them stay in a
pen somewhere."''

99

In the District of Columbia, The Washingtonian focused largely
on the Court of General Sessions.200 In the courtroom of Judge Edward

A. Beard, two defendants were awaiting trial on a narcotics charge
195 Schwartz, Judges as Tyrants, 7 CRam. L. BurL. 129,
196 Id. at 129-30.
197 THE WASmNrTONIAN, Sept., 1970, at 45.
198Id. at 74. The same judge once suggested that a

130 (1971).

mother beat her 18 year-old
daughter in court and ordered the sheriff to provide a strap.
199 Id. at 48.

200 This court, which has since gone out of existence in a general court reorganization,
was one of the better misdemeanor courts in the nation. Its judges were appointed by the
President, and they were compensated at the rate of $34,000 per year.
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when one of them fell asleep. Judge Beard promptly sentenced both
defendants to thirty days' imprisonment for contempt of court.
"But I'm all right," the non-offending defendant said. "Why me?"
"You are guilty by association," the judge replied. "Get them out
of here.

'20 1

In a similar vein, Judge W. Byron Sorrell once noticed a longhaired observer in the courtroom and shouted, "Get out of my court20 2
room and never come back."
After General Sessions Judge Milton S. Kronheim, Jr. had placed
a convicted defendant on probation, the defense attorney gave notice
that he planned to appeal. Judge Kxonheim then announced that the
defendant would not begin his term of probation until after the Court
of Appeals had made its ruling. Instead, because the defendant could
not post a $2,000 appeal bond, he would be returned to jail.
The defense attorney responded, "Your Honor, I would not want
to see this defendant locked up any longer, so I will not appeal the
case." The judge refused the defense attorney's offer-then withdrew
his award of probation and sentenced the defendant to 860 days' imprisonment.2 03
These examples are extreme. Nevertheless, similar incidents have
occurred throughout the nation. Judges have, for example, asked
defense attorneys whether they were not taught better in their first year
of law school,2 4 referred to their behavior as "shyster stuff," 20 5 called
206
their cross-examination of prosecution witnesses "just ridiculous,
and characterized them as "troublesome, like a school boy." 20 7 Judges
20
have similarly referred to defendants as drifters,

as bamboozlers,2 0

9

as black cats in a white Buick, 210 and as Sing Sing graduates. 211 As
recently as 1960 and 1963, moreover, judges told juries that they might
212
consider racial factors in reaching their verdicts.
201Id. at 45-46.
202 Id. at 47.
203 Id. at 48.
204 Eager v. State, 205 Tenn. 156, 166, 325 S.W.2d 815, 820 (1959).
205 Moore v. State, 147 Neb. 390, 597, 23 N.W.2d 552, 556 (1946).
206 United States v. Chikata, 427 F.2d 385, 388 (9th Cir. 1970). The Court of Appeals
said in this case, "We find nothing objectionable in the court's comments."
207 Adler v. United States, 182 F. 464, 472 (5th Cir. 1910), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 733

(1912).

20s People v. Brown, 2 App. Div. 2d 202, 204, 153 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746 (1956).
209 People v. Ohanian, 245 N.Y. 227, 231, 157 N.E. 94, 96 (1927).
210 State v. Belk, 268 N.C. 320, 324, 150 S.E.2d 481, 484 (1966). In making this remark,
the judge purported to be quoting from trial testimony, but no such testimony appeared
in the record.
211 People v. Herman, 255 App. Div. 314, 815, 7 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562 (1938).
212 Berry v. United States, 283 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 934
(1961); People v. Burris, 19 App. Div. 2d 557, 241 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1963). Of course the
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Witnesses, too, have been the subject of harsh judicial comments.
In one case, a judge said of a defense witness, "His testimony is a tissue
of lies. The defendant will be convicted on his testimony alone, if
nothing else."2 13 In another case, when an attorney called a witness
named "Mr. True," the trial judge remarked, "I can see now that
Mr. True is not going to be very good. He is going to belie his name.
But he'll be like the old gray mare that I so frequently refer to, except
that he's not all hell to get, but he isn't going to be worth a damn when
you get him." 214
There are, of course, still other illustrations:
-the judge who, at a pre-trial conference in a torts case, told
a lawyer who had refused to stipulate the amount of damages,
"I'm going to screw you every way I can short of reversible
2
error." 15

-the judge who, at the conclusion of a court appearance by
two defendants,
shouted, "Take those Puerto Rican animals
216
out of here."
-the judge who left the bench during testimony and
217
wandered about the courtroom whittling on a pine board.
-the judge who
threw coffee in a lawyer's face in a court218
house corridor.

Courtroom misconduct by prosecutors may merit special condemnation because of the influence that prosecutors commonly have
with juries, but juries are undoubtedly even more attentive to the
views and prejudices of trial judges. As the Iowa Supreme Court recently remarked, a trial judge's behavior "may influence the jury more
most striking illustrations of judicial bigotry come from another era. See, for example,
Green v. State, 97 Miss. 834, 835, 53 So. 415, 416 (1910), in which the trial judge told
a deputy to summon only young men as jurors, because "we want to break this nigger's
neck." The remark, although made before trial, came to the attention of a man who
later served on the defendant's jury, and as a result, the defendant's conviction was
reversed.
213 People v. Frasco, 187 App. Div. 299, 303-04, 175 N.Y.S. 511, 515 (1919). The judge
added, "I hope that you will never see the light of day again except behind bars in
SingSing prison."
14Myers v. George, 271 F.2d 168, 173 (8th Cir. 1959).
215 Braithwaite, Judicial Misconduct and How Four States Deal With It, 35 LAw &
CoNTmvr'. P oB. 151, 152 (1970).
216 Letter from William Teitelbaum, University of Texas law student and a summer
intern with the Philadelphia, Pa., District Attorney's Office, May 29, 1971, on file with
the Criminal Justice Project, Univ. of Texas School of Law.

217 Conner, The Trial Judge, His Facial Expressions, Gestures and General Demeanor
-Their Effect on the Administration of Justice, 6 Am.. Calm. L.Q. 175, 181 (1968).

218 Telephone interview with Jack E. Frankel, Executive Secretary, California Commission on Judicial Qualifications, June 80, 1971. For a view of judicial arbitrariness from
"the consumer perspective," see N. Km. , Tn AamiEs or THE NiGHr 227-37 (Signet
ed. 1968).
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than the evidence." 219 Moreover, if prosecutorial misconduct hinders
rehabilitative efforts and encourages defendants to believe that the
courts are stacked against them, if it promotes disrespect for the law
by the public in general and by minority groups in particular, judicial
misconduct surely has an even more harmful effect on the attitudes
of various constituencies toward our system of justice. Trial judges
are, however, even less subject to effective corrective measures than
prosecutors.
One can imagine a vignette in which a trial judge and a defense
attorney exchange obscenities with one another during a trial. Because
provocation by the trial judge ordinarily is not a defense to a charge
of contempt of court,220 the defense attorney might well be imprisoned
as a result of this incident. The trial judge, however (who is commonly
called "a symbol of experience, wisdom and impartiality" 22 1 ), could
in many jurisdictions not be disciplined at all.222 For some observers,
the "Chicago Eight" trial has already dramatized this paradox. Professor Herman Schwartz notes, "Abbie Hoffman may go to jail for five
years, but Julius Hoffnan went to Florida with a stop at the White
House for breakfast .... 21 23 The remainder of this paper will examine
what can and should be done to redress the balance and to give effect
to Thomas Jefferson's words, "Everyone in public life should be
answerable to someone.

224

Remedies for Judicial Misconduct
1. Appellate Review.-Allegations of courtroom misconduct by
trial judges are remarkably frequent in appellate litigation, but most
B.

219 State v. Kimball, - Iowa -, 176 N.W.2d 864, 867 (1970). Appellate courts have
repeatedly made similar observations, and indeed, some may have overestimated the
extent of the trial judge's influence with the jury. For example, in Pickerell v. Griffith,
238 Iowa 1151, 1166, 29 N.W.2d 588, 596 (1947), the court said, "[l]t is a matter of
common knowledge that jurors hang tenaciously upon remarks made by the court
during the progress of the trial, and if, perchance, they are enabled to discover the views
of the court regarding the effect of a witness' testimony, or the merits of the case, they
almost invariably follow them." In 1957, the Second Circuit said, "[The trial judge]
must not forget that the jury hangs on his every word and is most attentive to any
indication of his view of the proceedings." United States v. Ah Kee Eng, 241 F.2d 157,
161 (2d Cir. 1957). See also Veal v. State, 196 Tenn. 443, 446, 268 S.W.2d 545, 346 (1954).
220 See text accompanying notes 363-98 infra.
221 State v. Guido, 40 N.J. 191, 208, 191 A.2d 45, 54 (1963) (Weintraub, C.J.).
2 22
n the federal system, for example, it has commonly been maintained that
impeachment is the exclusive remedy for judicial misconduct and that impeachment is
permissible only in cases of "high crimes and misdemeanors." It is not clear that
obscenities from the bench could meet this standard, and it is virtually certain that the
House and Senate would lack the time and inclination to remedy such an incident even if
they had the power to do so. See text accompanying notes 269-84 infra.
228 Schwartz, supra note 195, at 133.
224 Quoted in Traynor, Who Can Best Judge the Judges, 53 VA. L. Rmv. 1266, 1279
(1967).
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of the allegations do not concern seriously disruptive behavior. Probably
the most common contentions are that the trial judge questioned
witnesses too extensively during the trial and that he commented too
forcefully on the evidence. Most jurisdictions wholly forbid judicial
comment, so that this last contention may merely take the form of an
argument that the judge directly or indirectly revealed his view of the
merits of the case. 225 In jurisdictions that permit comment, the usual
argument is that the trial judge went too far. In the federal system, for
example, a judge may comment on the evidence, but he "may not
become an advocate for one side.

'226

Similarly, in most jurisdictions, a

trial judge may question witnesses but "must not give an impression
227
of partisanship" in doing so.

Standards so general invite litigation even when the trial judge's
behavior has been perfectly proper. Although clearly abusive behavior
does arise under the headings "questioning witnesses" and "commenting on the evidence," 22 most litigation concerns situations in which
the trial judge has, at worst, made a plausible mistake of law or failed
to consider the aggregate effect of his behavior on the jury. A judge may,
for example, have questioned defense witnesses more extensively than
prosecution witnesses simply because the defense testimony was less
clear than the prosecution testimony. Despite the judge's good faith and
personal objectivity, his conduct might have indicated a general suspicion of the defense position to the jury.
Other appellate cases concern judicial comment on the defendant's
failure to testify229 and on the possibility that reversal, pardon, parole,

or probation may follow a conviction. 230 Finally, there are cases of
rudeness, bias, sarcasm, provocation, and generally undignified courtroom behavior-the cases with which this article is primarily concerned.
225 See, e.g., State v. Bryant, 189 N.C. 112, 126 S.E. 107 (1925).
226 See Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894). The leading case today is
probably Quercia v. United States, 289 US. 466 (1933), in which the trial judge informed
the jury that the defendant's testimony was a lie "except when he agreed with the
Government's testimony." The judge explained the reason for this conclusion: the
defendant had wiped his hands while testifying. Although the judge emphasized that
this view was merely a personal opinion and that the jury was free to disregard it,
the Supreme Court held the judge's conduct improper and reversed the defendant's
conviction.
227 See Annot., 84 A.L.R. 1172 (1933).
228 For example, in Cunningham v. United States, 311 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the
defendant admitted that he had been in the vicinity of the crime at 3:00 A.M.
Judge Alexander Holtzoff promptly commented, "[HI]onest people are in bed at 3:00 in
the morning."
229 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
230 E.g., United States v. Workman, No. 26,500 (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 1972); Bethel v. State,
162 Ark. 76, 257 S.W. 740 (1924); People v. Spitzer, 294 N.Y. 5, 60 N.E.2d 18 (1944).
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Appellate courts generally approach these cases in a different spirit
from that which typifies their opinions in cases of prosecutorial misconduct. The attitude is no longer that boys will be boys; instead, appellate courts seem to take the business of judging very seriously. There
are, of course, cases that seem to challenge this generalization. As in the
area of prosecutorial misconduct, each case does turn on its facts, and
the prediction of results is hazardous. My own view, however, is that
when appellate courts abandoned the rigid concepts of courtroom
propriety that had characterized their early decisions they did not
swing to the opposite extreme. Instead, they generally maintained a
sensible, sensitive, and fair-minded attitude toward allegations of
judicial misconduct. There are a few appellate decisions that seem to
tolerate abusive judicial behavior, 23 ' but not many.
There is, nevertheless, some evidence of a fraternal, protective
spirit among judges. Somewhat paradoxically, it lies primarily in the
opinions which reverse convictions on grounds of judicial misconduct.
The performance of trial courts is important public business, but when
an appellate court concludes that a trial judge's behavior was improper,
it frequently fails to reveal why. Perhaps this failure is attributable to
the appellate court's sympathy for the trial judge, or perhaps to a
misguided desire to preserve public respect for a judiciary that sometimes does deserve it. In any event, it is common for an appellate court
to say no more than that a review of the entire record has persuaded
it that the trial judge did not act with the requisite impartiality.
Similarly, courts sometimes cite instances of misconduct in appendices
which they do not publish, and they sometimes refer to particular pages
of unpublished trial records to support their findings of impropriety.
Even when an appellate court severely reprimands a trial judge, it
usually omits his name from the official report.
The more sensitive outlook that differentiates cases of judicial misconduct from cases of prosecutorial misconduct is apparent, not only in
substantive rulings, but in decisions on issues of appellate procedure.
For example, although courts have sometimes refused to consider claims
of judicial misconduct because of counsel's failure to object,2 32 they
have usually been ready to dispense with the requirement of objection
when judicial misconduct is at issue. 233 An objection to a trial judge
231 E.g., People v. Esse, 8 Mich. App. 362, 154 N.W.2d 545 (1967); United States v.
Chikata, 427 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1970).

232 See Note, supra note 83, at 545.
233 E.g., Harding v. United States, 335 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Salazar, 293 F.2d 442, 444 (2d Cir. 1961). See Note, Off the Deep End: Bias From the
Bench, 11 SYRACUSE L. lgv. 244, 252 (1960).
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concerning his own conduct is of course very likely to be fruitless; in
addition, challenging the behavior of a dictatorial judge may merely
antagonize him further.
Some experienced trial lawyers have considered how best to surmount the difficulties involved in raising objections to judicial misconduct.234 The task, however, remains difficult for most lawyers. As
the Second Circuit observed in a judicial misconduct case in 1957, "A
less experienced advocate might well have trimmed his sails to such a
judicial wind as prevailed in the courtroom during this trial ....
Appellate courts seem sympathetic to the delicacy of the lawyer's
position, and when this difficulty is added to the others inevitably
raised by a requirement of objection, 236 they have generally been
charitable.
Some appellate courts have excused what would otherwise be
improper behavior by a trial judge on the ground that it was provoked
by the misconduct of an attorney. In a 1967 Illinois case, for example,
a police officer reported that he had been assigned to a particular station,
and the defense attorney asked, "Is that the famous, or should I say
infamous, Fillmore district?"
234 New York defense attorney Henry B. Rothblatt recently described in some detail
his strategy in confronting a trial judge whose conduct seemed prejudicial:
The question is how to take him on. Very early in the trial, when he begins
to show his prejudice, let him know in a dignified way that you are not afraid
of him. What I do is immediately call a bench conference. A case I was trying
about two months ago was presided over by a judge who did not really mean
to act in an apparently prejudiced manner. I think it was just one of those
unfortunate slips. He made some remark.., that I thought was a little facetious
and sarcastic, causing members of the jury to snicker. I immediately said to
myself, "Let me put him in his place." Aloud, I said, "Your Honor, we want
a bench conference." We went up to the bench and, almost in a monotone,
I said, "The defendant now moves for a mistrial." (When you tell off a judge,
you, the attorney, never make any motions; it is the defendant who is making
the motions ....
) I said, "Your Honor's remarks, though I'm sure they weren't
deliberate, hurt just as badly when you said
I," and I
quoted his exact words. I said, "There was snickering in that jury. Your Honor
gave that jury the impression that the . . . defense here is completely without
merit. That type of remark made in the presence of the jury prevents the accused
from getting effective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution, and due process of law under the fourteenth
amendment."
Every time you chew out a judge.. raise constitutional questions. What you
are doing is telling the judge in very nice language that you are a constitutional
lawyer, that you are telling him off in constitutional terms, that this case is
going not only all the way to the highest state court, but that you are going to
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and that the petition
for certiorari is going to say what a lousy mean judge he is.
Trial Tactics in Criminal Cases, 37 TENN. L. Ray. 705, 714 (1970) (proceedings of a symposium at the Southeastern Trial Lawyers Institute).
235 United States v. Ali Kee Eng, 241 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1957).
236 See text accompanying notes 90-106 supra.
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The trial judge interjected, "It may be an infamous district but
it is only because of the fact of the people who live there I suppose."
Although the Illinois Appellate Court conceded that the trial
judge's remark was unfair, it decided that the defense attorney had
"deliberately baited" the judge by "quipping" with the officer. On
237
that ground, the court refused to reverse the defendant's conviction.
There are other rulings of this sort, but they are far less common
in cases involving trial judges than in cases involving prosecutors. The
apparent attitude of most courts was expressed by the Second Circuit
when it said in 1962, "Although the court was at times provoked by
defense counsel that is no justification for allowing the trial to become
23 s
a running battle between the court and counsel before the jury."
In 1960, the Eighth Circuit noted that both the defendant and his
counsel had done much to try the court's patience; nevertheless, it
reversed the defendant's conviction because of the trial judge's conduct.
fair trial "no
The court observed that the defendant was entitled to a 23
9
been."
have
may
he
a
character
matter how objectionable
Perhaps the most striking procedural difference between cases
of judicial misconduct and cases of prosecutorial misconduct lies in
the courts' application of the harmless error doctrine. Courts have of
course applied the harmless error doctrine in cases of judicial misconduct, and on occasion, the results have been as extreme as they
often are in cases of prosecutorial misconduct. In one case, a defense
attorney objected to the admission of a certain piece of evidence, and
the judge responded, "[Y]ou don't want the truth to come out." The
Tenth Circuit held the error harmless because there was "clear evidence
of guilt."2 40 In another case, a trial judge asked a defendant why he was
"telling all those lies," whether it was his custom to lie, and whether he
ever told the truth. The judge also announced that he had tried to
"get the defendant to speak like a man, but it did not seem to do any
good." Once again, an appellate court held the error harmless. 241
237 People v. Thomas, 85 IM. App. 2d 234, 288, 229 N.E.2d 301, 304 (1967). In a similar
vein, a California court remarked that under the stress of a difficult trial, a judge
could not be expected to choose his diction "with the nicety of a Field or Marshall."
People v. Knocke, 94 Cal. App. 55, 60, 270 P. 468, 471 (1928).
288 United States v. Persico, 305 F.2d 534, 540 (2d Cir. 1962).
239 Berry v. United States, 283 F.2d 465, 467 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 864 U.S.
934 (1961). See also People v. Di Carlo, 242 App. Div. 328, 275 N.Y.S. 40 (1934); Skelton
v. Beal 133 So. 2d 477, 481 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961); Note, supra note 233, at 252.
240 Addis v. United States, 62 F.2d 329, 331 (10th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S.
744 (1933). But see Cook v. State, 36 Ala. App. 449, 57 So. 2d 832 (1952).
241 People v. Earl, 10 Cal. App. 2d 163, 51 P.2d 147 (1935). See also United States
v. Allen, 431 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1970).
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Commonly, however, courts have demonstrated their extreme
reluctance to hold courtroom misconduct by trial judges nonprejudicial. 24 2 The courts, moreover, have been particularly reluctant to
apply the harmless error doctrine simply because evidence of guilt
seemed overwhelming 2 43 The Fifth Circuit said in 1932, "It is vastly
more important that the attitude of the trial judge should be impartial
than that any particular defendant, however guilty he may be, should
be convicted." 244 In 1970, a New Jersey appellate court wrote,
[W]e are not to reach a conclusion of harmless error because
we may believe that the defendant in fact was guilty as
charged ....

[C]ourts of justice act upon the belief that if

guilty, a party will be so found after a fair trial.... [N]o
matter how.., evident the guilt, an accused has an absolute
right to a fair trial
before an impartial judge and an un2 45
prejudiced jury.

In short, appellate courts have done a thorough and conscientious
job in most of the cases of judicial misconduct that have come before
them. Appellate judges seem to care more about preserving the integrity of the judicial system than about salving the feelings of their
brethren on the trial bench. Appellate review inevitably has a narrow
focus, however, and there are other important reasons why this remedy
cannot by itself control courtroom misconduct by trial judges. First,
judicial misconduct is most frequent and most extreme in the lower
criminal courts whose judgments are rarely reviewed on appeal. 24 6 Indeed, the more abusive behavior of lower-court judges may be attributed
as much to the absence of any real threat of appellate review as to their
more pressing caseloads or to the lower caliber of personnel who sometimes serve on the misdemeanor bench.24 7
A promising partial solution to this problem may be the installation
of sound-recording systems in misdemeanor courtrooms. Since January
242 See, e.g., State v. Kimball, 176 N.W.2d 864 (Iowa 1970).
243 See, e.g., Meeks v. United States, 163 F.2d 598, 602 (9th Cir. 1947).
244 Hunter v. United States, 62 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1932).
245 State v. Zwillman, 112 N.J. Super. 6, 20, 270 A.2d 284, 291 (App. Div. 1970).
246 See 1967 TASK FORCE REP., supra note 175. The Commission noted that in

many
lower courts, "defendants are treated with contempt, berated, laughed at, embarrassed
. Id. at. 31.
247 The President's Commission observed that although some lower-court judges are
as capable in every respect as their counterparts in more prestigious courts, the lower
courts do not attract such judges with regularity. Id. at 32. The Commission has proposed
a thoroughgoing reform of the lower criminal courts, a reform that might substantially
reduce the incidence of judicial misconduct. The program includes the abolition of
justice-of-the-peace systems whenever feasible, the modernization of physical facilities,
major increases in judicial manpower and supporting personnel, and the unification of
felony and misdemeanor courts. Id. at 29-36.
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1, 1970, the New Jersey court system has placed recorders in 200
Municipal Courts, including all Municipal Courts in cities whose
population exceeds 10,000. Lewis Bambrick, the Assistant Administrative Director of the New Jersey Courts, reports that the recorders have
apparently caused lower-court judges to conduct themselves with
greater dignity. Even without appellate review, the availability of an
authoritative record seems to have had a deterrent effect. 248 At the
same time, New Jersey's sound-recording systems plainly protect lowercourt judges against unfounded charges of misconduct.
A second reason why appellate review cannot entirely control
courtroom misconduct, even in major trial courts, is that much of what
judges do is essentially unreviewable. 2 9 A great deal of power lies in a
judge's gestures, grimaces, and tone of voice. On occasion, of course,
attorneys do seek to include evidence of non-verbal misconduct in the
trial record. In a New York case, a defense attorney said, "And I want to
state for the record that I wish your Honor would cease making these
remarks, that he would cease smiling and frowning and doing things
which might lead the jury to believe that he has an opinion as to the
facts in this case, and I ask the Court to please instruct the jury to
disregard any such smiles or frowns or what-not as the jury may see
the Court make." 250 There are, perhaps, less antagonizing ways of
making the objection. Judge Oris D. Hyder suggests that an attorney
approach the bench and say, "Judge, your indigestion this morning is
showing at times, and it just so happens that the pain is apparent at
critical times in my defense. I wondered if Your Honor would take a
couple of Milanta tablets, which I always carry, and control the making
of these faces."2 51
When a lawyer attempts to place evidence of a judge's misconduct
in the record, he may find that the judge will simply refuse to let him
do so. Court reporters, who must work closely with trial judges, have
been known to omit even verbal misconduct from official transcripts.
For this reason, in school integration cases, Justice Department lawyers
sometimes insisted on having their own stenographers present in Southern courtrooms. 252 Defense attorney Stanley E. Preiser recalls an occasion
on which a federal district judge refused to let him describe the judge's
behavior for the record:
248 Telephone interview, June 30, 1971.
249 See Schwartz, supra note 195, at 130;

Conner, supra note 217.
280 People v. Stiglin, 238 App. Div. 407, 420, 264 N.Y.S. 832, 847 (1933).
251 Symposium, supra note 234, at 711.
252 Schwartz, supra note 195, at 180 n.6.
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I was scared to death.... The judge said, "I'm not going to let
you put it in the record, and sit down or you're going to jail."
I sat down. At the first recess, I gathered all the people that I
could in the courtroom and took affidavits, which
we were pre253
pared to submit later as part of the record.
Efforts to bring non-verbal misconduct before appellate courts
are sometimes successful, however. In a 1954 case, the Tennessee
Supreme Court, without explaining how the facts had come before it,
reversed a conviction because a trial judge had nodded in apparent disagreement throughout a defense attorney's dosing arguments. The court
commented, "The jury was left to speculate whether his Honor's collar
was too tight .... ,,254 In such a situation, the use of sound and video
5
recorders might again be helpful. 25
There is one final reason why appellate review cannot be entirely
effective as a remedy for judicial misconduct. Some judges seem impervious to any corrective measure short of removal from office. Anyone
who has spent much time among trial judges has heard some of them
remark that they are quite indifferent to the prospect of appellate
reversal. These judges commonly say that they "call 'em as they see
'em," and if appellate judges disagree, "that's their problem." When
one has spent much time among trial judges, however, he also knows
that these statements are usually false. Most judges seem to take any
reversal, even one on an abstract point of law, as a personal reproach.
Still, the arrogance of some judges yields to no man and no law.
These are the judges who seem to be most frequently involved in
extreme cases of courtroom misconduct. Once, when a California
appellate court reversed a conviction on grounds of judicial misconduct,
it noted that on four previous occasions it had called the trial judge's
attention to the impropriety of his behavior. "Anything we may say
will have no effect on his future course of action," the court concluded. 25 6 The court's prediction quickly proved accurate; within six
months, the court was again required to reverse a conviction because
2 57
of the judge's courtroom behavior.
253 Symposium, supra note 234, at 712.

254 Veal v. State, 196 Tenn. 443, 446, 268 S.W.2d 345, 346 (1954). But see Hill v.
State, 153 Tex. Crim. 105, 109, 217 S.W.2d 1009, 1011-12 ("[W]e are at a loss to see
how we can rule on the expression on the face of a judge or what was meant by
means of a scowl or a frown or a movement of the head.") See also Billed v. United
States, 184 F.2d 894, 401-02 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
255 See State v. Barnholtz, 287 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Mo. 1956).
256 Etzel v. Rosenbloom, 83 Cal. App. 2d 758, 764-65, 189 P.2d 848, 852 (1948).
257 Podlansky v. Price, 87 Cal. App. 2d 151, 196 P.2d 608 (1948). The incident is
described in Note, supra note 83, at 548.

HeinOnline -- 50 Tex. L. Rev. 692 1971-1972

1972]

CO URTROOM MISCONDUCT

The point of this analysis is not that appellate review has been
ineffective. In light of the pressures and temptations to which trial
judges are subject (and in light of the incredible personalities that some
of them possess), it is probable that judicial misconduct would have
become a substantially greater problem had not the appellate courts
taken it so seriously. Nevertheless, appellate review cannot do the job
alone; there is a need for something more.
2. The Statutory Challenge.-Although appellate review, like
most remedies, operates after the fact, there is one mechanism that may
operate even before trial to reduce the impact of abusive judicial behavior. In every state, of course, a litigant may move to disqualify a
judge on grounds of bias, but some states have gone further. They have
authorized any litigant to disqualify a single judge without setting forth
a reason. 258 The result is a "peremptory challenge" comparable to that
which litigants may exercise against a limited number of veniremen
during the jury-selection process.
Such a mechanism might prove particularly useful in highly
publicized trials with political overtones, for these trials seem to bring
out, not only the worst in judges, but the worst judges. From Joseph
Gary in the Haymarket trial, to Webster Thayer in the Sacco-Vanzetti
case, to Julius Hoffman in the trial of the Chicago Eight, the luck of
the draw has not seemed entirely satisfactory. If the defendants in each
of these cases had been empowered to disqualify a single judge when the
initial assignment was unacceptable to them, history might have been
different.
Nevertheless, the implementation of this remedy would involve
substantial costs, and there is room to doubt its effectiveness. One
California defense attorney says of the statutory challenge, "Only a
dumb civil lawyer goes that route. When you challenge a judge, he
always sends you to another just as King-Sized as he is. Most of us
therefore go about dodging judges in the same way that we always
have."259
Although the challenge might still be invoked in a significant
number of criminal cases, I doubt that it would be used primarily to
avoid bad or abusive judges. Instead, its most probable use would be to
duck any judge whose sentencing philosophy was less acceptable to
the defendant than that of the judge likely to appear on the second roll
258 CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 170.6(3) (West Supp. 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-5
(Smith-Hurd 1970); see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 261.08 (Supp. 1972).
259 Personal interview with Luke McKissack, Los Angeles attorney, Feb. 17, 1968.
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of the dice. Indeed, the challenge has even been used to maneuver cases
into air-conditioned courtrooms and to disqualify able judges in the
hope of increasing the chance of reversible trial error.2 60 Moreover,
the challenge plainly becomes another weapon in the defense attorney's
arsenal of delay.
I believe that the challenge might also tend to disadvantage
indigent defendants and to relegate them to "bastard courtrooms."
Unless a public defender's office decided to challenge a particular judge
whenever a defender's client came before him, the fear of reprisal might
make the defender's office reluctant to challenge the judge at all. This
fear of reprisal is obviously less intense for a private lawyer, who is
likely to have only one or two cases before a given judge during the
judge's tour in the criminal courts. In jurisdictions without public
defender systems, it is common to appoint lawyers without significant
experience in criminal cases to represent indigent defendants, and these
lawyers often do not know which judges to duck. They would be the
lawyers most likely to occupy the courtrooms that the more knowledgable attorneys had abandoned. Indirectly, therefore, the challenge
might become another mechanism for victimizing the poor in criminal
cases.
The statutory challenge has at least the virtue of honesty. The
experience of most urban jurisdictions suggests that judge-shopping is
endemic, and an open procedure would certainly be preferable to the
disingenuous devices used today for that purpose. It would be far
better, however, if judge-shopping could be controlled and if each
litigant were simply required to take his chances. On a busy morning
in an urban courthouse, every judge will presumably hear someone's
case. The result of all the pre-trial shuffling will be simply to determine
2 61
which hapless litigants come before the tyrants.
3. Civil Lawsuits-Like a prosecutor, a trial judge enjoys absolute immunity from civil liability for acts undertaken in the performance of his official duties.262 A trial judge is, of course, the natural
object of a losing litigant's bitterness, and judicial independence may
merit careful nurturing more than prosecutorial independence. Moreover, whoever provides legal representation for a trial judge-whether
a private attorney or a governmental agency-is likely to appear before
260 Note, Remedies for Judicial Misconduct and Disability: Removal and Discipline
of Judges, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 149, 172 (1966).
261 Of course some judges become tyrannical only in certain sorts of cases. The
statutory challenge might be an effective means of directing these judges toward cases
that they seem able to handle with equanimity.
262 See Note, supra note 260, at 151.
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him in other cases. For these reasons, judicial immunity seems more
defensible than prosecutorial immunity. Although the better course
might, nevertheless, be to abolish this immunity in cases of actual
malice, the institution seems impregnable.
4. ProfessionalDiscipline.-At least two states, Missouri and Wisconsin, have given their local bar associations explicit authority to
institute disciplinary proceedings against trial judges. 263 The New York
University Law Review reports that in Missouri, the power has been
exercised sporadically and ineffectively. Members of the relevant bar
association committee have generally expressed distaste for the dirty
work that they are required to do.2 4 In Wisconsin, the bar association's
power to discipline judges has never been invoked at all.2 65 As one

Wisconsin lawyer explained, "It's like asking a committee of mice to
put a bell on the cat. '266 A disciplinary proceeding may stop short of
removing an abusive trial judge from office, and lawyers who may
again find themselves before the judge understandably fear the consequences of that development.
Professor Herman Schwartz has suggested a means by which the
natural timidity of bar association committees might be overcome; the
power to discipline judges might be given to "bar groups whose membership remains secret."267 A regime based on faceless accusers and face-

less decision-makers, however, seems inconsistent with traditional
notions of fair play.268 I am confident that a more appropriate tribunal

can be created.
5. Impeachment and Other Traditional Mechanisms for Removing a Judge from Office.-In many jurisdictions, the discipline
of judges is an all-or-nothing affair; these jurisdictions rely on traditional
disciplinary procedures such as impeachment, which do not authorize
any sanction short of removal from office. Because most cases of courtroom misconduct plainly do not merit so severe a penalty, these juris263 Mo. CONST. art. V, § 27; Wis. ST. BAR R. 10, § 5. Bar associations in other states
could presumably subject trial judges to the disciplinary procedures that are applicable
to all other members of the legal profession. See Gordon v. Clinkscales, 215 Ga. 843, 114
S.E2d 15 (1960); In re Copland v. Newcomb, 66 Ohio App. 304, 33 N.E.2d 857 (1940).
264 Note, supra note 260, at 165-66.
265 Id. at 166.
2661d. at 167.
267 Schwartz, supra note 195, at 137.
268 One might wonder how such a group would go about learning the trial judge's
side of the story. Perhaps committee members could sit behind a partition in the hearing
room and attempt to disguise their voices, or perhaps they could wear white sheets. If
the committee's ruling were adverse to the trial judge, appropriate notification might
consist of a page of the Bible marked with a black spot.

HeinOnline -- 50 Tex. L. Rev. 695 1971-1972

TEXAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:629

dictions have rarely dealt in any way with the problem of abusive
judicial behavior.
In 1804, a Justice of the United States Supreme Court was brought
to trial before the Senate in an impeachment proceeding. The charges
against the Justice, Samuel Chase, related primarily to his courtroom
conduct while riding the circuit as a trial judge. Mr. Justice Chase was
beyond any question an arrogant and impatient fellow. Not only was
his courtroom manner overbearing and sarcastic, but he also felt free
to lecture juries on political issues. Nevertheless, the movement to
impeach Mr. Justice Chase reflected not so much a concern for courtroom decorum as a desire to replace as many Federalist judges as
possible with Republicans. The Justice's acquittal by the Senate has
traditionally been viewed as a landmark of judicial independence, 6 9
and no Supreme Court Justice has since been impeached by the House
of Representatives.
Despite the lessons usually drawn from the Chase impeachment,
courtroom misconduct by a trial judge may occasionally be so outrageous, or so frequent an occurrence, that removal from office seems
appropriate. Nevertheless, there is room to doubt that a federal judge's
courtroom behavior, however tyrannical, could ever constitute adequate
grounds for impeachment under the United States Constitution.
Article III, section 1 of the Constitution provides that federal judges
"shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour." Article II, section 4
declares that "civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from
Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." The obvious gap between the
terms of these two provisions has produced a long-standing controversy,
recently rekindled by the efforts of some House conservatives to commence impeachment proceedings against Mr. Justice Douglas. The
basic issue is whether the impeachment of a federal judge requires a
showing that he has committed a high crime or misdemeanor, or
whether it is enough that his behavior has not been "good."
From my perspective, this issue is really not very difficult. It
would surely do no violence to the English language to say that a judge
should hold office during good behavior-that is, so long as he refrained from treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. It would, however, be linguistic nonsense to approach the
problem from the other direction and to say that a judge might be
269 See Blackmar, On the Removal of Judges: The Impeachment Trial of Samuel
Chase, 48 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 183 (1965).
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impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors-that is, anything that a
majority of the House and two-thirds of the Senate considered less than
good behavior. 27 0 Moreover, this Nation's claim to an independent
judiciary would seem rather strained if a judge were subject to removal
whenever the legislature, acting with virtually no standards, decided
that his behavior had not been "good."
The Senate has on two occasions, however, convicted federal
judges on articles of impeachment that did not charge indictable
crimes,271 and elaborate historical arguments have been presented to
show that the Constitution was designed to preserve judicial independence only from the executive branch of government, not from
the legislature. 72 Some authorities have even contended that because
the Constitution is ambiguous, Congress may rely on the necessary
and proper clause to set its own standards. 273
Although I believe that the Constitution requires the commission of a high crime or misdemeanor as a prerequisite to impeachment, the question remains whether courtroom misconduct by a trial
judge might satisfy this standard. Disruptive courtroom behavior by
litigants and attorneys is commonly viewed as contempt of court, a
criminal act, and there is no reason why a trial judge's misconduct
should be considered any differently. Although it is conventional to
refer to the trial judge as "the court," the man and the institution are
plainly not the same.274 Indeed, one federal statute defines contempt
of court, in part, as the "misbehavior of any of [the court's] officers in
their official transactions." 275 Another form of contempt under this
statute is the "misbehavior of any person in [the court's] presence or
so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice." 276 Abusive
judicial behavior could easily fit within these definitions, and in my
view, contemptuous behavior by a trial judge might reasonably be
2
classified as a high crime or misdemeanor.

77

270 But see Ford, Impeachment-A Mace for the Federal Judiciary, 46 NoE DAMe
lAW. 669 (1971).
271 Stolz, Disciplining Federal Judges: Is Impeachment Hopeless?, 57 CALIF. L. RV.
659, 663 (1969).
272The constitutional phrase "during good Behavior" was derived from the English
Act of Settlement. This Act authorized Parliament to remove any judge from office upon
a majority vote of both Houses. Id. at 662.
275 Id.
274.But cf. Sachet v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952): "At a trial the court is so

much the judge and the judge so much the court that the two terms are used interchangeably in countless opinions ... and contempt of the one is contempt of the other."
275 18 U.S.C. § 401(2) (1970).
2761d.
277

§

401(1).

See text accompanying notes 840-42 infra.
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Although courtroom misconduct by a trial judge might provide a
constitutional basis for impeachment even in the federal system, and
although there are cases of misconduct that may merit this extreme
remedy, impeachment is an extraordinarily cumbersome way of removing a trial judge from office. Thomas Jefferson referred to impeachment as "an impractical thing" and "a mere scarecrow" 278 and the
experience of a century and a half has only confirmed this judgment.
There are several reasons why impeachment has proved unsatisfactory as a remedy for courtroom misconduct. First, impeachment
proceedings obviously consume time that Congress or a state legislature
might otherwise devote to legislative business. Federal impeachment
trials have commonly lasted from six to eight weeks, 279 and that fact
may partly explain why only eight such trials involving federal judges
have occurred during the course of American history. 2 0 The last of
these trials was concluded in 1936, and today it is virtually inconceivable
that Congress or a state legislature would abandon its regular business
to remedy courtroom misconduct by a trial judge, however serious.
Second, an impeachment trial is expensive. The aggregate cost of two
recent impeachment proceedings in Florida, in both of which the
defendant judges were acquitted, was $250,000.281 Third, impeachment is sometimes an extraordinarily slow remedy, especially in states
whose legislatures meet only once each biennium. Fourth, the procedures employed in impeachment trials are ill-defined and seriously
unfair to the accused judge. Congressman Hatton W. Sumners, the
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, described the latest
impeachment of a federal judge (that of District Judge Halsted L.
Ritter in 1936) by saying, "[F]or ten days we presented evidence to
what was practically an empty chamber. '2 2 On one occasion, only
three Senators were present, one of whom was busily writing letters.288
At the conclusion of an impeachment trial, most Senators vote to
convict or acquit without expressing any view on the law or the facts.
It remains entirely unclear whether guilt must be shown beyond a
reasonable doubt, by a preponderance of the evidence, or by some
other standard of proof.284 Fifth, the outcome of an impeachment
278 Quoted in Note, The Chandler Incident and Problems of Judicial Removal, 19
STAN. L. Ray. 448, 455 nAl (1967). See also Frankel, Removal of Judges-Federaland State,

48 J. Am. Jut. Soc'Y 177 (1965) (quoting Mr. Justice Samuel F. Miller).
279 1967 TAsK FoRcE REP., supra note 175, at 70.
2801d.
281 Id.

282 Quoted in Frankel, supra note 278, at 180.
283 Note, supra note 278, at 456.
284 Stolz, supra note

271, at 667.
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proceeding may be determined as much by partisan politics as by the
evidence. Congressman Sumners noted that in the Ritter trial, "there
were 56 votes for conviction and of those 56 votes only five were of the
same political party as the Judge being tried.12 5
Similar observations apply to two other traditional mechanisms
for removing a judge from office: address, a procedure by which a
state legislature may formally request the governor to terminate a
judge's tenure; and concurrent resolution, a procedure which differs
from address only in that the governor is legally obligated to follow
the legislative recommendation. 2 6 In nine states, the electorate may
remove a judge from office through the process of recall; if a sufficient
number of voters sign a recall petition, the judge must face a special
election.28 7 This procedure is used as infrequently as the others, and
when someone does undertake the burden and expense of collecting
the necessary signatures, the outcome is far from certain. As in an
election at the conclusion of a trial judge's term of office, most voters
undoubtedly remain ignorant of the judge's courtroom behavior and
most other aspects of his record.
To say that the traditional mechanisms for disciplining judges are
ineffective is not, however, to establish the need for their replacement.
These slow, formal, and hard-to-invoke procedures were deliberately
chosen. Alexander Hamilton wrote in number 65 of The Federalist
Papers:
The awful discretion which a court of impeachments must
necessarily have, to doom to honor or infamy the most confidential and the most distinguished characters of the community, forbids the
commitment of the trust to a small
2
number of persons . 88
285 Quoted in Frankel, supra note 278, at 180. See generally ten Broek, Partisan
Politics and FederalJudgeship Impeachment Since 1903, 23 MINN. L. REV. 185 (1939).
28 See generally AM. Jun. Soc'y, JutICIAL DIscIPLiNE AND REmovAL (Rep. No. 5,
Aug. 1969).
287 ARiz. CONST. art. VIII pt. 1, §§ 1-6; CAr.. CONsT. art. 23, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. XXI;
Kn. CONsr. art. 4, §§ 3-5; Nav. CoNsr. art. 2, § 9; N.D. CoNsr. art. 33; OnE. CONST.
art. II, § 18; WIs. CONST. art. 13, § 212; Oh1o REv. CODE § 705.92 (Page 1954) (municipal
judges only). Most states having constitutional provisions also have statutes in furtherance
of administration. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-201 to -217 (1956); - 218 (Supp. 1971);
NEv. REv. STAT. ch. 306.010 (1967).
288Tm FEDmRA Tsr No. 65, at 428 (B.F. Wright ed. 1961) (Hamilton). In number
79 Hamilton added:
The want of a provision for removing the judges on account of inability has been
a subject of complaint. But all considerate men will be sensible that such a provision would either not be practised upon or would be more liable to abuse than
calculated to answer any good purpose.
Id. No. 79, at 498.
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Effectiveness therefore is not the only issue. The other side of the
problem is the need to preserve an independent judiciary. One writer
on the problem of judicial misconduct says, "To maintain that a judge
should be restrained only by his conscience is to restate the divine
right of kings in a different guise..
.. The American temperament
rebels at the thought that public officials are above the law and beyond
reasonable sanction." 289 Another emphasizes "the right of the individual
judge to exercise his office within his view of the law, without fear of
repercussions .... ',290 From my perspective, it does little good to intone
either of these sentiments to the exclusion of the other. The problem
lies in striking a reasonable balance, and that task must await an
examination of the newer, more effective mechanisms that a number
of states have provided for disciplining judges.
In the federal system there is a substantial argument that this
question of policy is not open, that the Constitution has struck its own
balance, and that impeachment must remain the exclusive method
of disciplining judges. 29 1 It is clear, at least, that if Congress were to
authorize a different disciplinary procedure, one result would be
litigation of an uncertain outcome. With these considerations in mind,
Professor Preble Stolz has proposed a modernization of basic impeachment procedures to overcome some of the difficulties usually associated
with them and to capture some of the advantages claimed for the newer
292
disciplinary procedures.
The first step in Professor Stolz's reform would be the creation of a
bipartisan House Committee on Judicial Fitness. This committee
would have a permanent professional staff, which would receive and
investigate complaints concerning judicial behavior on a confidential
basis. The committee's rules might require it to afford a confidential
hearing to the judge under investigation. In this hearing, the judge
would be entitled to representation by an attorney and to other procedural safeguards. If the judge's conduct did not seem to warrant removal from office, the committee might nevertheless issue a letter of
censure. 293 On the Senate side, Professor Stolz would authorize the ap289 Frankel, JudicialDiscipline and Removal, 44 TEXAs L. REv. 1117, 1118 (1966).
290 Note, supra note 260, at 150.
291 See text accompanying notes 344-62 infra.
292 Stolz, supra note 271.
293 If impeachment must remain the exdusive remedy for judicial misconduct under
the federal Constitution, it might be wondered whether formal censure by a House

committee would be a permissible form of discipline. Nevertheless, in executing the
impeachment power, it is certainly "necessary and proper" to establish a committee to
investigate prospective cases of impeachment, and it also seems "necessary and proper"
for this committee to explain its actions, whether it recommends in favor of impeachment
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pointment of a master-perhaps a senator or a retired judge-to
conduct evidentiary hearings and to prepare proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law. Proceedings before the entire Senate would be
limited to a review of the master's decision in much the same way
that certain administrative agencies limit their proceedings to a review
of the judgments of their hearing examiners.
Professor Stolz's proposals should, I think, be adopted if impeachment is to play any part at all in the discipline of judges, even a part
supplemented by other disciplinary procedures. The Stolz reforms
would relieve the burden that an impeachment trial imposes on
Congress and at the same time offer a fairer, more orderly procedure
for resolving the issues presented in each case.
6. Modern Disciplinary Procedures.-Between 1960 and 1970,
more than twenty-five states adopted new mechanisms for disciplining
judges. 294 All of these mechanisms place the final authority for judicial
discipline in a court-either the state supreme court or a special court
on the judiciary.
Although the newly enacted disciplinary mechanisms differ widely
in investigative and screening procedures, 29 5 the two leading prototypes are the New York Court on the Judiciary and the California
Commission on Judicial Qualifications. The relatively simple New
York system has been copied in five states, and the more elaborate
California system in twelve.29 6
The New York Court on the Judiciary was created by an amendment to the state constitution in 1947. The court has six members:
the Chief Judge and the Senior Associate Judge of the New York Court
of Appeals and four judges of the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court, one from each of the Appellate Division's four departments. 297 The court's disciplinary jurisdiction extends only to appellate
judges and to judges of the major New York trial courts (about 400
judges in all). The various departments of the Appellate Division retain
or not. The committee might, for example, report that although a judge's behavior was

seriously improper, it did not justify his removal from office. Such a report would, in
effect, be a letter of censure.
294Braithwaite, supra note 215, at 155.
295 See, e.g., id.; 1967 TAsK FoRcE REP., supra note 175, at 70-71; Bray, Judging
Judges-The California Commission on Judicial Qualifications,33 Nm'. ST. B.J., Jan. 1968,
at 28; Buckley, The Commission on Judicial Qualifications: An Attempt to Deal with Judicial Misconduct, 3 U. SAN FRANCIsCO L. Rv. 244 (1969); Burke, JudicialDiscipline and
Removal: The California Story, 48 J. Am. JuD. Soc'x 167 (1965); Healy, Judicial(Dis)qualifications, 4 TRIAL JUDGE'S J., July 1965, at 3; Note, A Study of the Colorado Commission
on JudicialQualifications,47 DENVER L.J. 491 (1970); Note, supra note 260.
296 Braithwaite, supra note 215, at 155.
297

N.Y. CONsr. art. VI, § 22(b).
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a long-standing authority to discipline city, village, and town judges
(about 300 judges). 298
The constitutional provision that created the Court on the
Judiciary authorized it to impose only one form of discipline: upon the
vote of four of its six members, the court may remove a judge from
office.299 The court has, however, assumed an informal power to reprimand judges whose conduct does not seem to warrant the severe
sanction of removal. 30 0 Before disciplinary action is taken, the court
must afford a hearing, with the customary procedural safeguards, to
the judge under investigation.
The New York Court on the Judiciary has no permanent staff,
no investigative arm, no screening mechanism, and indeed, no continuous existence. It must be specially convened to try each complaint.
The authorities who may call the court into session are the Chief
Judge of the Court of Appeals, any of the four Presiding Judges of the
Appellate Division, the Governor, and, by majority vote, the Executive Committee of the State Bar Association. The Chief Judge of the
Court of Appeals serves as the Presiding Judge of the Court on
the Judiciary, and before any hearing is held, he must notify the Governor, the President of the State Senate, and the Speaker of the State
Assembly of the identity of the judge under investigation, the charges
against him, and the proposed hearing date. Any member of the state
legislature may file identical charges against the judge within thirty
days of receipt of this notice. If a legislator does file these charges, and
if a majority of the State Assembly vote to entertain them, "proceedings
before the court on the judiciary shall be stayed pending the determination of the legislature which shall be exclusive and final."301
The immediate involvement of the political branches of government in each case plainly precludes the Court on the Judiciary from
operating on a private, confidential basis. One New York judge has remarked, "[W]hen proceedings are to be initiated at the top of any of the
three branches of government, there is inevitably a reluctance to take
action."8 02 The New York Court on the Judiciary has, in fact, been
convened only three times since its creation. 03
See Frankel, supra note 289, at 1125.
§ 22(c).
300 In re Sobel, 8 N.Y.2d at (a) (Ct. on the Judiciary 1960).
801 N.Y. CONsr. art. VI, § 22(e).
302 Frankel, supra note 289, at 1126.
303 Despite the lack of activity, the New York University Law Review has argued that
the state's disciplinary system should be retained-primarily because it has customarily
been manned by outstanding personnel. Note, supra note 260, at 190-91.
298

299 N.Y. CONsT. art. VI,

HeinOnline -- 50 Tex. L. Rev. 702 1971-1972

1972]

COURTROOM MISCONDUCT

The California disciplinary system operates at three distinct levels.
Final disciplinary authority rests with the state supreme court, but the
court may act only upon matters referred to it by the California Commission on Judicial Qualifications. This body is composed of five
judges appointed by the state supreme court, two lawyers appointed by
the state bar association, and two laymen appointed by the Governor
with the approval of the State Senate. The Commission is assisted by
a permanent staff-an Executive Secretary and his secretary-and by
occasional outside investigators. The staff acts on its own initiative to
investigate and screen complaints, thereby serving, in effect, as a third
tier in California's disciplinary structure.
California was the first state to implement a "commission system"
of this sort; in 1961, the state put into operation a constitutional amendment that the voters had approved the previous year.80 4 During the
first nine years of its operation, the Commission on Judicial Qualifications has received an average of about 100 complaints per year.80 5
Most complaints (although not most valid complaints) come from disgruntled litigants.
Approximately two-thirds of all complaints are, in the Commission's terminology, "closed by staff" because they seem plainly unfounded or outside the Commission's jurisdiction. In these cases, the
Executive Secretary acknowledges each complaint in a letter explaining
why the Commission cannot act. The Commission does, however, review all of the Executive Secretary's actions, even his actions in these
apparently insubstantial cases. 0 6 If a complaint seems valid on its face,
the Executive Secretary conducts an informal investigation, which may
include communication with the judge whose behavior has been questioned. The Executive Secretary reports regularly to the Commission,
which meets every two months or so. If further action seems warranted,
the first formal step is a registered letter to the judge describing the
charges against him and requesting a reply.
If the judge's reply is satisfactory, of course, the case is dosed. Even
if the reply is not satisfactory, the Commission may decide to close the
case on the theory that its investigation and communication with the
judge were themselves a sufficient corrective. As Jack E. Frankel,
the Commission's Executive Secretary, explains, "Sometimes there may
be reason to accept the plea, 'I didn't do it but I'll see it doesn't happen
304 CAL. CONSr. art. VI, § 18.
805 Braithwaite, supra note 215, at 162.
3O6Id. at 163.
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again.' "307 The Commission may expressly condition its dosing of the
case on the judge's agreement to desist from certain conduct. It may
also admonish the judge in a confidential communication prior to
dosing the case. Throughout the proceedings, there is an emphasis on
securing an informal settlement. Even in cases of serious misconduct,
a judge may bring the process to a halt by resigning from office.
After a judge has replied to the charges against him, the field investigation of his behavior may continue. Commission members as well
as the Executive Secretary may interview pertinent witnesses. Ultimately, the Commission may set the matter for a hearing, at which the
rules of evidence will apply, the judge may appear through counsel, both
sides may subpoena witnesses, and the judge may cross-examine the witnesses against him.

08

At the conclusion of this hearing, the Commission

may file a recommendation that the California Supreme Court formally
censure the judge or remove him from office.
All proceedings prior to the filing of this recommendation are
required by law to remain confidential, 30 9 and this requirement seems
to have been carefully observed. Upon the filing of the recommendation, however, the matter becomes public. If the Commission has
recommended removal from office, the judge is automatically disqualified from acting in his official capacity pending the supreme court's
disposition. If the supreme court does terminate the judge's tenure,
he becomes permanently ineligible for judicial office and is automatically suspended from the practice of law until further order of the
court.110
The Commission's efforts to resolve disciplinary matters quietly
and informally have been remarkably successful. So far, only three
cases have been referred to the supreme court, and even an evidentiary
hearing before the Commission has been a relatively rare event. During
the first nine years of the Commission's operation, however, fifty judges
resigned from office while under Commission investigation.31 A liberal
system of retirement benefits undoubtedly facilitated this nonadversary
resolution of serious cases, and it has been doubted that a disciplinary
807 Frankel, The Case for JudicialDisciplinary Measures, 49 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 218, 221

(1966).

808 CAL. R. Cr. 909-10 (West 1971).
809 Id. § 902.
310 CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(a), (d).
311 Braithwaite, supra note 215, at 162. See also Note, supra note 295, at 496 (Commission investigation responsible for resignation or retirement of five judges although
only one case involved a hearing and none went to state supreme court).
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commission could produce similar results in a state where retirement
3 12
benefits were less generous.
Of course no mechanism of judicial discipline is designed solely
to remedy improper courtroom behavior. A body like the California
Commission on Judicial Qualifications must consider cases of bribery,
criminal conduct not directly related to the performance of a judge's
official duties, financial conflict of interest, absenteeism, alcoholism,
physical disability, senility, psychosis, and other problems that resist
easy classification. A basic question concerning modern disciplinary
mechanisms is whether they are too concerned with other issues
to be effective in controlling abusive courtroom behavior by trial
judges. 313
Analysis can begin with the oldest of the modem disciplinary
mechanisms, the New York Court on the Judiciary. Only one of the
three cases that have come before this court since 1947 involved an
issue of courtroom conduct. That was a case in which two trial judges
had used their courtrooms and the press to express low opinions of
one another's official behavior. The case ended in a decision that reprimanded both judges but did not remove them from office.31 4 Because proceedings must be commenced at the highest level, because no
action can be taken without a public declaration, and because there is
virtually no room for informal investigation and adjustment, the New
York Court on the Judiciary seems likely to act only in cases (like this
one) in which relatively serious misconduct has already received substantial publicity. That pattern has, at least, been followed in the past,
and abusive judicial behavior usually does not make headlines.
A disciplinary system that incorporates a permanent staff to receive and investigate complaints seems more likely to be effective in
remedying courtroom misconduct by trial judges. The performance
of systems of this sort has, however, been varied. In both Illinois and
New Jersey, the administrative office of the state courts has, in addition
to its other duties, undertaken a disciplinary screening function comparable to that of the staff of the California Commission on Judicial
Qualifications. Lewis Bambrick, the Assistant Administrative Director
312 Note, supra note 260, at 182.
313 Any treatment of courtroom misconduct inevitably touches upon much broader

issues. A disciplinary system can, for example, be an overall success although it has
proven relatively ineffective in the area of courtroom misconduct; conversely, the system
that best controls courtroom misconduct may not be the system that a state should adopt.
314 In re Sobel, 8 N.Y.2d at (a) (Ct. on the Judiciary 1960).
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of the New Jersey Courts, reports that in his state complaints of courtroom misconduct by trial judges are extremely infrequent. Carl H.
Rolewick, the Assistant Director of the Administrative Office of the
Illinois Courts, reports that his office has never received such a complaint.31 5 As Rolewick explains the difficulty, "Lawyers will not complain and will not testify. We need specifics, and lawyers are afraid to
provide them. The result is that we spend almost all of our time on
cases of official misconduct that make the newspapers."8 16
Jack E. Frankel, the Executive Secretary of the California Commission, agrees that lawyers are usually reluctant to complain about judicial behavior-not only because they fear reprisal but because "it
doesn't seem worth the hassle."3 17 The Commission has, however, attempted to overcome this reluctance and to encourage complaints.
Frankel asks lawyers to report instances of misconduct even when they
wish to remain anonymous. He informs the lawyers that "it is a two-step
process" and that "the decision about testifying will be made later."
In that way, Frankel says, the Commission can at least "become aware
of developing situations." Moreover, the Commission may undertake an
investigation on its own initiative, and it may inform the judge of the
general nature of the complaint in an effort to induce some self-correction.
The California Commission on Judicial Qualifications is probably
better known than its counterparts in other states, and it enjoys a
growing reputation for effectiveness. Those circumstances, coupled
with the Commission's active encouragement of complaints, may explain why its performance in the area of courtroom misconduct seems
significantly different from the performance of the New Jersey and
Illinois systems. Not only do complaints of courtroom misconduct seem
more frequent in California, but according to Frankel, "If all forms
of rude, abusive, screaming, arrogant, impatient, and tyrannical behavior are lumped together, courtroom misconduct probably constitutes
the second most common complaint that we receive."3 18 (The most
frequent complaint, Frankel says, is that a judge has refused to decide
a matter for an extended period of time.)
Only three of the cases that have come before the California Commission on Judicial Qualifications are matters of public record-the
three cases in which the Commission recommended final disciplinary
315 Telephone interviews, June 80, 1971.
316 Id.

Telephone interview, June 50, 1971.
818 Id.

817
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action by the California Supreme Court. All of these cases involved,
at least tangentially, charges of courtroom misconduct. In 1964, the
Commission recommended that Judge Charles F. Stevens be removed
from office. In addition to charges of conflict of interest and of dishonesty before the Commission, it was alleged that Judge Stevens had
ridiculed and belittled police officers and prosecutors who had appeared in his courtroom. When the Stevens matter came before the
California Supreme Court, it lacked the express power that it now
possesses to censure judges for improper behavior. Perhaps because
the supreme court considered removal too severe a sanction, it rejected
the Commission's recommendation in a brief per curiam opinion. 31 9
In 1970, the supreme court accepted a Commission recommendation that Judge Gerald S. Chargin be censured. While presiding over
a juvenile hearing involving a fifteen-year-old Mexican-American,
Judge Chargin had referred to the youth's family and to MexicanAmericans generally as "miserable, lousy, rotten people." He had also
announced that "maybe Hitler was right" in seeking to destroy "the
animals" in society. 20 In 1971, the California Supreme Court again
accepted a Commission recommendation to censure a judge for courtroom misconduct. Judge Barnard B. Glickfeld had, at a chambers
conference at which an alleged assault victim was present, referred to
the young woman as "a horse's ass." Later, in the courtroom, Judge
Glickfeld declared that he did not want any police officer to sit near
the "alleged victim ... and I am using the term figuratively." When
the prosecutor objected that some of the judge's remarks had been unfair, he replied, "That is the way it is going to be. And I don't want to
hear about what a fair remark is. There are lots of things that are not
fair." 21
The California experience has demonstrated that a commission
system can be effective in disciplining judges for abusive courtroom
behavior. Nevertheless, one may have an uneasy feeling about a regime
that emphasizes confidentiality, that accomplishes its results primarily
319 Stevens v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 61 Cal. 2d 886, 393 P.2d 709,
39 Cal.
Rptr. 397 (1964).
82 0 See In re Chargin, 2 Cal. 3d 617, 471 P.2d 29, 87 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1970). The
Supreme Court's brief opinon did not report the facts in significant detail, nor did the

report of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications. See Inquiry Concerning a Judge,
No. 9, April 8, 1970 (Calif. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications) (unpublished). The details
of Judge Chargin's behavior were, however, widely reported in the press. See, e.g., Judge
Gerald
S. Chargin Speaks, 2 EL Garro 4 (1969).
32

1 See In re Glickfeld, 3 Cal. 3d 891, 479 P.2d 688, 92 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1971), Again
the Supreme Court's statement of the case was cryptic and condusory, but on this occasion
the Commission's report remedied the defect. See Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No. 10, Nov.
13, 1970 (Calif. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications) (unpublished).
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through backroom settlements, and that is dominated by members of
the elite professional group that it is designed to control. In a sense,
this system resembles the disciplinary committee of a country club.
Although I would not characterize the system as either too strong or
too weak, it seems likely to reach too far in certain sorts of cases and
not far enough in others.
For many members of a country club, a "suggestion" from the
disciplinary committee is likely to carry more weight than a suggestion
should. A person who values his club membership will ordinarily
strive to avoid giving offense; he may quickly abandon a challenged
practice regardless of his own view of its merits. Moreover, if a disciplinary committee values tradition, conformity, and restraint, its suggestions are likely to intimidate practices that are merely innovative,
different, and forceful. The safest course for a club member is always
to maintain a "low visibility" and to smile a lot at cocktail parties.
Some writers have maintained that because the newer mechanisms
of judicial discipline are located within the judiciary itself, they pose
no threat to judicial independence.8 22 This argument seems to me
obtuse. As Mr. Justice Black once observed, "[J]udges of the pastgood, patriotic judges ... occasionally lost not only their offices but
... also

sometimes lost their freedom and their heads because of the

actions and decrees of other judges." 323 Moreover, a system dominated
by the judiciary may sometimes concern itself more with matters of
tradition and form than with matters of substance. In one New Jersey
disciplinary proceeding, for example, the State Supreme Court found
a "shocking violation" of the rules of court and the canons of judicial
ethics partly because a magistrate had refused to wear a judicial robe
and had permitted smoking in his courtroom. (There were a number
of more serious charges against the magistrate, but Chief Justice
Vanderbilt's opinion did not differentiate among the various allegations.)

324

Although informal suggestions by a country dub disciplinary committee may have an immediate deterrent effect upon many club
members, some members of the club will inevitably resist these sug322 See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 278, at 180-81.
323

Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 143 (1970) (Black,

J., dissenting).

324 In re Stevens, 20 N.J. 177, 119 A.2d 9 (1955). Cf. Bray, supra note 295, at 28, 35:
"If a judge has a poor idea of public relations there should be a means of instructing
him in order that the judicial image keeps the respect of the people." Los Angeles Public
Defender Richard S. Buckley has observed, "Suggestions from such a prestigious and impartial tribunal as the California Commission are often gratefully heeded without further
ado." Buckley, .upra note 295, at 257.

HeinOnline -- 50 Tex. L. Rev. 708 1971-1972

1972]

COURTROOM MISCONDUCT

gestions and oppose the committee in every way they can. These members may include a large portion of the "dub curmudgeons" who are
most in need of discipline. In these circumstances, the principal danger
is not that the committee will prove too intimidating, but on the contrary that its members may lack the courage of their convictions. The
committee may conclude that a public dispute would tend to bring
discredit upon the entire club. Although a "friendly suggestion" to a
fellow dub member ordinarily seems harmless enough, an overt attack
on one who has been anointed may be viewed as a threat to the anointers and a challenge to the very concept of anointment. When the
power to discipline judges is given to other judges, informal suggestions
and pressures may be too frequent; at the same time, formal disciplinary
action may be taken only in the most serious and clear-cut cases.
Because of the confidential nature of commission proceedings, it
is impossible to evaluate the extent to which these defects have
materialized in practice. One may, if he likes, accept the unsubstantiated
assurances of "insiders" that all is well; but the safest assumption, in
my view, is that abuses are not only possible but likely. For all this
skepticism, however, I consider the dangers of the commission system
far less substantial than the dangers of doing nothing. I am more
willing to tolerate the threat to judicial independence presented by this
system than I am to permit judges to perpetrate flagrant and oftrepeated abuses with impunity. Moreover, Chief Justice Roger Traynor has argued that "once judges are held responsible to an impartial
commission, there is no longer the vestige of a case for subjecting them
to the popular or powerful will of the day."8 25 If a commission system
does in fact reduce the impetus for requiring the periodic reelection
of incumbent judges, it may ultimately give many judges greater
security and independence than they currently enjoy.
In a recent article on the problem of judicial misconduct, William
T. Braithwaite observed, "Broadly speaking, there are only two places
to put the power to deal with judicial misconduct, either in the judiciary itself or outside it ....
"826 Braithwaite then quoted Justice Walter
V. Schaefer on the difficulties associated with both solutions. On the
one hand, "there is a latent distrust of the ability or willingness of the
group of men who at any moment constitute one branch of government so to order the affairs of that branch as to satisfy legitimate public
325

Traynor, supra note 224, at 1280. See also Burke, supra note 295.

326 Braithwaite, supra note 215, at 153.
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concern. '327 On the other hand, placing the power of judicial discipline outside the courts presents "the perennial problem of the independence of the judiciary from legislative or executive domination. 8 28
Although judicial self-policing does pose a threat to the independence
of the individual judge, the threat posed by an equally effective nonjudicial agency would probably be more severe. On the whole, a conservative and cautious administration of judicial discipline seems
desirable, and for that reason it is not necessarily a fatal objection that
judges may sometimes yield to a defensive professional instinct to close
ranks when one of the group is threatened. Excessive activism, the
opposite vice, might be worse, and perfection will probably be unattainable. Perhaps the best observation concerning the commission system of judicial discipline was offered by a California trial judge: "Both
on paper and in practice, the program has balance." 329
A number of prestigious professional groups have reached similar
conclusions and have endorsed one or another of the modem disciplinary mechanisms. 3 0 Indeed, until very recently, the pattern of endorsement was virtually unanimous. In the summer of 1971, however,
the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association unanimously
approved a set of Standards Relating to the Judge's Role in Dealing
With Trial Disruptions.These standards condemned various forms of
judicial courtroom misconduct, but they did not suggest any enforcement mechanisms. (The same standards did, incidentally, set forth de-

tailed remedies for courtroom misconduct by defendants and by attorneys.) The commentary to the standards declared:
Under present practices, virtually the only sanctions available
when a judge occasionally fails in his responsibility are: correction of his decisions and, perhaps, censure by an appellate
court, public criticism through the news media and possibly
censure by the organized bar, and, if he serves a definite term,
eventual termination of his service by the electing or appointing authority. While none or all of these may appear
wholly satisfactory, adoption of alternative measures must be
approached with considerable caution. Mechanisms which
diminish the independence of the entire judiciary could have
327 Cusack v. Howlett, 44 III. 2d 233, 240, 254 N.E.2d 506, 509 (1969) (Schaefer,
828 Id. at 237, 254 N.E.2d at 508.

J.).

329 Healy, supra note 295, at 318.
330 See, e.g., Final Report of the Twenty-Seventh American Assembly: The Courts, the
Public and the Law Explosion, 49 J. Am. JuD. Soc'" 16, 18 (1965); The National Conference on Judicial Selection and Court Administration, 43 J. Ame. JuD. Soc'y 114, 122
(1959); Editorial, New Ways to Deal With Judicial Misconduct, 48 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 163
(1965).
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more harmful consequences than the occasional transgressions
of a few judges. On the other hand, ineffective mechanisms
merely raise false hopes.88 '
Although it does not mention them directly, this statement seems to
intimate disapproval of all of the modern disciplinary mechanisms. I
am reminded of the caveat that Chief Justice Traynor appended to
an optimistic prediction a few years ago: "I would be confident that
qualification commissions will gain wide acceptance, were they not so
38 2
plainly sensible.".
With somewhat less certainty than Chief Justice Traynor, I view
the commission system of judicial discipline as the soundest practical
mechanism for controlling courtroom misconduct by trial judges.
It may, however, be helpful to explore in more detail the ways in
which a commission system should operate.
(a) The Composition of Disciplinary Tribunals.-This article has
already suggested the basic reasons for placing the power to discipline
judges within the judiciary itself. Still, a leavening of non-judicial influences seems desirable, and I regard the California system-with two
practicing lawyers and two laymen on a nine-member screening commission-as an appropriate model. Somewhat less attractive is the commission system that Illinois implemented under a new state constitution
on July 1, 1971. As in every state that has revised its disciplinary procedures in recent years, the final authority for judicial discipline in Illinois has been given to a judicial body. The power to present cases to
this tribunal, however, rests with a Judicial Inquiry Board composed
of two trial judges, three lawyers, and four nonlawyers. All members
of this board except the two trial judges are appointed by the Governor, and the Governor's domination of the appointment process, coupled with the relatively short, non-staggered terms of the board members, seems likely to affect the rigorously nonpartisan character that a
sound disciplinary system must maintain. 333
(b) The Commission Staff.-An effective system of judicial discipline must include a permanent staff to receive and investigate complaints and to advise the disciplinary tribunal. Ideally, the staff should
have no other duties, but in smaller states, the volume of complaints
831 ABA, JuDGE's

RoLE, supra note 102, at 7.
332 Traynor, supra note 224, at 1280.
33 See ILL. CoNs-r. art. VI, § 15(b). The constitution seeks to insure impartiality by
requiring that no more than four of the governor's seven appointments be members of
the same political party. This safeguard seems illusory, for even President Nixon's
Secretary of the Treasury lists himself as a Democrat.
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may not be large enough to warrant the employment of even a single
individual with a full-time responsibility in the area of judicial discipline. In these states, the staff function can be profitably assigned to
the administrative office of the state courts. There may, however, be
some danger that regular contact between the administrative office and
members of the judiciary on other matters will influence the office's
performance of its investigative and consultative duties.3 4
Staff responsibilities should be clearly defined, and disciplinary
tribunals should leave investigative work to the staff. The informal
procedures of the California Commission on Judicial Qualifications,
under which Commission members sometimes interview witnesses
and participate in other ways in the investigative process, seem likely
to compromise the Commission's impartiality when a formal evidentiary hearing becomes necessary. The need to preserve the impartiality of the tribunal also suggests that it have a limited role in
securing negotiated settlements. The disciplinary tribunal should always act collectively; it should not make "suggestions" concerning
matters upon which it would plainly be unwilling to act in other ways;
and although the tribunal should consider any proposal that an affected judge might wish to put before it, it should not, except in very
unusual situations, initiate proposals for the informal resolution of
disputes. 3 5
(c) The Problem of Confidentiality.-A disciplinary tribunal
composed primarily of members of the judiciary may prefer confidential proceedings for the wrong reasons. Most judges probably tend to
believe that problems of misconduct on the bench should be resolved
"within the family." They may seek confidentiality so that public respect for the judiciary will be preserved. These sentiments seem
misguided. The public's respect for the judiciary should be earned;
it should not be preserved through myth, manipulation, and cover-up.
The public has a proper interest in learning about the successes and
failures of all branches of government, even its robed and revered
judiciary.
Nevertheless, the public's interest in information about its government should, in this instance, be subordinated to the practical needs
884 For example, a presiding judge may believe that he should be able to correct
problems of misconduct in his court in his own way, and the contact between a state's
presiding judges and the administrative office of the state courts is likely to be very
dose. In some states, of course, there is no administrative office of the state courts, and
it may be necessary to assign the staff function to another body such as the clerk's office
of the state supreme court.
835 Cf. Note, Judicial Plea Bargaining, 19 SrAN. L. Rav. 1082 (1967).
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of an effective disciplinary system, and the proceedings of a disciplinary commission should remain confidential. For one thing, confidentiality probably encourages complaints. Although a judge should be
entitled to confront his accusers before discipline is imposed, I doubt
the wisdom of requiring every accuser to embroil himself in public
controversy as well. Indeed, a judge's resentment of complaints is
likely to be intensified if they commonly lead to public as well as private embarrassment, and a complainant may therefore have even
greater reason to fear retaliation from the bench. More importantly,
confidentiality encourages judges to respond to complaints on their
own initiative. With confidentiality, self-correction does not become a
public admission of guilt. Even a judge who resigns while "under commission investigation" may of course assert reasons of age, health,
finances, boredom, time pressure, or administrative burden for his
decision; he will then take his place among other distinguished jurists
emeriti who have resigned for similar reasons. A public accusation, by
contrast, encourages a judge to fight to preserve his reputation.33 6 Confidentiality, in short, allows ample room for face-saving, something that
greatly increases the effectiveness of a disciplinary commission.
Finally, although I find the standard arguments for secrecy unpersuasive, one of these arguments may be somewhat stronger in cases
involving judges than in cases involving other public officials. Relatively
fragile myths seem to surround the judiciary, and the public may
truly believe that judges should be "beyond reproach." Even a saint
may be reproached unjustly, however, and a false public accusation
seems likely to injure a judge even more than a private individual
or another governmental officer.
In 1969, two Justices of the Illinois Supreme Court resigned from
office after a special commission found that they had engaged in business transactions with a criminal defendant while his case was pending
before their court. The incident, quite naturally, diminished public
confidence in the judiciary. Carl H. Rolewick of the Administrative
Office of the Illinois Courts reports that since that time, a public accusation of misconduct-whether justified or unjustified-has effec38 7
tively "washed-up" any judge about whom it was made.
886 It is at least conceivable, for example, that recent efforts to impeach Mr. Justice

Douglas have assured us of that jurist's services for a longer period than we might otherwise have had them-a fortunate result in this case (if one disregards the Justice's own
possible interest in retirement) but an unfortunate result when a judge's conduct truly
warrants removal from office.
337 Telephone interview, June s0, 1971.
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Exaggerated concepts of judicial propriety that count smoke as
the equivalent of fire lie at the heart of this problem, and one possible
solution might be simply to encourage a more sophisticated public
reaction. Democratic theory suggests that more information, rather
than less, is the appropriate response to unfair public condemnation
of this sort. In practice, however, a false accusation will almost inevitably have its painful effects, and when the anticipated public
reaction seems particularly unsophisticated, the temptation is strong
to commit the controversy to a secret tribunal away from public view.
Although I believe that this solution may aggravate the problem in
the long run, the impulse toward confidentiality reflects an understandable human response to the suffering that early publicity would
otherwise inflict upon innocent individuals.
The proceedings of a disciplinary tribunal may properly remain
confidential, but the existence of the tribunal should be widely known
if it is to have any significant effect. Nevertheless, the public and the bar
have generally seemed unaware of fhe modem disciplinary mechanisms
even in states in which they have operated for years. The California
Commission on Judicial Qualifications is, for example, the oldest, the
most active, and undoubtedly the best known of the commission
systems, but the New York University Law Review interviewed a
number of California lawyers in 1966 and reported that "the vast
majority ...

either had never heard of the Commission . .. or were

acquainted only with the name, believing that the Commission was
concerned with approving the Governor's judicial appointments." 33 8
The Law Review added that Commission members were aware of this
widespread public ignorance, but hesitated to act for fear that publicity
"might undermine public confidence in the judiciary... [and] might
alienate many judges whose cooperation is essential to the Commission's
success." 33 9 This attitude carries confidentiality much too far. When the
victims of judicial misconduct are unaware that a corrective mechanism
exists, the failure of that mechanism is ensured.
(d) Sanctions.-Because most courtroom misconduct does not
warrant removal from office, a disciplinary tribunal should be authorized to impose lesser sanctions. Formal public censure is an obvious
alternative, and most modem disciplinary systems seem to have incorporated that remedy. Usually, however, state legislatures have failed
to authorize any intermediate sanction, so that disciplinary tribunals
338

Note, supra note 260, at 178.

839 Id.
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have been confined to these two extreme alternatives. Ordinarily, for
example, tribunals have not been empowered to cite an offending
judge for contempt of court, to suspend him from office temporarily,
or to require him to pay a monetary fine. A possible argument against
the use of these intermediate sanctions is that they would so discredit
a judge that he might as well be removed from office. His rulings
would no longer command respect, and his effectiveness would be at
an end.
I am not entirely persuaded by this line of argument, and I believe
that a disciplinary tribunal should be able to consider the use of these
sanctions in individual cases. Much judicial courtroom misconduct does,
340
for example, fit the standard statutory definitions of contempt of court.
There would be a certain equity in subjecting trial judges to the same
rules that apply to others who may disrupt the trial process, and indeed,
a few disciplinary systems have incorporated the power to punish offending judges for contempt. 341 Moreover, fines seem as consistent
with judicial dignity as any other effective sanction, and audiences
that might view public censure as a purely symbolic remedy could
conceivably regard a monetary penalty as a more concrete expression
of disapproval. For example, both the Chargin and the Glickfeld
cases342 presented situations in which fines might have been appropriate.
(e) Implementation.-State constitutions commonly set forth at
least one mechanism of judicial discipline, and when a statute or
court rule creates a different one, it may be argued that the newer
mechanism unconstitutionally short-circuits procedures that were deliberately made slow, formal, and restrained. To foreclose this argument, new disciplinary procedures should ordinarily be established by
constitutional amendment. The amendment process in most states,
although burdensome, is not nearly so burdensome as it is in the
federal system. An amendment creating a new mechanism of judicial
discipline should be self-executing; despite the apparent will of the
voters, state legislatures sometimes fail to enact implementing legislation. In New Jersey, for example, although the voters approved a
constitutional provision on judicial discipline in 1947, the legislature
43
did not put it into effect until 1970.8
340 See text accompanying notes 274-77 supra.

341 The states in which disciplinary tribunals may hold trial judges in contempt for
courtroom misconduct include New Jersey and Illinois. See Braithwaite, supra note 215, at
167 n.3.
157-58,
3
42 See text accompanying notes 320-21 supra.
343 Braithwaite, supra note 215, at 151, 157-58.
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7. A Modern Disciplinary System for Federal Judges: The Constitutional Problem.-Various bills have been introduced in Congress
to establish a commission system for disciplining federal judges 44 It can
reasonably be argued, however, that the Constitution permits only
one remedy for misconduct by Article III judges-impeachment- and
that no modern disciplinary system could be implemented without a
Constitutional amendment. This issue has been debated extensively in
a number of law review articles, but no scholarly consensus has
emerged. 845 Recently the United States Supreme Court touched upon
the problem in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit. 46
How Judge Stephen S. Chandler incurred the displeasure of his
fellow judges is something of a mystery, but in December 1965, the
Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit found that Judge Chandler, the
Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Western District
of Oklahoma, was "presently unable, or unwilling, to discharge efficiently the duties of his office." 34 7 Acting under its statutory authority
to "make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within its circuit,"3 48 the
Judicial Council ordered Judge Chandler to "take no action whatsoever
in any case or proceeding now or hereafter pending... ." After Judge
Chandler unsuccessfully sought review of this order in the United
States Supreme Court,34 9 the Judicial Council modified its position
and permitted him to dispose of the cases previously assigned to him,
but forbade him to undertake any new judicial business. When the
Judicial Council issued this second order, it asserted a new basis for
3844 See, e.g., S. 1506, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
345 Articles which argue that Congress' impeachment power is probably exclusive

include: Otis, A Proposed Tribunal: Is It Constitutional? 7 U. KAN. CrrY L. REv. 3
(1938-39); Yankwich, Impeachment of Civil Officers Under the Federal Constitution,26 Gao.
UJ. 849 (1938); Comment, Judicial Responsibility, 21 Ru'rEms L. Rxv. 158 (1966); Comment, supra note 278. Articles which argue that the Constitution permits Congress to
establish new mechanisms of judicial discipline include: Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibilities Under the Constitution (pts.
1-3), 28 Micn. L. RPv. 485, 723, 870 (1930); Comment, Judicial Trial and Removal of
Federal Judges, 20 TExAs L. REv. 352 (1942); Comment, Removal of Federal JudgesNew Alternatives to an Old Problem: Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit,
13 U.C.LA.L. REv. 1385 (1966); Comment, Removal of Federal Judges-Alternative to
Impeachment, 20 V.ND. L. Rv. 723 (1967).
346 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
47 Id. at 77. The Council's order noted that Judge Chandler had been sued unsuccessfully in both a civil and a criminal action and that he had twice refused requests
to disqualify himself in certain cases. Surely, however, these facts alone, unaugmented by
any examination of the merits of the controversies, did not warrant the conclusion that
Judge Chandler would fail to discharge the duties of his office. The assumption kindest
to the Judicial Council is that it acted from some secret motivation.
348 See 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1970).
349 See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 382 U.S. 1003 (1966).
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its action: the statutory power to make rules for the division of business among a district court's judges when the judges themselves "are
unable to agree on the adoption of rules or orders for that purpose .... "350
The action of the Judicial Council provided, at best, a makeshift
remedy for whatever misconduct or disability the Chandler case involved. Because Judge Chandler retained his office at least in name,
no new judge could be appointed to consider the cases that he was
thought unfit to hear. Instead, the workload of the other judges of
the District Court increased. Moreover, although the Council offered
to give Judge Chandler a hearing after it had filed its initial order,
there were no established procedures for the Council to follow.851 This
lack of procedural regularity provided a significant argument for Judge
Chandler when, once again, he sought a writ of mandamus from the
Supreme Court. Judge Chandler's principal argument to the Supreme
Court, however, was one that would have applied even if he had been
disciplined by a body established for that purpose and limited by carefully drawn procedural safeguards. He maintained that the Judicial
Council had usurped the power of impeachment, a power that the
Constitution gives exclusively to Congress.
The Supreme Court ultimately avoided the constitutional issue
and held that because Judge Chandler had not exhausted all other
remedies, he had not "made a case for the extraordinary relief of
mandamus .... -352 In the course of its opinion, however, the Supreme
Court intimated that had it reached the merits, Judge Chandler might
well have lost anyway:
There can, of course, be no disagreement among us to the imperative need for total and absolute independence of judges
in deciding cases or in any phase of the decisional function.
But it is quite another matter to say that each judge in a complex system shall be the absolute ruler of his manner of conducting judicial business. The question is whether Congress
can vest in the Judicial Council power to enforce reasonable
standards as to when and where court shall be held, how long
a case may be delayed in decision, whether a given case is to
be tried, and many other routine matters. As to these things
-and indeed an almost infinite variety of others of an admin350 See 28 U.S.C. § 137 (1970).

351 The same objection applies to other informal remedies for judicial misconductsuch as reassignment by a court's presiding judge, who may determine that an associate
judge's courtroom demeanor qualifies him to hear only pretrial motions, forcible detainer
actions, and habeas corpus proceedings.
352 398 U.S. at 89.
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istrative nature-can each judge be an absolute monarch and
yet have a complex judicial system function efficiently?... [I]f
one judge in any system refuses to abide by such reasonable
procedures it can hardly be that the 3extraordinary
machinery
3
of impeachment is the only recourse. 5
Dissenting, Justices Black and Douglas argued that the Judicial
Council had effectively deprived Judge Chandler of his office, and in my
view their argument was persuasive. The office of a United States District Judge surely encompasses more than a salary, a temporary "token"
caseload, and the power to have one's name listed at the beginning of
each volume of the Federal Supplement. The middle portion of that
volume is more important, and despite the argument of at least one
Supreme Court Justice to the contrary, the object of the Judicial Council
was certainly to prevent Judge Chandler from deciding cases. 354 I agree
with Justices Black and Douglas-and with Alexander Hamilton,
Joseph Story, and James Kent as well 350-that the only constitutional
way to accomplish this objective is through the extraordinary mechanism
of impeachment. Although I would rather the Constitution had not
been written that way, I believe that impeachment was made a cumbersome and formal procedure quite deliberately. The purpose of the
framers was to promote judicial independence, and their restrictions
on use of the impeachment process would have been of little avail if
Congress could, by simple majority vote, establish a broader, speedier,
and more effective mechanism for removing unwanted judges.
To say that impeachment is the only constitutional way to remove
a federal judge from office is not, however, to say that impeachment
must remain the exclusive mechanism of judicial discipline. Many forms
of discipline do not deprive a judge of the powers of his office, particularly the power to hear and decide cases. I do not accept some of the
broader assertions of Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion:
Under the Constitution the only leverage that can be asserted
against [a federal judge] is impeachment ....
[T]here is no
353 Id. at 84-85.

354 Mr. Justice Harlan filed a separate concurring opinion and argued that Judge
Chandler had not been deprived of his office; the Judicial Council had merely required
him to eliminate his backlog before being assigned new cases. Any attempt to characterize
the Council's action as a housekeeping matter, however, overlooks the Council's express
reliance on Judge Chandler's involvement as a defendant in civil and criminal litigation
and its reliance on his refusal to disqualify himself in certain cases. It also overlooks the
fact that Judge Chandler's backlog was less than that of other judges in his district.
Finally, this position overlooks the fact that, unless modified by affirmative action, the
Council's order would remain in effect after Judge Chandler had eliminated his backlog.
355 See Stolz, supra note 271, at 662.
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power under our Constitution for one group of federal judges
to censor or discipline any federal judge . . . . It is time
that an end be put to these efforts of federal judges to ride
herd on other federal judges. This is a form of "hazing"
having no place under the Constitution.3 5 6
Indeed, Mr. Justice Douglas himself gave a partial answer to these
assertions. The Justice declared that "if [judges] break a law, they can
be prosecuted,"3 57 and Mr. Justice Black added that "judges, like other
people, can be tried, convicted, and punished for crimes ... ."358 Unfortunately, these statements may not be entirely accurate, for the immunity that protects judges from civil liability for acts undertaken in
the performance of their official duties has occasionally been extended
to criminal prosecutions as well.359 Nevertheless, a judge's common law
immunity can be altered by statute, and the statements of Justices
Black and Douglas do seem accurate in the context of the problem
that they were discussing. Congress' power of impeachment does not
preclude the prosecution of a judge who accepts a bribe or otherwise
violates a criminal statute of general applicability.3 60
This article has argued that much judicial misconduct constitutes
contempt of court, a criminal act.3 61 Were a federal disciplinary tribunal empowered to punish judges for this offense, the tribunal's actions
would, I think, be valid even under the relatively stringent reading of
the Constitution suggested by Justices Black and Douglas. A tribunal
confined by the Black-Douglas view of the Constitution would, of
course, hold less power than many of the state disciplinary tribunals
created in recent years. Such a tribunal could not punish judges for
"conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the
judicial office into disrepute," 86 2 nor could it devise special standards
for judicial officers concerning stock and real estate ownership, the
356 898 US. at 186-37, 140 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
357Id. at 140.
358 Id. at 141-42 (Black, J., dissenting).
359 As the rule is usually stated, "[A] judge can not be held criminally liable for
erroneous judicial acts done in good faith ....
But he may be held criminally responsible
when he acts fraudulently or corruptly." Braatelien v. United States, 147 F.2d 888, 895
(8th Cir. 1945). Because most criminal statutes are confined by the requirement of mens
rea and do not purport to punish acts done in good faith, a judge's immunity from
prosecution for acts done in good faith is of little practical importance. See, e.g., McFarland v. State, 172 Neb. 251, 109 N.W.2d 897 (1961) (judge imprisoned for contempt
when he issued a writ of habeas corpus knowing that he lacked authority to do so).
360 See, e.g., United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 309
U.S. 664 (1940).
361 See text accompanying notes 274-77, 840 supra.
362 See CAL. CoNsr. art. VI, § 18(c)(2) (constitutional standard for censoring or re-

moving a judge from office).
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authorship of books, articles, and lectures, or other noncriminal
matters. Instead, the tribunal would enforce only criminal laws that

applied to judges on the same terms as other individuals. Moreover,
such a tribunal would not be able to remove a judge from office even
when the judge had engaged in criminal conduct; that power would
belong exclusively to Congress. Despite these restrictions, the Constitution does seem to permit the creation of a disciplinary system for
federal judges, a system that would be adequate for all but the most
severe cases of courtroom misconduct and that would have a significant
effect in these extreme cases as well.
C.

The Significance of Courtroom Misconduct by a Trial Judge in
Contempt Proceedings Against a Litigant or Attorney

Leonard B. Boudin has said of the "Chicago Eight" trial:
[A] fair evaluation... indicates that the defendants and their
lawyers intended a traditional approach, that of winning the
case, and of behaving firmly but with at least as good a be-

havior as typifies the criminal bar generally; and that they did
not intend to disrupt the processes of the court or to drive
the judge mad. The truth is that the defendants and their

counsel were literally shocked, driven by Judge Hoffman (with
the most charitable interpretation of the trial judge's behavior)
into an emotional response which they never intended, and
from which, I think, they never completely recovered. 363
Mr. Boudin's allegations raise a significant question: If the "Chicago
Eight" defendants and their lawyers did engage in what would other-

wise constitute contemptuous conduct, might this conduct be excused
by a showing that the trial judge had himself provoked it through his
3
own serious misbehavior? 6

363 Disruption, Discipline and Due Process in the Trial Court, 1 HUMAN RIG-TS, No.
2, at 132, 134-35 (July 1971) (proceedings of a symposium at the Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association, Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, St. Louis,
Mo., Aug., 1970). The trial of the Chicago Eight may suggest that misconduct by defendants
and defense attorneys sometimes arises from a tense interpersonal situation in which
the prosecutor and trial judge play leading roles. As Professor Harry Kalven concludes, "One
strong impression from the Chicago transcript is that we are watching a domestic comedy
where the . . . parties can't stand each other, can't escape each other and, above all,
can't let each other alone." Kalven, Confrontation Comes to the Courtroom, 1 HUrMAN
RIGHTS 10, 21 (1970). Professor Geoffrey Hazard adds, "To some who observed the
'Chicago Eight' trial, one of the appalling things was the noisome patter of witticism
and jokes by Judge Hoffman. It is conceivable that if he had consistently avoided playing
it like a minstrel show, the defendants might not have played it like a circus." Hazard,
Securing Courtroom Decorum, 80 YALE L.J. 433, 446 (1970). Compare Sir Francis Bacon's
statement, "Judges ought to be more learned than witty," quoted in Myers v. George,
271 F.2d 168, 172 (8th Cir. 1959).
264 On the appeal of his contempt conviction, defendant Bobby G. Seale has presented
the following argument:
[R]egardless of whether appellant was actually guilty of contempt, the extensive
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There have been surprisingly few rulings on the validity of the
argument that judicial misconduct is-for one reason or anothersignificant in evaluating whether a litigant or attorney has been guilty
of contempt. Nevertheless, on the infrequent occasions when this argument has been presented, the courts have almost invariably rejected
it. As early as 1895, the Indiana Supreme Court considered a case in
which a trial judge had called a defense attorney's voir dire examination of a prospective juror "absurd." The defense attorney objected
that the judge was "trying to belittle him before the jury, and that
he would not suffer such a remark to pass without a vigorous protest."
The trial judge then repeated his remark, and the defense attorney
said, "If that language was used towards me on the street, I would
know how to answer it, but here in court I cannot." The Indiana
Supreme Court affirmed the defense attorney's citation for contempt
of court and said:
The contention of appellant that the language of the judge
was provoking, and also detrimental to the interest of his
client, and hence he ought to be excused for his conduct, can
have no weight or consideration from a legal standpoint. The
wrong of the judge, if any, cannot justify the misconduct of
counsel....
It is the imperative duty of an attorney to respectfully
yield to the ruling and decisions of the court, whether right or
wrong, reserving the rights of his client by proper and necessary
exceptions thereto. A remedy for the correction
of the court's
3 65
errors, if any, is fully provided by law.
and egregious pattern of misconduct engaged in by the prosecuting attorneys,
the trial judge, and the United States Marshals under the judge's supervision
requires that the charges be dismissed. . . . Courtroom decorum, and an atmosphere in which guilt or innocence might have been soberly and fairly tested,
were so shattered by the prosecutor and the judge as to leave appellant little
opportunity to work further harm.... Punishment of all the offending parties
might be appropriate but that of course is not possible. Neither the judge, the
prosecuting attorneys nor the marshals are before this court or are likely to be
brought here. . . . Where, as here, all the offending parties cannot be subject
to punishment, and particularly since those who escape are all public officials, the
principle of equal protection and elementary notions of fairness demand that
appellant not alone be punished.
Brief for Appellant at 155-56, 167-69, United States v. Seale, No. 18246, 7th Cir. (decision
pending).
The other "Chicago Eight" defendants have argued:
It is reactions to things said or done by the judge or prosecutor that form the
basis for these charges. . . . In considering the ultimate tests of contempt, i.e.,
obstruction and intent, a judgment cannot be made without relating the judge's
conduct to the facts which are charged as contempt. The law does not assume
litigants are imperturbable and that reactions to judges' misconduct exposes them
to punishment without regard to the judge's contribution.
Brief for Appellants at 93-94, In the Matter of Dellinger, No. 18294, 7th Cir. (decision
pending).
365 Dodge v. State, 140 Ind. 284, 288, 89 N.E. 745, 746 (1895).
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Other state courts have reached the same conclusion, and their language has been equally forceful. 66
The United States Supreme Court touched briefly upon the issue
in 1952 in Sacher v. United States.3 67 The principal question in Sacher
was whether the trial judge had been so deeply involved in the controversy that he should have disqualified himself and permitted a different judge to consider whether the defendants, attorneys in a highly
publicized prosecution of Communist Party leaders, were guilty of
contempt. Over the dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme
Court affirmed the contempt citations. The case is significant partly
because both Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the majority suggested that
judicial misconduct could not excuse contemptuous behavior by litigants or attorneys.
Justice Frankfurter said of the record in Sacher:
Truth compels the observation, painful as it is to make,
that the fifteen volumes of oral testimony in the principal trial
record numerous episodes involving the judge and defense
counsel that are more suggestive of an undisciplined debating
society than of the hush and solemnity of a court of justice.
Too often counsel were encouraged to vie with the court in
dialectic, in repartee and banter, in talk so copious as inevitably to arrest the momentum of the trial and to weaken the re36 8
straints of respect that a judge should engender in lawyers.
Despite his obvious displeasure with the trial judge's performance,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter emphasized that this performance could not
affect the defendants' guilt or innocence of the charge of contempt:
Counsel are not freed from responsibility for conduct appropriate to their functions no matter what the encouragement
and provocations. Petitioners must be held to strict accountability for the contempts they committed. 369
The majority apparently agreed. It said:
Of course, it is the right of counsel for every litigant to press
his claim .... But if the ruling is adverse, it is not counsel's
right to resist it or to insult the judge-his right is only respectfully to preserve his point for appeal .... These are such

866

White v. State, 218 Ga. 290, 294, 127 S.E.2d 668, 671 (1962); Spencer v. Dixon,
248 La. 604, 613, 181 So. 2d 41, 44 (1965); Gautreaux v. Gautreaux, 220 La. 564, 574, 57
So. 2d 188, 191 (1952); State ex. rel. Cheadle v. District Court, 92 Mont. 94, 100, 10
P.2d 586, 588 (1932).
307 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
368 Id. at 38 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
369 Id. at 59.
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obvious matters that we should not remind the bar of them
370
were it not for the misconceptions manifest in this case.
Two years later, in Offutt v. United States,371 the Court considered another case in which a trial judge had held a defense attorney
in contempt after a trial in which the judge had allegedly exhibited
bias and hostility toward the defense. On this occasion the Court ruled
that because the trial judge had "permitted himself to become personally embroiled with the petitioner," the contempt charge should
have been resolved by a different judge.
The Court noted that it was not concerned with "the reprehensibility of petitioner's conduct and the consequences which he should
suffer."3 72 When the case was retried in accordance with the Court's
instructions, however, the significance of the trial judge's misconduct in
evaluating the defendant's guilt became a central issue. The district
court adopted the conventional position that "improper conduct of a
trial judge can never justify or excuse contemptuous conduct of a trial
3 73
attorney."
The district court's opinion in Offutt revealed the remarkably
authoritarian attitude apparent in many judicial rulings on this issue.
To support its position, the court cited such works as Roberts Rules
of Order, The Rules of ParliamentaryPractice, In Silence I Speak:
The Story of CardinalMindszenty, and the writings of Gerard Groote,
"one of the most learned men of the Fourteenth Century." The court
also relied upon
a fundamental principle of life which has been exemplified
Socrates accepted the death
by the great trials in history ....
sentence of the popular court of Athens ... . Jesus of Nazareth stood mute before Pilate . .. and His silence redounds

to His glory .... Sir Thomas More's farewell to his judges is
another magnificent example of the transcendency of meekness over injustice. Chief Justice Coke himself set an example
for lawyers when he was called to account before the king.
When the king persisted in the assertion of his arbitrary will,
would not become me further
Coke appropriately replied, 3"It
74
to argue with your Majesty.
The Court's position therefore seemed to be that trial judges were en370 Id. at 9.
371348 US. 11 (1954).
372 Id. at 17.
373 United States v. Offutt, 145 F. Supp. 111, 114 (D.D.C. 1956).
374 Id. at 114-15.
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titled to roughly the same respect as the Kings of England and that
lawyers less noble than Christ, Socrates, and More might fairly be
37 5
imprisoned.
Although the orthodox view is that judicial misconduct has no
bearing on whether a litigant or attorney is guilty of contempt, a
number of decisions offer a tentative basis for arguing against this
conclusion. As this article has noted,3 76 appellate courts have usually
been quick to disregard prosecutorial misbehavior induced by the
misconduct of defense attorneys. The courts have insisted that this "provoked" misconduct could offer no basis for the reversal of a criminal
conviction. A few decisions have even extended this analysis to cases
of judicial misconduct. 377 In these cases, the courts have not insisted
that two wrongs can never make a right, that the only proper remedy
for courtroom misconduct lies in a respectful appeal through established legal procedures, and that "counsel are not freed from responsibility for conduct appropriate to their functions no matter what the
encouragement and provocations." The contrast between decisions involving prosecutors and those involving defense attorneys seems to
illustrate a bias in our legal system.
Cases involving prosecutors have, of course, arisen in a different
procedural context from those involving defense attorneys. Because the
.state cannot appeal an unfavorable trial verdict in a criminal case,
questions of defense misconduct have ordinarily come before appellate
courts in the context of contempt proceedings. And because trial judges
seem virtually never to hold prosecutors in contempt, 378 questions of
prosecutorial misconduct have arisen primarily in appeals from criminal convictions. This difference in procedure merely intensifies one's
suspicion of bias. In contempt proceedings, as in other criminal actions,
375 The court's outlook became even more evident when it described the difference
between the courtroom and "the playing field":
fIjhe trial judge represents the sovereignty of the law and government. If the
man who is counsel meets the man who is judge on the street, in the marketplace, or on the playing field, they are governed by the same rules of conduct
that apply to other men, and they stand on equal footing. When in court, however, the judge, even in spite of human frailties, still is the representative of
the sovereign power, and counsel must always respect the office whatever his
opinion of the incumbent. Two wrongs do not make a right, and misconduct
cannot obliterate other misconduct....
Contempt usually occurs when self-assertion predominates over respect for
authority. There is no place for selfishness or pride in the service of the law.
... A man is never more upright in mind and heart than when he genuflects
before the Supreme Authority.... Humility forestalls humiliation.
Id. at 114, 117.
376 See text accompanying notes 107-18 supra.
377 See text accompanying notes 237-39 supra.
378 See text accompanying notes 164-69 supra.
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the principal issue is the culpability of the defendant. If an alleged
contemnor was subject to intense provocation-provocation that might
have caused even a "reasonable man" to forget himself and to do as
the defendant did-that circumstance certainly seems relevant in assessing his culpability. When a criminal conviction is appealed on grounds
of prosecutorial misconduct, however, the central issue is not the prosecutor's culpability but whether the defendant was tried in the careful,
impartial atmosphere that promotes confidence in the accuracy of his
conviction. Prosecutorial misconduct may have had a prejudicial impact even when it arose out of a trying interpersonal situation and, on
balance, does not seem seriously culpable. The courts have, however,
seemed less ready to explore the issue of provocation in cases in which
it was directly relevant than in cases in which it was not-apparently
because one set of cases has typically involved prosecutors and the other
defense attorneys.
Both lines of cases surely cannot stand.37 9 Indeed, my own view is
that because provocation is more relevant in contempt than in conven50
tional appellate proceedings, neither line of cases should survive.3
So
long, however, as the courts continue to excuse prosecutorial misconduct on grounds of provocation when they review the fairness of criminal convictions, their action will lend support to defense claims of
provocation in the context of contempt proceedings. The discrimination
the courts have manifested in the past and continue to manifest today
is unconscionable.
A recent decision by an intermediate appellate court in Illinois
suggests a second line of attack upon the conventional view that judicial misconduct is irrelevant in evaluating whether a lawyer or litigant
is guilty of contempt. People v. Pearson3 81 grew out of a bizarre prosecution for perjury. When the defendant in the case applied for a
driver's license, he correctly listed as his "residence address" the place

379There is, however, a conceivable distinction: When a defendant seeks reversal
on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct that was provoked by misconduct on the part
of the defense, it might be maintained that he is attempting to profit from his owit
wrong. A trial judge does not "profit" in the same sense when he punishes a defendant
or defense attorney for misconduct that he himself has induced. This distinction is, of
course, highly conceptual; I doubt that any unbiased observer would find it persuasive.
38oTo a very limited extent, I think that appellate courts should consider defense
misconduct in evaluating claims of prosecutorial misconduct, even when the courts' task
is simply to review the fairness of criminal convictions. The significance of defense misconduct has, however, usually been greatly exaggerated. See text accompanying notes
107-13 supra (setting forth more precisely the revisions that I propose in the "provocation doctrine" that appellate courts have applied in cases of prosecutorial misconduct).
For the changes that I propose in the traditional doctrine that provocation is irrelevant
in contempt prosecutions see text preceding note 398 infra.
38198 Ill.
App. 2d 208, 240 N.E.2d 837 (1968).
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where he lived. When he applied for a certificate of title for his automobile, he listed as his "legal address" the service station where he had
worked for the past fifteen years and where he received most of his
mail. No other evidence suggested that the defendant had, in the language of the statute, "with fraudulent intent use[d] a false or fictitious
'38 2
name or address ... in an application for a certificate of title.
The Illinois Appellate Court noted that throughout the trial the
trial judge had manifested an intense hostility toward the defense:
Commencing with the first witness, the court shut off [the defense attorney's] questions (which we consider to have been
proper ones) characterizing them as "ridiculous"; general objections of the State's Attorney (in the form of "I object")
were frequently and consistently sustained without any specification of grounds even when requested by [the defense attorney]; on occasions, the court foreclosed answers to [the
there having been
defense attorney's] questioning without
83
any objection by the State's Attorney.
The defense attorney finally told the court, "I think your bias is showing." The court held him in contempt.
Judicial bias, although an unpleasant subject, is a relevant legal
issue, and an attorney should be permitted to discuss it. In my opinion,
the defense attorney's statement in Pearson,far from being contemptuous, was proper argument. The appellate court, however, rejected this
contention and resolved the case on a different ground. The court said
of the defense attorney's remark:
This is not a proper statement for him to have made, and he
should be ashamed of having made it, but we do not consider
it an adequate basis for a contempt citation. We do not mean
to be holding that provocation by the court may, in itself, be
a defense to a contempt action, nor that contemptuous conduct directed at a court's rulings is excusable merely because
the court may have been in error. Nevertheless, we do believe
that these factors may be taken into account in ascertaining
the state of mind of an alleged contemnor ....

[W]e do not

consider [the] comment about bias, made in the heat of battle,
382 ILL. RF-v. STAT., ch. 95Y2, § 4-103(d) (1965), as amended, ILL. ANN. STAT., ch.
95V2 § 4-105(d), (f) (1971). The Illinois Appellate Court commented:
[I]t completely surpasses our understanding how, on this evidence, the Secretary
of State could have initiated prosecution . . . how the State's Attorney could
have elected to proceed with the case ... and, finally, how the court could have
found the defendant guilty of perjury.
98 Ill. App. 2d at 207-08, 240 NE.2d at 339.
383 Id. at 211-12, 240 N.E.2d at 341.
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lem and simply does not care whether or not his behavior wi]
have obstructive consequences? Might it even be enough that the a
leged contemnor does not pause to consider the consequences of hi
behavior when a reasonable man would do so?
In resolving these questions, the courts should consider the vague
ness of most contempt statutes. In general, the narrower and mor
"specific" the requirement of intent, the less substantial the problem c
notice becomes.88 7 In the main, however, courts have failed to examin

the variations and combinations suggested by these issues and hay
talked about intent without explaining what they meant. Until on
knows what mental element is required for a contempt citation, it i
very difficult to discuss the potential significance of provocation ii
negating this intent.
This article is not the place for an extended discussion of th,
principles of construction that should apply in defining the menta
element of particular crimes,38 8 and I will therefore not attempt th,
difficult task of determining when provocation can properly negate ai
alleged contemnor's intent. Nevertheless, the foregoing analysis doe
supply a basis for some general observations. As the term is commonl,
used in the criminal law, intent denotes an awareness of actions
circumstances, and consequences. It does not denote an emotional de
tachment. Provocation may occasionally affect a person's awareness o:
cognition as well as his emotions, and in these relatively unusual cir
cumstances, provocation might be significant in evaluating a person,
intent. A defendant might, for example, testify quite believably tha
he did not stop to think when the trial judge unexpectedly insultec
him. He did not consider that he was in a courtroom before a jury
His response was a reflex action-just what he would have done ii
someone had insulted his professional integrity in his office or home
or on the street. This testimony should negate the mens rea required
for a contempt citation.
Ordinarily, however, even in cases of serious provocation, an al.
leged contemnor would probably remain aware of what he was doing,
where he was, and what the likely consequences of his behavior would
be. In these circumstances, to say that provocation negated the required intent would be a fiction. When an alleged contemnor has
responded to outrageous provocation, criminal punishment may seem
Cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
classic treatment of the general problem is MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02,
Comment (rent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
387

288 A brief but

HeinOnline -- 50 Tex. L. Rev. 727 1971-1972

972]

CO URTROOM MISCONDUCT

to have been "calculated to embarrass, hinder or obstruct a
court in the administration of justice."38 4
A contempt citation ordinarily requires a showing of culpable inant,.8 5 but the courts have failed to define the mental element of this
rime with precision. The issue is commonly one of statutory construcion, and its resolution might vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
4evertheless, contempt statutes often define the crime in terms of beLavior that obstructs the administration of justice, and these statutes
resent at least three sets of issues with regard to the problem of mens
ea: (1) Must the alleged contemnor's intent extend to the consequences
)f his conduct? Must he be aware not only of what he is doing but
iso of the likelihood that this conduct will have some obstructive
ffect?3 16 (2) Must the alleged contemnor recognize, or at least advert
o, the legal significance of his behavior? If he knows what he is doing
.nd what the probable effect will be, can he nevertheless be excused
f he remains unaware that this effect could constitute "obstruction"
n the eyes of the law? When contempt statutes are drawn in terms
vhich include large, unresolved "legal" components, is ignorance of
he law a built-in excuse? (3) What kind of intent must the alleged
:ontemnor have toward each element of the offense? Must he, for exLmple, desire to obstruct the administration of justice, or is it enough
hat he knows that his conduct will certainly have an obstructive effect?
Aight it be sufficient that the alleged contemnor adverts to the prob384 Id. at 211-12, 240 N.E.2d at 341-42.
385 See, e.g., United States v. Sopher, 347 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1965); In re Boasberg, 286

kpp. Div. 951, 143 N.YS.2d 272 (1955); State v. Goff, 228 S.C. 17, 88 S.E.2d 788 (1955).
3ut see Albano v. Commonwealth, 315 Mass. 531, 535, 53 N.E.2d 690, 692 (1944).
Some opinions suggest that wrongful intent is not required when the defendant's
:onduct is "per se contemptuous," when the conduct involves "gross discourtesy," or
vhen it is "dearly blameworthy." These same opinions, however, require proof of
ntent when the defendant's conduct is ambiguous. See, e.g., Offutt v. United States, 232
..2d 69, 71-72 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 988 (1956); Maclnnis v. United States,
191 F.2d 157, 160 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 953 (1952). Although the language
)f the opinions seem to me unfortunate, the import of the decisions is clear: a defendant's
Ictions may be so outrageous that no other evidence of contemptuous intention is retuired; it is only when the defendant's behavior does not "speak for itself" that indepenlent proof of intention becomes necessary. The decisions therefore indicate the kind of
.widence necessary to establish a culpable intent; they should not, despite their imprecise
language, be read to dispense with a requirement of intent in "gross" or "blatant"
;ituations.
386 Consider, for example, the basic federal statute which proscribes "misbehavior of
my person in [the court's] presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration
f justice." 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1970). One possible construction of this statute would be
Lhat an intent to "misbehave" is a prerequisite to conviction, but that "obstruction"
;imply defines the point at which the resulting harm becomes serious enough that
=riminal penalties are appropriate. My own inclination would be to reject this construction
and to require a "specific intent" to misbehave and an "advertance to the risk" of ob;truction. Cf. MoDEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3), (4) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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inappropriate. In most cases, however, the reason is not that the defendant has failed to realize what he was doing but simply that the
defendant's conduct does not seem seriously culpable in light of the
behavior of others and the emotional stresses inherent in the situation.
The significance of provocation should therefore be faced directly. Obstructive behavior may not merit criminal punishment even when its
author has the intent necessary to support a contempt citation. Fortunately, a few decisions do suggest that the courts have gone too far in
their assertions that provocation can never be a defense to a charge of
contempt.
In re Abse,38 9 for example, arose when an attorney asked a trial
judge to sign an ex parte order. The judge not only refused but said
that by submitting the order the attorney had attempted "a dirty
trick" and had engaged in "a sneaky practice." The attorney asked for
a chance to be heard, but the judge said that he would hold the attorney in contempt if the attorney took any more of his time. When
the attorney persisted, the judge proved as good as his word.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the trial
judge's insulting remarks justified the attorney's refusal to remain silent.
Since the attorney was personally charged by the judge with unprofessional conduct and no appeal could be taken from the judge's remarks,
the attorney could answer the allegations even by direct defiance of
the judge's order not to speak.3 °0
If, as Abse suggests, there should be a right of reply to personal
accusations from the bench, this right should not turn on whether the
trial judge's statements were made during a pretrial hearing or during
the trial itself. The court emphasized in Abse that no appeal could
be taken from the judge's remarks, but in a sense, there can never
be any appeal from a trial judge's remarks. If a criminal trial ends
in conviction, the defendant may of course urge reversal on the
ground that the trial judge's statements tended to prejudice the
jury. The defense attorney, however, who may have been the subject of the trial judge's comments, has no right to appeal; there
can be no appeal if the trial ends in acquittal; and even when an appellate court does consider the trial judge's statements, it will not be
primarily concerned with their truth or falsity. Thus the personal interests that the court sought to vindicate in Abse are unlikely to be
affected by the appellate process, and Abse should be read to support
389 251 A.2d 655 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
SOO Id. at 656.
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the right of a lawyer to answer all direct judicial insults-even, when
necessary, by statements that in other contexts might be contemptuous.3 9'
A more striking illustration of the significance of judicial provocation is Schlesinger v. Musmanno.39 2 Just before the trial of an apparently routine tort action, Judge Michael A. Musmanno asked the
parties and witnesses to leave the courtroom. He announced, "Before
we proceed in this case, I want to interrogate, and my duties require
that I interrogate, counsel for the plaintiff." The judge then asked the
following questions:
Hymen Schlesinger, have you ever been a member of the
Communist Party?
Are you a member of the Civil Rights Congress?
Did you or did you not form the Civil Rights Congress, which
is a Communist Front Organization, in your office-the Civil
Rights Congress which is part of the movement to overthrow
the Government of the United States by force and violence?
The plaintiff's attorney replied that the judge lacked jurisdiction to
ask these questions. The attorney then attempted to leave the courtroom, but on the judge's order, court officials restrained him. Judge
Musmanno finally concluded the episode with a dramatic pronouncement:
We have formally adjudged you unfit to try a case in this
Court as of today, morally unfit. You do not possess an allegiance to the United States. There is sufficient evidence before the Congress of the United States that you made statements that you believe in overthrowing the Government of
the United States by force and violence. Because of these
sworn statements, which you do not see fit to reply to, we declare you morally unfit to try a case in this courtroom. Therefore, the case will be continued until you purge yourself of
contempt or until your client is able to obtain another lawyer.
Judge Musmanno later filed an order directing the lawyer to appear
before him on a charge of contempt. The deputy sheriff who attempted
to serve this order reported that the lawyer glanced at it, said that he
was not accepting any service of process today, threw the paper to the
ground, and walked away.393 Judge Musmanno then issued a bench
391 See also Cooper v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 291, 859 P.2d 274, 10 CaL, Rptr.

842 (1961) (establishing an attorney's right to object to judicial conduct even when the
attorney has been ordered to remain silent).
392

867 Pa. 476, 81 A.2d 316 (1951).
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warrant for the attorney's arrest. By the time the attorney was arrested
and brought before the court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had,
at the behest of the attorney, directed Judge Musmanno to show cause
why a writ of prohibition should not issue against him. In addition,
the supreme court had stayed all proceedings in the trial court pending
its disposition of the prohibition action. Although Judge Musmanno
had notice of the supreme court's orders, he once again conducted a
hearing and held the attorney in contempt.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that because Judge Musmanno's various orders were "null and void," the attorney's refusal to
obey them could not constitute contempt of court. 94 The supreme
court also advanced an alternate basis for its decision. The court held
that a trial judge's misconduct could itself excuse behavior by an attorney that in other circumstances would be contemptuous:
Inasmuch as Judge Musmanno insisted upon questioning petitioner on matters which had no bearing whatsoever on the
issue then before him, and even restrained petitioner when he
sought to leave the court room, the Judge is not in a position
to complain because of petitioner's remarks to him or the
manner in which he made them, nor could the Judge properly hold petitioner in contempt for so doing. A judge's conduct should always be above reproach. 395
Abse and Musmanno were not cases in which a lawyer sought to
excuse abusive or insulting courtroom remarks by pointing to a "general atmosphere" of provocation or to judicial misconduct that had
occurred long before. In both cases, the alleged contempt consisted of
an immediate and direct response to a specific act of misconduct. Moreover, this response did not take the form of insult; for the most part,
the alleged contemnors merely refused to obey invalid judicial orders.
The significance of Abse and Musmanno may, however, extend beyond
this narrow description of their factual circumstances. When a lawyer
is confronted with an utterly tyrannical judge, the proposition that
he should respect the judicial office whatever his opinion of the incumbent may seem unduly abstract. A judicial robe cannot always
work unlimited magic. The norms of civilized conduct do vary with
the circumstances, and in ordinary human terms, a Musmanno is simply not entitled to the same respect as a Solomon. It would be par393 The attorney contended that the deputy sheriff's description of this incident was
seriously exaggerated.
394 Cf. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
395 867 Pa, at 482, 81 A.2d at 319.
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ticularly unfair to expect a litigant, unaccustomed to the refinement
of courtroom proceedings, to respect the judicial office whatever the
teaching of his senses. Moreover, judicial abuse can be so extreme that
even a lawyer might be forgiven for thinking of the judge as nothing
more than an obnoxious human being.
Although one may be tempted to conclude that contempt is exactly what Judge Michael A. Musmanno deserved, I would not suggest that misconduct by a litigant or attorney could ever be an appropriate response to misconduct by a trial judge. Abusive courtroom behavior is something that I would rather not have happen whatever the
circumstances; in that respect, my sentiments correspond to those that
lie behind the traditional view that provocation cannot excuse contemptuous behavior.
Criminal punishment need not, however, be society's response to
everything that should not happen. The question is one of excuse,
not justification. It may be unfortunate that a litigant or attorney has
exacerbated a courtroom conflict by responding to abuse with abuse,
but before society imposes criminal punishment and escalates the conflict further, it should consider exactly what function it expects the
criminal punishment to serve.
That a lawyer or litigant has behaved inappropriately when confronted with judicial abuse offers little indication that he would disrupt the trial process in ordinary circumstances. The lawyer or litigant
who responds to judicial provocation therefore does not pose the same
danger to the legal system as the lawyer or litigant whose misconduct
lacks a direct and understandable impetus from within the courtroom.
Moreover, when serious judicial misconduct has eliminated any possibility of a fair trial, the misconduct of a litigant or attorney is likely
to add only marginally to the ultimate harm. Because a new trial is
almost inevitable, this misconduct cannot affect the tangible interests
at stake in the case at hand. Although the lawyer's or litigant's misconduct may tend to diminish even further the dignity and effectiveness of the judicial system, the danger seems far less substantial than
that presented by most cases of contempt of court.
More important than the question of harm is the question of how
much the criminal law should expect of mankind. As Professor Herbert Packer has observed, the best course may sometimes be to coexist
with evil. We trivialize the criminal sanction when we apply it to everything that we dislike.396 If, in a case of extreme provocation, the
396 H. PAcKER, THE LmTs oF THE CRiMINAL

SANcri

(1969).
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temptation to respond in kind might have overpowered even a man
of reasonable patience and firmness, use of the criminal sanction seems
inappropriate. It would be self-defeating to apply the term criminal
to everyone save a handful of saints.
By hypothesis, the trial judge-who the American Bar Association
has said "should be the exemplar of dignity and impartiality" 39 7-has
yielded to the emotion of the moment. It may therefore be unreasonable to expect something better from a lawyer charged with partisan
responsibilities or from a litigant who probably lacks the trial judge's
training and sophistication and who undoubtedly has more at stake.
Considerations of equality also suggest that judicial misconduct
should be weighed in determining whether to punish a lawyer or litigant for contempt of court. This article has described various mechanisms for disciplining trial judges and has argued that it might even
be appropriate to cite abusive judges for contempt. Nevertheless, it is
probably unrealistic to expect any mechanism of judicial discipline to
operate as effectively as the summary procedures that the courts now
possess for disciplining unruly lawyers and litigants. Moreover, the
significance of judicial provocation must be resolved today even in
jurisdictions which lack any workable machinery for punishing judicial misconduct.
When a trial judge's misconduct is at least as serious as that of
the person who has been charged with contempt, it is incongruous to
send the alleged contemnor to jail and to ignore the trial judge's behavior on the ground that it is irrelevant to the only question of discipline likely to come before a court. This disturbing spectacle can
only reinforce the view that power and position place some men above
the law. Although the inequality could be remedied by subjecting
trial judges to the same discipline as litigants and attorneys, the more
effective and more practical course might be to recognize judicial
provocation as a defense to a charge of contempt.
The principle of equality can of course be extended too far; I
would not maintain that all wrongdoers should go free whenever one
wrongdoer has gone free. The issue, however, is one of systematic discrimination based on the different positions occupied by lawyers, litigants, and trial judges. In practice, the trial judge's position, which
should carry special responsibilities, carries special immunities. Although it is common to maintain that trial judges have an even
greater obligation to preserve courtroom dignity than do other par397 ABA, JuDGE's RoLE, supra note 102, standard B.I. This standard was approved by
the House of Delegates of the ABA in summer, 1971.
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ticipants in the trial process, the trial judge's responsibility is usually
enforced with moral exhortations while the responsibility of lawyers
and litigants is enforced with jail sentences.
This inequality probably does not present a significant constitutional problem; it almost certainly would not violate the equal protection clause to punish a lawyer or litigant whose conduct merited
punishment simply because a trial judge whose conduct also merited
punishment might escape any sanction. Still, the concept of equality
does offer a valid reason to consider judicial misconduct in deciding
whether a lawyer or litigant should be punished for contempt.
Every judicial error should not, of course, excuse misconduct by
a litigant or attorney; the trial judge's misconduct should have been
serious enough that even a man of reasonable patience might have felt
a strong temptation to respond improperly. Moreover, even in extreme
situations, judicial misconduct should not excuse a response that was
disproportionate to the provocation.
The issue does not yield to exact rules. I contend only that a court
should not blind itself to the potential significance of judicial provocation. It should consider all the circumstances and should withhold criminal punishment when the alleged contemnor's conduct does
not seem seriously culpable. A court should not fear that justice to
the defendant in the case at hand will seriously injure judicial authority; judges should not sacrifice their own sense of fairness to formal,
abstract notions of courtroom propriety.
III.

CONCLUSION

Chief Justice Warren Burger told the American Law Institute in
the spring of 1971:
[C]ivility is relevant to judges, and especially trial judges because they are under greater stress than other judges, and subject to the temptation to respond in kind to the insolence and
bad manners of lawyers. Every judge must remember that no
matter what the provocation, the judicial response must be
judicious response and that no one more surely sets the tone
and pattern for courtroom conduct than the presider. 398
The national publicity that followed the Chief Justice's address did
not focus upon his brief remarks about trial judges. Instead it empha398 Remarks of Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, at Opening
Session, American Law Institute, May 18, 1971, at 8-9 (unpublished).
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sized his characterization-or, perhaps, his caricature-of one sort of
defense attorney:
[A]ll too often overzealous advocates seem to think the zeal
and effectiveness of a lawyer depends on how thoroughly he
can disrupt the proceedings or how loud he can shout or how
close he can come to insulting all those he encounters-including the judges ....

At the drop of a hat-or less-we find

adrenalin-fueled lawyers cry out that theirs is a "political
trial." This seems to mean in today's context-at least to some
-that rules of evidence, canons of ethics and codes of professional99 conduct-the necessity for civility-all become irrele3
vant.
It is unfortunate that the public has come to associate courtroom
disruption almost exclusively with the misconduct of defendants and defense attorneys. In my view, the misconduct of prosecutors and trial
judges presents a much more pressing problem. Although it probably
occurs no more frequently than defense misconduct, it is far more
damaging to the cause of justice.400 Although a defense attorney is
an officer of the court, his primary responsibility is to his client. Society does not expect from him the same degree of impartiality that it
does from officials who are paid by the state. Nevertheless, the mechanisms that currently exist for disciplining defendants and defense
attorneys are quick and powerful, while existing mechanisms for disciplining prosecutors and trial judges are largely ineffective. The political philosophy and personal lifestyle of the "new left" have apparently captured public attention and obscured the central problem. It is time to regain our perspective, to consider the system as a
whole, and to seek a fairer balance.
399 Id. at 4. Compare Reinhold, "Bar Study Notes Little Court Disorder Despite Burger
Views on Unruliness," N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1971, at 1, col. 3.
400 See text accompanying notes 10-15 supra.
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